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1 NTROI)U( TION
In 1915, Turkey was known as the "sick man of Europe" due to its substan-
tial economic, social, political, and military problems., Soon, World War I
would bring Turkey's problems into larger relief and usher in a transition
from fading Muslim empire to secular nation.2 During this same time, Tur-
key engaged in one of the largest campaigns of mass murder in history: an
attempt to eradicate its Armenian population-"genocide" by any definition
of the word.' Between 1915 and 1920, an estimated 1.5 million Armenians
were slaughtered, with another million deported during death marches
I See R. R. PAIMER & JOEL C()ITON, A HIsToRY OF, THI. MO)DERN WORIL) SINCE
1815, 655 (8th ed. 1995) ("Since the loss of Hungary in 1699 the Ottoman Empire
had entered on a long process of territorial disintegration" but "was still huge" in
the nineteenth century). The phrase "sick man of Europe" derives from a reference
made by Czar Nicholas I of Russia to Sir George Hamilton Seymour, the British
ambassador to St. Petersburg in 1854. The Czar's comment was made in the con-
text of the declining Ottoman Empire and negotiations between the Russian Empire
and its European counterparts to extend their spheres of influence after the dissolu-
tion of the Ottoman state. See, JOsEPlH H. WILLSEY, HARPER's BOOK OF FAC-TS: A
CLASSIFIED HISTORY OF Ti WORLD 703 (Charleston T. Lewis ed., 1895); Vernon
J. Puryear, New Light on the Origins of the Crimean War, 3 J. MoD. His. 219 (Jun.
1931 ). See infra Section 1. H. See also JANI BuRBANK & FRIEDERI'K CoopF.R. EM-
PIRIS IN WORLD HISTORY: POWER AND T[ril POILITI(S OF DIFFiRENCE 128-43 (2010)
(describing generally the rise and structure of Ottoman Empire).
See PALMER & COLTON, supra note 1, at 654-61, 718-22. 791-93. See also
SEAN MCMEEKIN, THE BERI.IN-BAGIIDAI) ExPRiss: TiiF 0-I-rOMAN EMPIRI, AND
GERMANY'S BID FOR WORLD POWER chs. 3. 18 (2010) (outlining the collapse of
Ottoman Empire and development of modern Turkey during World War I era);
ERSIN KALAYc(IO6 U, TURKISH DYNAMICS: BRIDGE, ACROss TROUBL[I) LANDS 15-
43 (2005): Osman Okyar, Atatirk's Quest for Modernism, in A'IATUJRK AND TIlE
MODRNiZATION OF' TURKY 45-53 (Jacob M. Landau ed., 1984) (describing the
historical context of Turkey's transition to secularism).
3 See SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBI|M FROM HELL": AM!'RICA AND TH. AGE OF
GiFNOClDr, ch. 3 (2002) (summarizing large scale carnage from intentional Turkish
government actions against Armenian population): PALMER & COLTON, supra note
1, at 710-12; GRIGORis BAILAKIAN, ARMENIAN GOLGOrA: A MEMOIR 1F THE AR-
MENIAN GENOCIDE, 1915-1918 (2009) (originally published in 1922) [hereinafter
ARMENIAN GOLGOTHA] (detailing horrors inflicted on Armenian population by
Turkish government): ARNOLD TOYNBIl, ARMENIAN ATROCITIES: THE MURDER OF
A NATION (1915). The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of" the Crime of Genocide describes genocide as "acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group." See
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, U.N. G.A. Res. 260, U.N. G.A.O.R., 3d
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out of the collapsing Ottoman Empire and into the Syrian Desert.4 Sub-
merged even more than these atrocities, which have largely been down-
played in the public and historical consciousness,5 is the refusal of life
Sess., 179th Plen. Mtg. at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). The term is generally
credited to Raphael Lemkin, who observed that genocide was
[a] coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction
of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the
aim of annihilating the groups themselves. Genocide has two
phases; one: destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed
group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the op-
pressor. This imposition, in turn, may be made upon the op-
pressed population which is allowed to remain, or upon the
territory alone, after removal of the population and colonization
of the area by the oppressor's own nationals.
RAPHAEL LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN OC'UPiEf EUROPE: LAWS OF OCCUPATION, ANAL-
YSIS OF GOVERNMIENT, PROPOSALS FOR RDRI.olss 79 (1944). See also POWER, supra.
note 3. at 43:
The perpetrators of genocide would attempt to destroy the politi-
cal and social institutions, the culture. language. national feelings,
religion, and economic existence of national groups. They would
hope to eradicate the personal security, liberty, health, dignity.
and lives of individual members of the targeted group. A
group did not have to be physically exterminated to suffer
genocide.
4 Sec infra text accompanying notes 106-107: MCMEEKIN, supra note 2. at chs. 2,
3, 6, I1 & 14 (reviewing Genocide and long history of Turkish abuse of Armeni-
ans): TANER AKCAM, A SHAMEI.Ii. Aci: Till ARMENIAN Gi NOCIDE AND TIlE
QO 1S I]ON OF TJRKISll RiFSPONSIBILITY chs. 1-2. 4-5 (2006) (pro\ iding background
of Genocide); Powi R, supra note 3, at 7-16 (noting large scale of Genocide):
PAiMl IR & COLTON, supra note 1, at 711 (noting large scale of Genocide): VAIIAKN
DADRIAN, THE HISTORY OF THIL ARMENIAN GENOCIDE: ETHNIC CONFLICT FROM
THE BAILKANS T1) ANATOLIA TO 1-111 CAIJCASI'S (1995); ARM-NI.\N GOLGoTil \.
supra note 3; VISCOUNT BRYCI, Tillr TREATMENT ()1 ARMENIANS IN THE ()TTOMAN
EMPiwi 1915-16 (1916): TOYNI3E, supra note 3.
5 Sec infra Part IV Although within academia the Armenian Genocide is largely
accepted as historical fact, wider political recognition and social ax\areness has
been slower to develop due to strong opposition and pressure from the Turkish
government. See AKCAM, supra note 4, chs. 6- 10 (noting failure of attempts to hold
culpable Turks and Turkish institutions accountable for Genocide due to various
political factors): P I R BAILAKIAN, 'II r BURNING TI(;RIS: THi ARMENIAN GENO-
CIDE AND AMERICA'S RESPONSIE 375-90 (2003).
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insurers to pay death benefits to the beneficiaries of their Armenian
policyholders!'
Ironically, the life insurers werc not Turkish companies but Ameri-
can, British, German, and Western European insurers, commercial citizens
of nations that officially opposed the Genocide.7 But these insurers were not
above taking opportunistic advantage of the mass killing and its disiuption
of law, order, and record keeping, as well using the practical barriers the
Genocide erected to collection of insurance benefits." For decades, the lost
insurance of the Genocide victims was seemingly forgotten.9 Only in the
late twentieth century did the issue surface, spurring legislative efforts and
litigation to collect on the policies and vindicate the rights of victims and
beneficiaries."' Despite aggressive defense by the insurers and their allies,
many of the descendants of the victims (and, of course, their fee-earning
lawyers) eventually achieved some belated compensation, settling with one
insurer for more than three million dollars.I' But an insurer that refused to
budge from its position of no compensation initially prevailed in a judicial
' See infra text accompanying notes 115-17. In addition, Armenians residing in
Turkey with funds on deposit in Turkish financial institutions suffered financial
injury. After these Armenians in Turkey were killed in the genocide of 1915-1920,
much of their deposited wealth was seized by the banks or the Turkish government.
See HRAYR S. KARAGUEULZIAN & YAIR AtlRON, A PERFECT INJUSTICE: GLNOCIDI.
AND THEFT ()1 ARMENIAN WEALITi 99, 113 (2009); UNITED STATEs OFIICIAL
RECoRDS ON THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE 1915-1917, 150-51 (Ara Sarafian ed.
2004). An examination of the conduct of Turkish banks is beyond the scope of this
paper, which focuses on efforts to collect insurance from policies sold to victims of
the Armenian Genocide.
7 Among the Western companies doing business in Turkey were major insurers
such as New York Life, Equitable Life Insurance of New York, L'Union de Paris,
Assicurazioni Generali de Trieste, Commercial Union of London, Union Assurance
Soc., Metropolitan Life, Liverpool and London and Globe Ins. Co., Le Phoenix
Autrichien de Vienne. Star of London, La Federale and companies now part of
Munich Re, the largest insurer in the world. See infra text accompanying notes 233:
Letter from the Spectator Company to G. P. Ravndal, U.S. Consul-General (Nov.
14, 1912) (on file with author); see also KARAGUEIUZIAN & AURON, supra note 6, at
23.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 115-17 (describing insurer response to the
genocide).
9 See infra text accompanying notes 218-19.
10 See infra Part II.
l' See infra text accompanying notes 232.
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decision that is both legally flawed and morally embarrassing. 2 Although
the appellate court panel subsequently reversed itself, a subsequent en banc
Ninth Circuit reinstated the initial decision striking down the California
law. This decision essentially stands for the absurd proposition that that
U.S. foreign policy required termination of the attempt to collect rightfully
owed insurance benefits because the mere mention of the words "Armenian
Genocide," was bothersome to Turkey.' 3
This article describes the long and treacherous path of the effort to
hold insurers to contractual promises made a century ago in a now-bygone
world.' 4 Part I describes the Ottoman Empire and its Armenian popula-
12 See infra text accompanying notes 249-62 (describing Munich Re litigation and
defenses based on deference to presidential power over foreign policy, a foreign
policy perceived as insulating Turkey from any U.S. litigation it might find
offensive).
13 See infra text accompanying notes 233-305, describing reversal of initial deci-
sion in Munich Re litigation and remaining review of the case.
14 Although life in the nineteenth century for the Armenian minority in Ottoman
Turkey was hardly an "Eden," the analogy suggested by this article's title is apt in
that the Genocide of 1915-20 to a large degree cast the Armenian population out of
its homeland either through expulsion. flight, or death. The resulting diaspora ex-
tended to scores of countries on four continents as the Armenians of the Ottoman
Empire (also known as "Western" Armenians as distinguished from Armenians
residing in what is now the Republic of Armenia) and nearby portions of the former
Soviet Union attempted to reconstitute their lives, leaving little practical opportu-
nity to also seek enforcement of their life insurance contract rights, an effort that
took shape only decades later. See Robert Mirak, The Armenians in America, in
Tiii ARMENIAN PEOPLE FROM ANCIFNT TO MODERN TIMES VOL. 2, 389 (Richard
G. Hovannisian ed., 1997): DAVID MARSHALL LANG, THE ARMENIANS 120-36
(1981). For the victims of the genocide and their dependents, it was indeed a rough
road out of whatever Eden they had previously had in Turkey.
The exile from Eden metaphor (Genesis 2:15-3) is not perfect, but neither
has it applied literally in the other instances in which it has been used. See PAUL W.
KAHN, OUT OF EDEN: ADAM AND Evi AND Till PIROBLEM OI Evii, (2006) (using
Bible story as springboard for philosophical analysis of nature of cvil): RIcHARD
DAWKINS, RIvI;R OUT 0w EIIN: A DARWINIAN VIEW OF LIEE (1995) (defending
evolutionary theory as source of creation as alternative to biblical tale of Adam and
Eve); Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YAI I. L. J. 1669 (1985) (comparing adjudica-
tion to a dispute resolution Eden left behind by some adherents of alternative dis-
pule resolution movemcnt): EAGLIS, LONG ROAD OUr OF EDE-N (Lost Highway
Records 2007) (seventh studio album of prominent American rock band Eagles
employs Eden inetaphor as illustration of path of human travails) (not to be con-
fused with albums by the American Gospel group Out of Eden. which made several
albums on the Gotee Records label in the 1994-2000 period).
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tion,' - life insurance activity during the early twentieth century,1'6 and the
horrific Armenian Genocide 7 that provided insurers with the opportunity
for fraudulent gain. Part 11 tells the story of the Armenian battle for justice
through legislation' 8 and litigation" ' designed to call insurers to account,
including the technical but pitched battles waged by insurer defense coun-
sel. Part IIl describes and assesses the outcome of the battle and compares it
to the similar struggle waged by the descendants of the Jewish victims of
the Nazi Holocaust -  and to the efforts of torture victims to obtain recom-
pense.2 These episodes reveal litigation, despite its imperfections, to be a
potentially powerful corrective force even in the face of adverse financial
and political opposition. But they also reveal the degree to which overly
brittle legal concepts and undue judicial deference to outside political forces
can needlessly impede the pursuit of justice. In addition, the story of the
quest for the Armenian insurance payments demonstrates the occasional
ability of a small group of advocates and victims to launch an effort of far-
reaching consequence. The story of the Armenian insurance litigation, de-
spite being one of mixed tenuous success, is also a story of courage and
persistence in the face of long odds.
I. TH- LONG ROAD TO THE GENOCIDE INSURANCE LITIGATION
A. The Millet Sy'sten of Non-Geographic Ethno-Religious
Administrative Autonomy
Since its inception in 1299, the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic state that
governed its affairs through the legal framework of the sharia principles as
recited by the Prophet Mohammed. 22 The Islamic sharia drew distinctions
between Muslims and non-believers who resided within the jurisdiction of
15 See infra text accompanying notes 22-39.
16 See infra text accompanying notes 79-85.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 95-110. There appears to be no established
convention as to whether "genocide" should be capitalized when referring to the
Turkey's attack on its Armenian population. We elect capitalization, just as many
or most refer to the "Jewish Holocaust" or "Nazi Holocaust" in light of the similar
nature and magnitude of the crimes.
IS See infra text accompanying notes 205-209.
'9 See It.D.
20 See III.B.3.
21 See IIl.B.
22 AKCAM, supra note 4, at 20-22; WILLIAM YALE, THE NEAR EAST: A MODERN
HISTORY 19 (1968); see PHILLIP K. HITTI. THE NEAR EAST IN HISTORY: A 5000
YEAR STORY 329, 336 (1961).
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the Ottoman Empire.23 Based on this principle of Islamic law, the sharia did
not apply to non-Muslims. 24 Thus, these non-Muslim communities of vari-
ous Christians and Jews were organized into non-geographic religious com-
munities, known as millets, which provided a bureaucratic system of
governance. 25
Each millet was recognized through a Sultanic letter of permission
and administered its own affairs, including areas of life that extend beyond
religion. 26, The millets often regulated issues such as inheritance, education,
divorce, guardianship, and adjudication of disputes between non-Muslims. 27
The millet system in one sense created a government within a government
where the leadership of each millet was mainly chosen from and by the
clergy of that religious community. 28 Those leaders served as intermediary
liaisons with the Ottoman government.
23 AKCAM, supra note 4, at 23; YALt-, supra note 22. at 19.
24 Id.
25 AKCAM. supra note 4, at 23. Accord, PALMER & COLTON, supra note 1, at 654-
55 (describing millet system but not using that term). The three major millets were
the Greek Orthodox, Armenian, and Jewish millets. The Greek Orthodox millet
encompassed Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians. Romanians, Macedonians, Vlachs, and
others. Other Christian religious groups such as Armenian Catholics and Armenian
Protestants were later authorized by the Sultan to form separate millets. The millet
system was later reformed to allow laymen to share authority with religious leaders.
See Hagop Barsoumian. The Eastern Question and the Tancimat Era, in THE AR-
MENIAN PEOPLE FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TINIi.s Vol. II 175, 182-83 (Richard
G. Hovannisian ed., 1997). Although the millet system superficially seems to have
provided some autonomy for the religious minorities, it did not counter-balance
their inferior treatment by the authorities as well as the society. MAR' MANGIUIAN
TARZIAN, THE ARMENIAN MINORITY PROBLEM 1914-1934 30 (1992): SARKIS
ATAMIAN, TIn: ARMENIAN COMMUNIFY: THE HIsTIORIA[. DEVELOINlENT Of A So-
(IAI AND II)tOL(OGICAI CoNFIiCT 22-23 (1955).
26 AKCAM, supra note 4, at 23. See also Bruce Masters. Christians in a Changing
World, in Tll; CAMBRIDGE HISTORY (r TuRKIY VOL. III 272 273-74 (Suraiya N.
Faroqhi ed. 2006).
27 AKCAM, supra note 4, at 23. Fatma Mtige G6 $ek, Ethnic Segmentation, Western
Education, and Political Outcomes: Nineteenth -Century Ottoman SocietY, POETICS
TODAY Autumn 1993, at 507, 514-15.
28 See ARYIII SiIMuIII iViIZ, Tiii, JI\ws Ol TEil 01 ITOMAN EMtPIRE IN IHE LATE
FIF'TEENTH AND Till, SIXTILNTII CiNIrVRII S 15-18 (1984). These relorms were im-
plemented during the Tanzimnat era where the Ottoman government sought to reor-
ganize and reformn the empire. See Barsoumian, supra note 25, at 175, 182-83.
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Furthermore, the millet system also served to isolate and limit the
religious minorities when dealing with their Muslim counterparts.2 9 For ex-
ample, these non-Muslim communities were forbidden from practicing their
religions in any way that would disturb Muslims. , () These limitations illus
trate the uneven exchange in the quasi-contract between the Ottoman rulers
and the non-Muslim religious minorities. Although the milles were semi-
autonomous, they had little power or influence in the relationship with the
central government and ruler t
B. The Ottoman Empire and Its Armenian Population
The condition of the religious minorities in the Ottoman Empire depended
largely upon the relations with foreign nations as well as the ruling Sultan's
predispositions. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, the Ottoman Em-
pire struggled with the European powers to maintain its influence in Eastern
Europe, and specifically in Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece.12 In response to
the weakening power over these provinces, the Sultan issued two major
decrees of reform. The reform or lanzimat33 decree of 1839, and the similar
decree of 1856, provided for inter-religious equality and secularization.
21 See Mige G6ek, supra note 29,at 507, 514-15.
30 AKCAM, supra note 4, at 24. See Roderick Davison, Turkish Attitudes Concern-
ing Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century, AM. HIST. REv. 59
(1954) 846-47.
31 AKCAM, supra note 4, at 24. The non-Muslim minorities were also referred to
as "gavour." meaning non-believer, and carried a negative connotation. See ROB-
iiT F MELSON, REVOLUTION AND GENO(CIDE 44 (1992).
32 See, AKCAM, supra note 4 at 27; DADRIAN, supra note 4, at 7. See generally
McMELiKIN, supra note 2. The European powers recognized that the ethnic and
religious tensions between Ottoman authorities and non-Muslim communities of-
fered an opportunity to influence and expand their sphere of influence. When upris-
ings and rebellions developed, European powers and the Russian Czar would
intervene. See DENNIS P Ht JPCHICK, Tii BALKANS: FROM CONSTANTINOPL- -O
COMMUNISM 238-39 (2002).
33 This period of reform in the Ottoman history is largely referred to as the
"Tanzimat Era' and began in the middle of the eighteenth century. Although the
Arabic word tanzimat directly translates to "'reorganization," the underlying objec-
tive for these treaties was to preserve the Ottoman Empire by incorporating, at least
superficially, Western principles. See HUPCHICK, supra note 32, at 238-39. See also
DONALD BLOXHAM, THE GREAT GAME OF GFNO('U)I: IMPIRIALISM, NATIONALISM,
AND Till. DESTRUCTION OF TtlE O-I-OMAN ARMFNIANS 31 (2005).
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Some scholars comment that this increasing movement toward religious
equality and tolerance was shocking to the Ottoman cultural identity.3 4
Despite these foreign and mainly western efforts to elevate the sta-
tus of religious minorities, Armenians were subjected to various discrimina-
tory restrictions.3" The most significant was that Armenians were forbidden
from bearing weapons, as well as serving in the military, which made them
a population vulnerable to violence. 6 Further discrimination took place in
the taxation process. Tax collectors would collect poll taxes, property taxes,
and other taxes several times a year from both rich and poor, in what
amounted to functional extortion of the Armenian populace. 37
The most difficult burden for Armenians to endure, particularly in
the eastern provinces, was the obligation of providing winter quartering to
the nomadic Kurds, their families, and flocks.3 8 Knowing that Armenians
34 AKCAM, supra note 4 at 32: PALMI'R & COLTON, supra note 1, at 654-66. See
also BL OXIIANs. supra note 33, at 31, 39.
31 See CHIRISTOPIIER J. WALKER, ARMILNIA: SURVIVAL ()I A NATION 88 (1990);
MANGIGIAN TARZIAN, supra note 25. at 30. See also BENJAMIN BRAUDI & BER-
NARD LEWIS, CHRISTIANS AND JEWS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRi: THE ARABIC-SPEAK-
IN(; LANDS VOL. II 14 (1982) (discussing references made to Christians and Jews
by the Ottoman authorities and the maintenance of distinctions between the Muslim
majority and non-Muslim minorities).
36 See, WAL KER supra note 35. at 88:BI OXHAM, supra note 33. at 39-40: P,\il ER
& COLTON, supra note 1, at 655.
37 See, WALKER supra note 35. at 88. In the Anatolian provinces where the Arme-
nian population was mostly rural, local, and regional authorities imposed a variety
of taxes. Property taxes were applied to houses, pasture-land, farm-animals, and
fruit-bearing trees. There were also administrative taxes for births. marriage, death,
transfer of goods, use of roads, and in some areas. a general tithe. See Barsoumian,
supra note 25, at 175, 193. One British author provides detailed examples of the
treatment of the non-Muslim population through taxation methods imposed by the
central Ottoman government and the implementation of taxation methods by the
rcgional authorities. See E. J. Dillon, The Condition of Armenia, Tilt CONTEMI'O
RARY REVIEW, Vol. 68 153-89 (Aug. 1895), reprinted in THE ARMENIPN Ms-
SAC ES 1894-1896: BRIrISII MEDIA TESIMONY 231, 241 (Arman J. Kirakossian ed.
2008).
38 See. WALKER supra note 35, at 88: BIOxII, SM. supra note 33, at 39-40. See
JI RI;MY SALT, IMPFRIAIISM, tVANGtI ISM AND THE; 0'1I'OMAN ARMENIANS, 1878-
1896. 24 (1993): BILOXIIAM, supra note 33. at 39-40. Ironically, the Kurds, like the
Armenians, are a distinct cthnic group spread across several countries in the
Mideast/Ccntral Asia, frequently a minority group oppressed by a different ethnic
group. But bccausC they were Muslim, they enjoyed greater favor with the Ottoman
government than did the Armenians.
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were forbidden from bearing arms, the nomadic guests would often take
advantage of their hosts' dwellings, possessions, wives, and daughters. 1
Faced with these conditions, the Armenian population, like other rCligious
or ethnic minorities, understandably sought out opportunities to obtain
greater financial security, even if it could not guarantee physical safety.
Savings in foreign banks and the purchase of life insurance were natural
responses to the perils faced by Armenians in Turkey.
C. The Russo-Turkish Wars and the Armenian Question
Although the Ottoman Sultan was challenged by the demands for reform by
all religious minorities, the Armenian Question became more defined after
The fall of the Soviet Union and the U.S.-Iraq- Kuwait Gulf War provided
some greater semblance of homeland for both groups in that the Republic of Arme-
nia emerged from the collapse of the Soviet empire and the Kurds of Northern Iraq
were granted substantial autonomy through U.S. enforcement of a no-fly /,one
prohibiting attacks by the Iraqi army then controlled by Saddam Hussein. See Peter
Rutland. Democracy and Nationalism in Armenia, 46 Ei JR-AsIA STuD. 839 (1994)
(describing "process of political democratization" in Armenia that led to indepen-
dence from the Soviet Union); DAVlD MC'DoWALL, A MODERiN HISTORY Of rTH
KtiRDs 277, 374-76, 390-91 (3d rev. ed. 2004) (describing the establishment of the
Kurdish "safe haven," subsequent U.S. enforcement efforts, and the "relative na-
tional freedom from 1991 onwards" of the Iraqi Kurds). The 2003 U.S-Iraq War
subsequently deposed Saddam and led to greater Iraqi Kurdish autonomy. See
David Romano, IDP and Refugee Return in Post-Saddain Iraq. 18 J. Rii G EE
SiTJD. 430, 443 (2005) ("After twelve years of autonomy, Iraqi Kurds are less will-
ing than ever to live at the convenience or mercy of Arabs. "). Kurds in Turkey
and Iran, however, continue to be a largely disadvantaged minority. See generally
MU'DOwALL, supra this note, at 277-80 (discussing Iran) and at 444-46, 449-50
(discussing Turkey). But see Sebnem Arsu, Step by Step, Gulf Between Turkey and
Kurds Narrows, N.Y. TiMis, Jan. 10, 2011, at A8 (discussing Turkey's historical
difficulties with the Kurds, but noting Turkey's recent steps toward reconciling
with the Kurds); DENISE NATALI, THE KURDS AND THE STATE: EvoI VING NATIONA[
IDENTITY IN IRAQ, TURKEY, AND IRAN 158-60 (2005) (noting more Kurdish pro-
gress in Iraq and Turkey than in Iran).
19 See FLORENCE MAZIAN, WHY GENOCIDE: TIlE ARMENIAN AND JEWISH EXPER-
iiEN( S IN PERSPIF('TIVE 10-11 (1990): BALAKIAN, supra note 5, at 41-43. The win-
ter quartering requirement of Kurdish nomads placed a heavy burden on the rural
population, by forcing impoverished families to serve the daily needs of their
"guests." and to endure the theft and looting of their few possessions as well as the
assault and rape of Armenian women without reprieve. See BLOXHAM, supra note
33, at 39-40.
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the four Russo-Turkish wars that took place between 1806 and 1877.40 In
the early nineteenth century, the Russian Czar sought to expand his sphere
of influence and geopolitical domination into the Balkans, the Black Sea,
and the Caucasus, and thus produce a pan-Slavic sphere. 4'
In 1853, Russia entered into war with the Ottoman Empire over
Crimea, a small peninsula in the northern part of the Black Sea. 42 The
French and British entered on the side of the Ottoman Empire, possibly out
of fear that the Russian sphere of influence would expand into Eastern Eu-
rope.4 - With the British military's assistance, as well as support from
France, Turkey prevailed. The peace treaty following the 1853 Crimean
War specifically promised more equitable treatment of Christians, but also
disallowed any further involvement in Turkey by foreign powers.4 4 This
exchange of promises effectively gave Turkey unchecked dominion over
the Armenians and other minorities, even though its struggle with Russia
and other Ottoman neighbors remained largely unresolved.
40 See BALAKIAN, supra note 5, at 36-37. As western European powers endeav-
ored to expand their influence and support toward minorities in the western prov-
inces of the Ottoman Empire (geographically located in present day eastern
Europe). the Russian Empire also sought to extend its control over the Black Sea's
Crimean peninsula. The continuing challenge by the Russians aligned the interests
of the Ottoman Sultan and the competing European powers. The large Armenian
population in the eastern provinces of Anatolia and in the south Caucasus region of
the Russian Empire raised geopolitical questions for all the powers involved. See
ARMAN J. KIRAKOSSIAN, THE ARMENIAN MASSACRES 1894-1896: BRITISH MEDIA
TESTIMONY 18 (2008).
41 See BALAKIAN, supra note 5. at 36-37: HIvri, supra note 22, at 342. See also
WALKI i, supra note 35, at 64. Despite their antagonism in the Crimean War, the
Russian and Ottoman Empires shared many characteristics. Specifically. both were
the Czar and Sultan govern autocratic states. respectively, who created a trickle-
down system of repression through a variety of taxation methods, as well as other
social restrictions. See MICHIAI MANN, ThE DARK SIDE OF DEMOCRA("': ExPL.\IN-
IN(; ErnINIC CiLEANSING 112-13 (1005).
42 Although scholars point to differing causes of the conflict, the Crimean War is
generally credited with ending one of the longest eras of peace in Europe and caus-
ing unfathomable suffering and loss for both civilians and states. See YAI E, supra
note 22, at 73; See also RoBiRTi B. EDGERTON, Di ATII OR GIORY : THE LEGACY OF
Till, CRIMEAN WAR 5-31 (1999).
41 See BAIAKIAN, supra note 5, at 37-38; HIrrl, supra note 22, at 342.
44 See BALAKIAN, supra note 5, at 38.
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In 1876, triggered by cries for autonomy and equality from Eastern
Europe, Russia again entered into war with the Ottoman Empire. 45 During
this battle, Czar Alexander II of Russia sent his forces across the Turkish
border with the specific agenda of guaranteeing the security of the Christian
minorities through occupation.Y' During this same time period, Bosnia, Her-
zegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and later Bulgaria also sought independence
from the Ottomans, opening a front in the western part of the empire.47 The
Russian military's movement across the border, and the occupation of the
eastern provinces that were heavily populated by Armenians provided some
breathing room from Ottoman oppression. 4
The final Russo-Turkish war ended with the San Stefano Treaty,
which would have granted autonomy to Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Herzegovina
while providing independence for Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia.49 It
also would have granted the Armenians protection in the form of a tempo-
rary Russian occupation that would remain until improvements and reforms
were implemented. 0 But the treaty was never implemented.
The European Powers, and the British in particular, were concerned
with the Treaty of San Stefano and the Russian occupation of the Armenian
territories because European trade passed through these territories on the
way to and from Persia (modern Iran).5 1 With these political and economic
15 See id.; McMF.FKIN, supra note 2, ch. 14; Hi, supra note 22, at 345. During
the second halt' of the 19th century, European society began to accept the concept
of the individual nation-stale over the large and multi-ethnic empire. Caught be-
tween the Hapsburgs, Russian Czar, and the Ottoman Sultan, the Balkan educated
and intellectual circles espoused an independent national identity for the state. As
such, the Balkan national movements developed out of these ideas. See HtJPCHI-'K,
supra note 32. at 275-88.
46 See BALAKIAN, supra note 5, at 38; MCMEEKIN, supra note 2, ch. 14; SIR ED-
WARD HERTSLET, THE MAP OF EUROPE BY TREATY, VOL. 4, 1875-1891 2598-99
(1891).
41 See BAIAKIAN, supra note 5, at 38; McMF[KIN, supra note 2. ch. 14; Richard
G. Hovannisian, The Armenian Question in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1914, in
THE ARMENIAN PEOPLE FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMEs VOL. 2, 206-207 (Rich-
ard G. Hovannisian ed., 1997).
41 See BAI.AKIAN, supra note 5, at 38. Hovannisian, supra note 47, at 206-207.
4,1 See BALAKIAN, supra note 5, at 38-39; HERTSI.IT, supra note 46, at 2685-
86;HUPCHICK, supra note 32, at 262.
50 See E. B. Lanin, Armenia and the Armenian People, THI-L FORTNIGHTLY REV.,
Vol. 54 258-73 (Aug. 1890), reprinted in THE ARMENIAN MASSACRES 1894-1896:
BRIISH MIEDIA TESTIMONY 67, 77-78 (Arman J. Kirakossian ed. 2008).
5I See BALAKIAN, supra note 5, at 38; HUPCHICK, supra note 32, at 266. The
geographic area that covers present day eastern Turkey, Armenia and northern Iran
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concerns at play, a new treaty was drafted in Berlin in 1878 that also ad-
dressed the Armenian Question, but not in a manner particularly salutary
for Armenians.
The Treaty of Berlin effectively nullified the promises and guaran-
tees of reform promised in the Treaty of San Stefano. 52 In the Berlin treaty,
promises were made, but the guarantor of implementation was the Sultan.53
The treaty required that two of the occupied Armenian provinces be re-
turned to Ottoman control without any Russian ground-level presence that
could guarantee the safety and security of the local population. 4 As one
author explained, the situation created by the Treaty of Berlin was essen-
tially "a classic case of having the fox guard the henhouse." 55
The Crimean Wars and the resulting treaties effectively defined the
problem that the Ottoman Sultan faced with the existence of the Armenian
population in the eastern provinces. This Christian population opened the
door to constant intervention and intrusions by the European and Russian
powers.
represents the ancient trade route of Marco Polo's "silk road" that connected Asia
to the Middle East and Europe. See MARCO POLO, THE BOOK OF MARCO POLO 39-
43 (Sir Henry Yule, trans., ed.. 1871); LALRI NC BERGREEN, MARCO POLO: FROM
VENICE I() XANADU 42-44 (2008).
52 See BALAKIAN, supra note 5, at 39-40. See also Mark D. Kielsgard. Restorative
Justice for the Armenians, Resolved: It's the Least We Can Do, 24 CONN. J. INT'L
L. 1, 5 (2008).
51 See BALAKIAN, supra note 5, at 39.
54 See SIR EmWIN PEARS. LIFE OF ABDUL HAMID 217-19 (1917).
55 See BALAKIAN, supra note 5, at 39. The far-reaching changes from the Treaty
of San Stefano to the Treaty of Berlin regarding the status and treatment of the
Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire deeply disappointed the Armenian
people around the world. The Armenian delegation at the Berlin Congress was
headed by Archbishop Mgerdich Khrimian. Upon returning from Berlin to Con-
stantinople. Archbishop Khrimian preached an often-remembered sermon describ-
ing his experience in Berlin through the metaphor of an Armenian barley stew
called, "herisa." He preached that the various Balkan representatives came to Berlin
with iron ladles to take their portions of the "herisa,'" but that the Armenian delega-
tion came forth with a paper petition that disintegrated into the stew, leaving them
with nothing. Archbishop Khrimian warned the Armenian congregation that they
must place any hope of liberation in themselves. (An English translation of the
serimuon is available at http:/armenianhouse.org/khrimyan-hayrik/loving-father.
html). See Hovannisian, supra note 47, at 211.
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D. The Massacres of 1895 and the Role ! Sultan Abdul Hamid I!
In the late 1890s, Sultan Abdul Harid 11, who later earned the name the
-Bloody Sultan," made every effort to quell the call for reforms and main-
tain the traditional administrative system of ethno-religious commtunities. 5s'
Despite the promises of reform and equality, the Armenian population liv-
ing in the eastern provinces, particularly agrarian peasants who inhabited
the remote highlands of Anatolia, continued to endure tax extortion, com-
pulsory winter-quartering of nomadic Kurds, as well as ethnically-moti-
vated violence and rape. 57
The Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin represented both the hope
for and disappointing reality of reform of the Ottoman Empire and the im-
plementation of western principles of equality, tolerance, and civil rights. -8
After suffering the empty-promises and consequences of the Treaty of Ber-
lin, the Armenian population began to organize resistance against local au-
thorities.59 For example, in 1891, grain farmers and ranchers in the region
of Sassoon resisted a system of double taxation, and after confrontation
were driven into the mountains by the local authorities.6 ' To quell this on-
going rebellion in Sassoon, the sultan eventually sent his military to burn
the villages.6'
56 See HFNRY MORGENIIiAU, SR., AMBASSADOR MORGENTHALI'S STORY304
(1918) (noting that the British Prime Minister William Gladstone "stigmatized"
Sultan Abdul Hamid II as "the great assassin"). In response to the reform move-
ment that developed under previous Sultans, Abdul Hamid II sought to restore au-
thority in his centralized government by brushing aside any constitutional right to
equality and a resurrecting repressive scheme based on the constant threat of mas-
sacre. See MANN, supra note 41, at 112-13; Edward S. Creasy, TIlE HISTORY OF
NATIONS: TURKEY 489-91 (1913).
57 See BAILAKIAN. supra note 5, at 53-55. See also Barsoumian. supra note 25. at
175. 193.
518 See MANN, supra note 41, at 112-13: P ARS, supra note 54 at 217-19.
59 See BAILAKIAN, supra note 5, at 55; MANN, supra note 41. at 119.
60 See BAILAKIAN, supra note 5. at 55: Richard Davey, Turkey and Armenia, FoRT-
NIGHTLY REVIEW, Vol. 62197-210 (February 1895) reprinted in THE ARMENIAN
MASSACRES 1894-1896:BRITISH MEDIA TESTIMONY (Arman J. Kirakossian ed.,
2008). See also Armenia and the Sultan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1894 (available at
http://query.nytimes.com/search/). The Sassoun massacre is largely viewed as the
precursor to Sultan Abdul Hamid II's larger massacres of the Armenian population
of Anatolia. which in and of itself, is the precursor to the Armenian Genocide. The
Sultan's attitude toward the Armenian population set the tone for increased intoler-
ance and extremism implemented by the Young Turk leadership.
61 See MEl SON, supra note 31. at 44. See also Turkey 's Mail Censorship: State-
inent Made by Porte Regarding Armenian Massacres. N.Y. TIMIs, Dec. 31, 1894,
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Similarly, in 1895, nearly two thousand Armenians began a march
from the Armenian Patriarchate to the Sublime Porte (Grand Vizier) to de-
liver a petition that protested the treatment of Armenians and the lack of
action by the central government in Constantinople. 62 This petition included
demands for fair taxation, freedom of public assembly, equality before the
law, and protection of life and property. 63 Additionally, the petition empha-
sized that the Armenian population sought implementation of the Treaty of
Berlin's promised reforms. As this public demonstration moved through the
available at http://query.nytimes.com/search/ I hereinafter Turkey 's Mail
Censorship 1.
62 See BAI AKIAN, supra note 5. at 58. Text of the Armenian Protest: Reforms the
Demand of Which Caused the Riot at Constantinople and Intervention of Powers,
N.Y. TIMi s, Nov. 10, 1895 (on file with author, Times archives): Fanatics in Stam-
boul; Agitators for Redress Made a Deliberate Provocation, N.Y. TIMi s, Oct. 2,
1895 (on file with author, Times archives).
63 See BAI AKIAN, supra note 5, at 58. See also DADRIAN, supra note 4. at 119-
120. The Armenian petition for reforms specifically included a demand for the
protection of women because of the widespread practice of Turkish and Kurdish
chieftains kidnapping and raping women and girls, forcing conversion to Islam, and
marriage to fellow tribesmen. A spotlight was shined on this gender-based harass-
ment, and the Ottoman state's condoning and even sponsoring this activity, in the
story of a fifteen year old Armenian girl named Gulizar from the village of Bu-
lanukh in the region of Moush. In this region, a Kurdish chieftain named Musa
Bey, who had influential connections throughout the Ottoman government, contin-
uously harassed and pillaged the local Armenian villages with the assistance of
hundreds of his tribesman. One evening in 1889, he and his cohorts attacked Bu-
lanukh, murdered dozens of Armenian men and boys and kidnapped the fifteen
year old Gulizar. Fed up with the continuous harassment of Musa Bey, the local
villages protested the loss of Gulizar until European and American foreign diplo-
mats finally intervened with the Ottoman authorities. After three months of being
held hostage and enduring continuous rape and abuse. Gulizar was restored to her
family and Musa Bey was brought to trial. In the first trial, the Ottoman court
acquitted Musa Bey. When foreign diplomats intervened again, Musa Bey wvas
lound guilty after a three year trial and exiled to Mecca for two years. Gulizar s
story spread throughout Europe and even became the subject of Gladstone's Letter
to the Daily Mail. Gulizar married Kcgham Kevonian, survived the Genocide, and
settled in Paris, France. See KARO SAStNI, PATMUT'IWN TARONi AsIIKnAIIRi 542-
545 (1957) (the author includes a facsimile copy of British Prime Minister Glad-
stone's August 27, 1889 letter to the Daily Mail): CHRIS-Oi'iiiR Di. BELLAGUIE.
R[.BEi LANI): UNRAVIA.MN iiil RIDDI oi HISTORY IN A TIRKISH TOWN 82
(2010). See also LivoN CHORMINASiAN, HAMABADKER ARt w, ii).Xi \YOTS 126-127
(1972); ARMINOlmi Ki;VONIAN, LE No(,cvs NoIREs i)o.p GUiIIZAR (2005) supra note
5, at 55. See also DADRIAN, supra note 4. at 120.
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streets of Constantinople, the authorities unleashed soldiers and police to
attack and massacre the protestors .64 These horrors, documented by foreign
diplomats, continued for more than a week in the broad daylight of
Constantinople.,"
A wave of Armenian massacres spread throughout the eastern prov-
inces from 1894 to 1895.66 With these massacres the Sultan earned his title
as the "great assassin," and provoked further international inquiry of the
Armenian Question .67 By 1896, estimates of the number of Armenians
killed ranged from 88 thousand to three hundred thousand.6
E. The American Protestant Missionary Movement-Education and
Liberalism
At the turn of the nineteenth century, the Christian missionary movement-
both Catholic and Protestant-spread throughout the world and entered into
the Ottoman Empire, a prime target.69 The American Protestant missiona-
ries, who hailed from well-known seminaries in New England, were in-
spired by their experience of Christian revival and sought to broaden the
movement beyond the American shores.70 Two young American missiona-
ries from the Andover Theological Seminary spearheaded this effort with
64 See BAI.AKIAN, supra note 5, at 55.
65 See id.
66 See Turkey's Mail Censorship, supra note 61. See also Appeals to Civiliation,
N.Y. TIMIs. Dec. 31, 1895, available at http://query.nytimes.com/search/. The
New York Times archives include hundreds of articles, including first hand ac-
coums, of Armenian massacres during this time period.
67 See MORGENTIIAU, SR., supra note 56, at 304 (Gladstone denounced Sultan
Abdul Hamid II as the "great assassin" in response to these atrocities). See also
Were Ordered by the Sultan: Charges That Armenian Massacres Were Designed by
the Porte, N.Y. TIMi s, Aug. 18, 1896.
68 See AK'AM, supra note 4, at 42: RICHARD G. HOVANNISIAN, Tiit, ARMENIAN
GENOCIDE: CULTURAL AND ETHICAL LEGA( ii s 4 (2007). Turkish scholar Taner Ak-
cam notes that Kaiser Wilhelm 11 believed the estimate of the number of people
killed as 80,000, while French and English reports estimated 200,000. The Arme-
nian patriarchate (the leadership of the Armenian millet) placed the number of mur-
der victims at 300.000. See AKCAM, supra note 4. at 42.
69 See AKCANI. supra note 4, at 42: SAl T, supra note 38, at 30. See also Thomas
Otakar Kutvirt, The Emergence and Acceptance of Armenia as a Legitimate Ameri-
can Missionary Field, ARMENIAN REV. VoL,. 37 Autumn 1984 at 7-32.
70 SALT, supra note 38, at 30; see also Kutvirt, supra note 69, at 9.
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an initial expedition through the region in 1810.71 Based on their report, a
formal foreign missionary movement was initiated by the Andover Theo-
logical Seminary and carried out by missionaries from Princeton, Yale,
Dartmouth, Middlebury, and Bowdoin.72 In an effort to provide support and
coordination, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions
["American Board"] governed this expansion, and put particular emphasis
on developing operations in the Middle East, India, China, and Africa. 73
In 1831, the American Board recognized that the original purpose
of converting Muslims and Jews was fraught with challenges, and decided
to shift the focus to evangelizing "degenerate churches of the East," specifi-
cally the Armenian, Greek, and Syrian Orthodox churches. 74 As United
States Ambassador to Turkey Henry Morgenthau noted, "Christian mission-
aries in Turkey were carrying forward a magnificent work of social service,
education, philanthropy, sanitation, medical healing and moral uplift." 75 By
the second half of the nineteenth century, the American Board was respon-
sible for twelve missionary stations, 270 outstations, 114 churches and 150
missionaries." ,
One of the most important achievements of the missionary move-
ment was the educational system that it established throughout the Ottoman
Empire to serve their new congregants. During this period, the missionaries
created 1,100 elementary schools, 132 high schools, and six colleges, with
the vast majority of students being Armenian. 77 This educational system
represented the missionary movement's effort to increase literacy and intro-
71 JOSEPtt L. GRABILL, PROTESTANT DIPI OMA('Y AND t-tji NEAR EAST:1810-1927
8 (1971). Samuel Newell and Gordon Hall were sent to the Far East to explore
communities that would be conducive environments for missionary work. In India,
Newell and Gordon interacted with the Armenian community and sent back reports
noting that the "'Armenian church may be rendered an important instrument in the
work of evangelizing the western part of Asia." See Kutvirt. sujra note 69, at 12-
15.
72 See GRABIII., supra note 71. at 8.
73 See id.; Suzanne Moranian, Bearing Witness: The Missionary Archives a.S Evi-
dence of the Armenian Genocide in THE ARMEINIAN GENOCIDE: HISTORY, POLITICS.
E-iHiCs (Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., 1992). Samuel Colcord Bartlett, HISTORICAL
SKIF( III 5 OF TIE MISSIONS OF Tin AMERICAN BOARI): TtIRKEY 11 (1972).
74 See GRABIIL, supra note 71, at 8.
75 Id. at 65.
76 See BAILAKIAN, supra note 5, at 25: see also ALAN PALMER, THE DtCIINI AND
FAI I- i111L OTTrOMAN EMPIRE 176-77 (1992).
77 Sce BAI AKIAN, supra note 5, at 25. See also MAL'OL.M V MAI.COi M, THE
ARMENIANS IN AMER IA 18 (1919).
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duce the democratic concepts of individual liberty, gender equality, individ-
ualism, and freedom from oppression.78
As literacy and education increased, and western ideas entered the
Armenian community's consciousness, the Armenian millet became more
vibrant and cognizant of its place in the Turkish Empire. Additionally, the
exposure to western culture created a natural affinity for America by these
Ottoman subjects, and played a role in the passage of emigrants from Tur-
key to the United States.
F Foreign Life Insurers Invade Turkey
In the late nineteenth century, as the concept of life insurance became more
socially acceptable in America, New York Life Insurance Company ["New
York Life"] expanded the scope of its business activities beyond the United
States, and opened regional offices in Europe.7 9 As part of this corporate
growth, New York Life, along with European insurance companies, ex-
panded into the Ottoman Empire to offer a life and fire insurance in a new
market.8 0
When New York Life came ashore in the Ottoman capital Constan-
tinople the company implemented its then-unique strategy of using agents
and sub-agents to promote their life insurance products on a one-on-one
basis with consumers.8! In the larger urban centers of Constantinople and
Smyrna, these life insurance agents were often American citizens living
78 See BALAKIAN, supra note 5, at 27-29.
79 See JAMS MONROE HIJDNUT, HISTORY OF rH NEW-YORK LiF[ INSURANCE
COMPANY, 1895-1905 173 (1906). New York Life Insurance Company was
tunded in 1845 and quickly established itself as one of the nation's most promi-
nent insurance companies. The expansion into the European market began with
New York Life's construction of buildings in the European capitals. The com-
pany's first European building was built in Paris in 1882-84. The company's fi-
nance committee had recommended this purchase based on the increased income
being generated from the business on the European continent. In 1876, New York
Life had $374,300 in income from Europe, which later increased to $1,384,190 in
1882.
80 See Marootian et al. v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 99-cv-12073 (C.D. Cal. filed
Nov. 1999), PLTF 0316-0317 (on file with author).
81 See Viviana Zelizer. Human Values and the Market: The Case qf'Life Insurance
and Death in 19th Century America, AM. J. Soc., Vol. 84, No. 3 (Nov. 1978), p.
591-610. New York Life enjoyed early success in the life insurance business due to
its person-to-person marketing technique. Although secular, agents selling insur-
ance were often seen as "missionaries" reaching out to ordinary Americans to assist
in financial planning.
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abroad.8 2 But in the "interior" parts of the Ottoman Empire, in smaller cities
and towns like Harput, Van, and Bitlis, the vast majority of New York life
sub-agents were native Armenians, as well as some Greeks.83
As life in the Ottoman Empire was organized into ethno-religious
communities, these sub-agents naturally turned to their relatives, friends,
fellow-church-goers, and compatriots as a market for this new financial
planning product. Many of the individuals who purchased life insurance
came from a variety of backgrounds and trades including grocers, teachers,
shopkeepers, merchants, housewives, cobblers, and clergy.84 However, the
overwhelming majority were urbanized people whose families were depen-
dent on the breadwinner's wage-earning income.85 Having moved away
from the economic self-sufficiency of the agricultural and rural lifestyle and
being under constant suspicion by the local and national Turkish authorities,
Armenians and Greeks were the perfect customers. Based on the historical
circumstances, these communities appear to have sought financial security
and wealth protection mechanisms to compensate for the precarious state of
affairs in the Ottoman Empire, becoming comparatively large purchasers of
insurance.
In the early twentieth century, opposition to Sultan Abdul Hamid
II's control over the Ottoman Empire continued to grow, primarily in the
form of minority, nationalist, and left-wing groups who requested demo-
cratic reforms. But with the growing and hungry market, New York Life
was willing to overlook ethnic friction, inhospitable authorities, and politi-
cal unrest.
82 See Letter from John G. A. Leishman, American diplomat serving in Turkey. to
Mr. Hayes, American Legation in Constantinople (August 26, 1902) (on file with
authors).
8 1i.
11 See Marootian Settlement Insurance Policy List. ARMENIAN INSURANCE SEIT-
TLEME NT FuNI).('OM, http://web.archive.org/web/2006042205 1258/http://armenian
insurancesettlemnentl'und.com/PolicyList.pdf (last \ isited Mar. 19. 2012) (accessed
by searching for "http://armenianinsurancesettlementfund.com/PolicyList.pdf' in
the Internet Archive Wayback Machine). See Armenian Insurance Settlement Fund.
Policyholders List. http://www.armenianinsurancesettlementfund.com/PolicyList.
pdf (last visited June 17, 2009). The list of more than three thousand Armenian
policyholders found in the corporate archives of New York Life and marked "'do
not destroy" included occupations. Most, if not all, of the policyholders were urban
tradesman (e.g., cobblers, tailors, and ironmongers) or shopkeepers.
85 See also PA MI, & (& CIiON, siipro note 1-, Zeli/cr. supra note 81, at 597.
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G. orld War I and the Young Turk.s
The Sultan's continuing repression of his subjects led to the "Young Turk"
Revolution of 1908, \hich promised a democratic and constitutional gov-
ernment that included the participation and representation of all minori-
ties. ' However, the nationalist leaders of the Young Turk Revolution soon
abandoned these dernocratic ideals and began to push out of leadership the
liberal-minded supporters of the revolution. 87 This shift was partly moti-
86 See DADRIAN, supra note 4, at 179: YAILE, supra note 22. at 159-60. See also
MCMI. KIN, supra note 2, ch. 3, AKCAM, supra note 4, chs. 3, 4. The group became
known as the "Young Turks" because of both their age and their objective of
change from the Ottoman hierarchy to one more receptive to modern values and
government systems. See PAIMER & COL TON, supra note 1, at 657 (in reaction to
Sultan's resistance to modernity and oppression, "some tens of thousands of Young
Turks, the activists of the reform era before 1876, or their children and successors,
lived in exile in Paris, London, or Geneva, plotting their return to Turkey and ven-
geance upon [Sultani Abdul the Damned.").
87 DADRIAN. supra note 4, at 180-81, YALE, supra note 22. at 169. Ironically, but
perhaps symptomatically (in view of the centrality of the Young Turks' role in one
of the world's great human rights crimes and the degree to which the world has
largely forgotten the Armenian Genocide), the term "Young Turk" is one with a
generally positive connotation in the United States. Technically defined as -'an in-
surgent or a member of an insurgent group esp. in a political party" or "one advo-
cating changes within a usually established group" (see MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
NINTH COLLEGIArI.. DICTIONARY 1374 (10th ed. 1996)), the term is often identified
with younger persons seeking to shake up an excessively stodgy establishment by
disregarding older, worn-out, or excessively proper lolkways. For example, irrever-
ent athletes challenging the conventional wisdom in their sports are often referred
to as "Young Turks." See, e.g., Sports: Basketball, Nrw YORK MAGAZINE, Mar. 27,
1995. at 134 ("Press-box weenies waxing about Michael Jordan returning to the
game [of basketball] to rein in the hot-headed Young Turks who bring the play-
ground to the hardwood have it all wrong."). Boston Bruins star center Derek San-
derson, the NHL's 1968 Rookie of the Year, was nicknamed "Turk" in part because
of his similarity in appearance to Turkish nationals but also because of his irrever-
ent ways, particularly an inclination to party hard despite the physical demands of
playing a professional sport. See Pat Jordan, The Vita's Still Dolce, But
Hockev's Chief Nonconjbrnist and Big Spender, Derek Sanderson of the Bruins,
Tastes Life in the Minor Leagues, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 7, 1974. at 24-25
("He was a firebrand who aroused the fans and, off the ice, a character who made
lively newspaper copy -just the kind of athlete to fill an arena."): DEREK SANDER-
SON, I'VE GOT TO BE ME (1970) (autobiography in which Sanderson glories in
Young Turk image); STAN FiscriER, THE BURLY BRUINS: HOCKEY'S TEMPESTU-
Otis Ti.\m 19, 66-73 (1971) (featuring photographs of Sanderson on the ice). See
also ELLEN JOAN POLL OCK, TURKS AND BRAHMINS: UPHEAVAL AT MILBANK,
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vated by the need to appeal to the conservative Turkish population con-
cerned with preserving Islamic authority and superiority in the Ottoman
Empire. The Young Turk leaders embraced an aggressive version of Islam
in order to gain credibility and popularity that would secure their political
position and a new form of dictatorship."8 Led by Talaat Pasha, Enver Pa-
sha, and Jemal Bey, the Young Turk government set to work on purging the
country of Armenians who occupied a strategic geographic area and were,
as Christians, considered a disloyal minority. 9
The Ottoman Empire, under the governing authority of the Young
Turks, joined the Central Powers by entering World War I in October
T\\ I F : WALL SIRI- I's GENTLI AIEN TAKE OFF TiEIR GLovI.s (1990) (describing
generational division at venerablc New York law firm Milbank Tweed Hadley &
McCloy in which Young Turk partners are generally painted as positive forces
trying to modernize the firm even if somewhat at the cost of collegiality and lifes-
tyle); Jonathan Glater, Joseph H. Flom, Pioneering l, awver in Mergers and Acqui-
sitions, Dies at 87, N.Y. TIMi. s, Feb. 24, 2011 at A24, col. 1 (term is used with
positive connotation regarding famous attorney who built Skadden Arps law firm
by bucking the legal and business establishment and creating situation in which
"major corporations . . . bypassed their own legal advisers and turned to young
Turks like Mr. Flom at Skadden and [celebrated mergers and acquisitions special-
ist] Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz."). And, of course, Kemal
Ataturk, the penultimate product of the Young Turk movement. is generally well
regarded in the West for making Turkey more secular and xestward-looking. See,
e.g., PALMER & COLTON, supra note 1, at 791-93 (text widely used in American
high school history courses) (crediting "cnergetic drive" of Ataturk and folloxcirs
for creating modern, secular Turkey with separation of church and state as well as
greater rights for women, including abolition of polygamy). But see id. at 792 (con-
sequence of change was greater nationalism and ethnocentrism. "The Turks wanted
a modem Turkey - by and for the Turks."). As this fuller view of Ataturk, the
Young Turks, and the Armenian Genocide reveals. a more secular. westernized,
and modern government is not necessarily a consistently humane government.
In a rational world, notwithstanding the benefits of a secular Turkc\ that is
an ally rather than an avowed enemy, one would expect the Young Turk label to
carry a little more baggage. That it does not is testament to the degree to which the
Armenian Genocide and the Young Turk role in it has been largely airbrushed out
of history. See MIAN KLINDERA, Tiii, BOOK OF LAtHiER AN) FORGETTING
3(Michael Henry Keim trans., Penguin Books 1981) (1978) (describing degree to
which Eastern Bloc regimes literally airbrushed disfavored politicians out of photo-
graphic records to accord with prevailing official versions of past events).
88 See AKCAM, supra note 4, chs. 3, 4; DADRIAN supra note 4, at 5. See also YALi,
supra note 22, at 168, 206.
89 See BALAKIAN, supra note 5, at 160; McMLIKIN. supra note 2, chs. 4-6, 14;
AKCAM, supra note 4, chs. 3, 4. See also YAILi, supra note 22, at 208, 228-29.
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1914.'" The Turkish leaders had been in secret negotiations with Germany
and were particularly interested in promoting their interests in the region,
especially in regard to realigning relationships with their neighbors in the
Caucasus and Russia." By joining the Central Powers, Turkey expanded
the war to a new Russian front that included the vital ports in the Black Sea
and the Bosporus 22 As part of this expansion, Turkey also opened a front
against Russian through the cast by attacking the Russian border that was
mainly populated by eastern Armenians living under the Czar's rule.'"' Al-
though the Young Turks expected a relatively easy victory on this eastern
front in the oppressive winter months of 1914, they were surprised by any
enemy army of 100,000 soldiers-including Russian and Armenian battal-
ions-who thwarted their plans. This initial defeat in the winter of 1914
added to the animosity that the Young Turks felt toward the Armenians in
the Ottoman Empire. 9 4
H. The Armenian Genocide 1915-1920
With the outbreak of World War I in the summer of 1914, as a precaution-
ary measure and a response to the war mobilizations throughout Europe,
New York Life "discontinued making new contracts of insurance in the
Turkish Empire."'( Company management likely had concerns regarding
the political maneuverings of the Young Turk authorities and the Austro-
Hungarian Empire. For an insurance company, the climate and spread of
90 See Richard G. Hovannisian, Armenia's Road to Independence, in Tin; ARMIL
NIAN PEOPLE FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIME s VoL. 2, 280 (Richard G. Hovanni-
sian ed., 1997); BERNARD LEWIS, TIuE MnDe) I.D EAST: A BRIHi. HISTORY 01 TIlif
LAsT 2,000 YEARS 338 (1995).
91 See also YAiF, supra note 22, at 204-206.
9)2 See MCMEEKIN, supra note 2, passim: AKCAM, supra note 4, chs. 3-5; Hovan-
nisian, Armenia's Road to Independence, supra note 90, at 280; PALMER & COI-
ION. supra note 1, at 791-93: FRANK HERBERT SiMONDS, His'IORY 01. T1. WORLD
WAR, VOL. 1 180 (1917).
93 The Armenian population was largely divided into two groups: western
Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire and eastern Armenians living in the Rus-
sian Empire. Although these groups were divided by a political and geographic
border, their political and national aspirations were consistent. See Hovannisian,
Armenia's Road to Independence, supra note 90, at 280-85.
94 See id. at 280. SARKIS ATAMIAN, THE ARMENIAN COMMUNITY 222 (1955).
95 Sec Pl. 's Opp'n to Def. 's Mot. to Dismiss, Exhibit J, Letter from James McIn-
tosh, General Counsel to the William J. Bryan, Secretary of State, Washington
D.C.. dated Mar. 20, 1915.
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war presents changes in the risk assessments, even when life insurance poli-
cies include war exclusions.
In the early months of 1915, U.S. diplomats stationed in fourteen
consulates throughout the Ottoman Empire sent reports and messages to
Washington D.C. noting a change in the political conditions and increasing
intolerance and terror towards Christian minorities, specifically naming
Greeks, Armenians, and Chaldeans.96 These communications indicated that
the increasing reports of violence occurred in all parts of the Ottoman Em-
pire, were religiously motivated, and in some cases involved either direct or
silent participation of the local authorities.97 Under these conditions, all for-
eign diplomats experienced communication difficulties in the form of dis-
patch interception, censorship, and continuous monitoring of activities.98
96 See Letter from Charles F. Brissel, American Consul, Baghdad, Turkey. to Wil-
liam J. Bryan, Secretary of State, Washington D.C. (Apr. 1, 1915). in UNITED
STATLS OIiI('IAL RECORDS ON THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE 1915-1917. supra note 6.
at 4 (describing arrests of Christians, institution of martial law, and confiscation of
arms from Armenian soldiers serving in the Ottoman military). Chaldeans are a
Christian-Catholic ethnic group emanating primarily from what is now Iraq. See
MARY C. SENGSTOCK, CHALDEAN AMERICANS: CHANGING CON(EI[TIONS OF Eii-
NIC IrI-NTITY 8 (2d ed. 1999).
17 See Letter from J. B. Jackson, American Consul, to Henry Morgenthau, Ameri-
can Ambassador, Constantinople, Turkey (Apr. 21. 1915). in UNITED STATES OFFI-
CIAL RI..CORI)S ON ill. ARMINIAN GINO('IDF 1915-1917, supra note 6. at 7
(describing conditions and reports from Marash, Zeitoun. and Aintab, and enclos-
ing the written eye-witness report of Rey. John E. Merrill); Letter from William S.
Dodd, Konia, Turkey, to Henry Morgenthau. American Ambassador (May 6,
1915), in UNITID STATES OFFICIAL REiCORDS ON Till ARMENIAN GIENOCIDE 1915-
1917, supra note 6, at 37 (describing the arrival of two thousand Armenian refu-
gees from Zeitoun by train and foot, mostly women and children, and the Turkish
military's efforts to prevent aid from the American hospital to treat the starvation):
Letter from J. B. Jackson, American Consul, Aleppo, Syria to Henry Morgenthau.
American Ambassador (May 12, 1915), in UNITED STAIFS OFFICIAL RICORI)S ON
[ini ARMENIAN GFNOCI)E 1915-1917, supra note 6, at 40 (describing arrival of
28,000 Armenians from Konia. Caesaria, Zeitoun, Marash by government order.
and the division of men, women, and children into separate groups): Letter from
Edward 1. Nathan, American Consul, Mersina, Turkey to Henry Morgenthau.
American Ambassador (May 18, 1915), in UNIED SrATS O(FICIAL RECORDS ON
Tt11. ARMENIAN GIENO(CIDE 1915-1917, supra note 6. at 44-45 (reporting the depor-
tation of seventy Armenian families from Adana, Mersina, and Tarsus).
98 See UNrII.) STA T1S OIl ICIAI RICORDS ON THE ARMENIAN GINOCIDE 1915-
19 17, supra note 6, at 1-19. Several of the telegrams and reports indicate that they
were transmitted in red or green cipher. Leslie Davis, Consul-General of Harpoot,
also noted in his final report continuous censorship by the Turkish authorities, a
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Foreign companies and their foreign employees were not immune
to this sudden change in atmosphere and the rise of reigning terror against
minority groups. In one dispatch from the American Consulate in Smyrna
to the State Department in Washington, an American Consul stated:
American employees of the MacAndrews Forbes Coin-
pany, returning from trips into the interior report that there
is great hostility to Englishmen The Americans under-
stand this from their treatment when they are mistaken for
British. As this feeling is something new in this region, and
is shown especially by the military, it is doubtless being
artificially worked up from the headquarters.99
These dispatches note that the relative ease of doing business in
Turkey evaporated, and that neither these foreign companies nor the Turk-
ish authorities guaranteed the safety of foreign employees working in the
interior parts of the former Ottoman Empire. By October 1914, when the
Turkish government joined Germany and the Central Powers, New York
Life immediately began the process of closing down its operation in the
Ottoman Empire. In an effort to maintain its life insurance contracts, New
York Life reduced its presence to a representative office in Constantinople
with two Greek employees. Policyholders continued to make payments
through American consulates located throughout the country. 00
In 1915, the Young Turk government shifted its policy toward the
Armenians from oppression to a systemic premeditated extermination and
perhaps surprising Turkish clampdown considering that the United States did not
enter World War I until 1917, and was a neutral party during the early years of the
Armenian Genocide.
,9 See Letter from George Horton, American Consul-General in Smyrna to Wil-
liam J. Bryan, Secretary of State, Washington D.C. (Feb. 4, 1915). in UNITED
STATES OiFICIAL RECORDS ON TiHE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE 1915-1917, supra note 6,
at I (describing "Turkish bands" terrorizing Christians, and MacAndrews Forbes
Co. employees describing a new sense of intolerance increasing in the interior of
the Ottoman Empire).
100 Telephone Interview with Vartkes Yeghiayan, Yeghiayan & Associates, lead
attorney in Marootian ". New York Life. (March 20, 2009). Upon being given ac-
cess to the New York Life corporate archives, Mr. Yeghiayan found documentation
of policyholders continuing to make payments on their policies during the time of
the Armenian Genocide until they were presumably killed or sent on deportation
marches. These actions could be interpreted as policyholders attempting to secure
resources for their families in the face of likely clashes and violence.
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deportation of the entire Armenian population. 101 On the night of April 24,
1915, days after Easter celebrations, 235 Armenian lawyers, doctors, politi-
cians, clergy, and teachers were arrested in Constantinople. 102 The arrests
and subsequent deportation or massacre of the arrestees wiped out the lead-
ership of the Armenian community and left the population fearful and vul-
nerable. 0 3 From late May to early June 1915, the Turkish military put out
an order to deport all non-Turks. However, all non-Armenian populations
were exempt from deportation. 0 4 During the remaining months of 1915, the
authorities' evacuation and deportation orders were implemented by gather-
ing Armenian men, and separately the elderly, women, and children into
convoys. 10 5 These convoys were forced to march on foot through harsh ter-
l0l See DADRIAN, supra note 4, at 221; ARMENIAN GOLGOTHA. supra note 3. at 77-
82: MERRILL D. PETERSON. "STARVING ARMENIANS" 30-33 (2004); In his memoir
describing his experience as American Ambassador to Turkey in 1915, Morgenthau
notes several signs of a change in the Young Turk leadership and the impending
doom that was about to befall the Armenian population. He notes that in early 1915
the Young Turk government downgraded Armenian soldiers serving in the Turkish
army from combatants to laborers, and thus stripped these soldiers of their arms,
medical treatment, and in many cases, food. He also describes reports where Arme-
nian men and women were arrested, tortured until they confessed to being part of a
resistance or hiding weapons, and finally killed. See MORGENTHAU SR.. supra note
56, at 302-308.
102 See YAIR AtIRON, THE BANALITY ()I- INI)IFFERENCE 42 (2000): Poxsi .< supra
note 3, at 1-29; ADAM JONES, GENOCIDE: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 106
(2006): see WALKER, supra note 35. at 209; see MAZIAN, supra note 39, at 88: see
also Christopher J. Walker. World War I and the Armenian Genocide. in THE AR-
MENIAN PE oplt FROM ANCIINT I0 MODERN TIMES VOL. 2, 256-366 (Richard G.
Hovannisian ed., 1997) (quoting several eye-witness accounts by diplomats about
the atrocities that followed in the days, weeks, and months following April 24.
1915): ARMENIAN GoIGOTIIA, supra note 3.
03 See AtuRON, supra note 102, at 42; ARMENIAN GOLGOTHA, supra note 3, at 52:
see Christopher J. Walker, World War I and the Armenian Genocide, in TlE ARME-
NIAN PiO.EiI FROM ANCIlNT TO MODERN TiMIs Vol.. 2, 252 (Richard G. Hovanni-
sian ed., 1997).
04 See DONAILD Bi OXIIAM & A. DIRK MoSES. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 01. GI.NO-
(IDE Sitloiis 375 (2010); BIN Ki.ERNAN, Bioo) \ND SoIi: A WORILD HisTORY OF
Gi-NOCII)Ik AND EXTERMINATION FROM SPARTA TO DARFUR 409 (2007).
15 See AIIRON, supra note 102, at 43; Walker, supra note 103, at 256-366 (noting
that the "Temporary Law of Deportation" authorized by the Turkish Council of
Ministers was officially published three days prior to its actual approval, and pro-
vided the necessary euphemism and legality for the massacres). The svstemic na-
lure of the "deportations" is apparent in the eye-witness account of Henry H. Riggs,
an American missionary living in the city of Harpoot (known in Armenian as
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rain toward the vast Syrian l)esert in the south."0' Along the way, the con-
\oys were sub ject to starvation, looting, beating, rape, and murder."1 7
Numerous foreign diplomats, including U.S. Ambassador Henry
Morgenthau, documented and reported on the campaign of massacres and
forced deportation marches.")" As the Turkish mass-murder and deporta-
tions of Armenians continued, the governments of France, Great Britain,
and Russia made a declaration denouncing these acts as "crimes against
humanity and civilization." ' 9 It was during this period that the Turkish
Minister of Interior, Talaat Pasha, discussed the New York Life Insurance
policies taken out by Armenians.'' 0 Ambassador Morgenthau recounted:
One day Talaat made what was perhaps the most astonish-
ing request I had ever heard. The New York Life Insurance
Company and the Equitable Life of New York had for
years done considerable business with the Armenians. The
extent to which this people insured their lives was merely
another indication of their thrifty habits. 'I wish,' Talaat
Kharpert) at the time. In vivid detail, he describes the condition and treatment of
the Armenian population, as well as the arrival of caravans of Armenian deportees
from other cities. Riggs was born in the Ottoman Empire to a family of missiona-
ries, after his experiences in Harpoot, he later became a teacher and evangelist
amongst the Armenian refugees in Beirut. See HENRY H. RIGGs, DAYS OF TRA(-
EDY IN ARMENIA: PERSONAL ExPERIENCES IN HARPOOT, 1915-1917 78-80 (1997).
106 See AURON, supra note 102, at 43; Rouben Paul Adalian, The Armenian Geaa-
cide, ill CENTURY OF GFNOCIDE: CRITICAL ESSAYS AND EYEW'INIss ACCOUNTs 45,
47 (Samuel Totten & William S. Parsons eds., 3d ed. 2009).
107 See AURON, supra note 102, at 43. Foreign diplomats and missionaries sta-
tioned throughout the former Ottoman Empire documented their observations of
the inhumane mistreatment of the Armenian population. In communications with
their respective home offices, many of these individuals requested foreign interven-
tion and assistance. See Letter from Members of the German Mission Staff in Tur-
key to the German Foreign Ministry (Oct. 8, 1925), in TIll TREATMENT OF
ARMENIANS IN TIE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1915-16, at xxxiii (Viscount Bryce ed.
1916): LISIIE A. DAVIS, THE SL AUGHITERHOUSE PROVINCI: AN AMERICAN DIPI.O-
MAT's REPORT ON THF ARMENIAN GENOCInI., 1915-1917 (Susan Blair. ed.) (1989).
1(18 See BRYCE, supra note 4; DAVIS, supra note 107; MORGsNTIIAI SR., supra note
56.
109 This declaration's use of the phrase "crime against humanity" can be viewed as
an early reference to the concept of genocide and the need for new terminology.
See U.N EcON. & Soc. COUNCIL [ECOSOCI COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, U.
N WAR CRIMES COMMISSION REPORT, E/CN. 4/W. 20 (May 28, 1948). See also
DADRIAN, supra note 4, at 239.
110 See MORGENTIIAJ SR., supra note 56, at 339.
28 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 18
now said, 'that you would get the American life insurance
companies to send us a complete list of their Armenian pol-
icy holders. They are practically all dead now and have left
no heirs to collect the money. It of course all escheats to the
State. The government is the beneficiary now. Will you do
so?' This was almost too much and I lost my temper. 'You
will get no such list from me' I said, and I got up and left
him.'"1
As this exchange between the American Ambassador and the Turk-
ish Minister of Interior indicates, authorities on all sides recognized the
value of life insurance as wealth and as personal property. The Turkish
Ministry of Commerce sent a similar request to the New York Life Insur-
ance Company's headquarters in Constantinople. 12 In a letter dated Febru-
ary 18, 1916, the New York Life director in Paris forwarded the Turkish
request for a list of Armenian policyholders to Ambassador Morgenthau. 1
The New York Life director explained that it would be difficult to comply
with the request and that there were concerns that the Turkish authorities
would respond negatively.'' 4 Additionally, these requests imply that the
Turkish authorities were aware that Armenians had purchased life insurance
and that the government was interested in confiscating these assets.
As the attempted extermination of the Armenian people became in-
creasingly apparent, New York Life's management recognized that the
genocidal massacres could create an unexpectedly high financial burden if
the survivors or their heirs demanded payment of the insurance benefits all
at once. In 1922, in a letter addressed to the U.S. Secretary of State. New
York Life's vice president explained that a large portion of company's busi-
ness in the Ottoman Empire was
written upon the lives of subject peoples, such as the
Armenians and others who have ... been subjected to mas-
Id. See also Letter from P Duncanson, Financial Director. European Depart-
ment, New York Life Ins. Co. to U.S. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau (Feb. 18,
1916) (this letter describes the same request from the Turkish Ministry of Com-
merce, for a list of Armenians residents of the Ottoman Empire and insured by New
York Life. The letter notes that the insurance company did not keep a nationality-
based listing of policyholders, and further described compliance with the request as
a "delicatc matter.").
112 S,c SIIAVARSII TORIGLIIAN, THE ARMENIAN QtI-SFION AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 140-41 (1988).
113 Id. See also M()RGINTIIAO SR., supra note 56, at 339.
" TORIGIUIAN, supra note I 11. Id.
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sacre and illegal killing and fatal exposure by or with the
acquiescence of the Turkish authorities. In consequence of
such illegal action and willful failure of the Turkish Gov-
ernment to protect the lives of those within its jurisdiction,
the [New York Life Insurance Company] has incurred
heavy and extraordinary losses.'"
This letter continues to explain that, in accordance with New York
state law, the company maintained reserve levels that correlated to the life
expectancy levels, however, those life expectancy tables did not account for
genocide.'1 6 The letter states that, as a result, New York Life incurred
$320,000 of losses beyond its reserve levels, in claims and benefits paid out
under the Armenian insurance policies.' 17
115 See, e.g., Letter from W. Buckner, vice-president, New York Life Insurance Co.
to Charles E. Hughes, U.S. Secretary of State, (Nov. 20, 1922) (on file with author)
(requesting that treaty include provision recognizing "obligation of the Turkish
government to indemnify insurance companies for losses suffered by such compa-
nies through the premature death of Armenian and other clients formerly resident
on Ottoman territory who were massacred or deported.") Letter from William Phil-
lips, U.S. Under-Secretary of State to Sullivan & Cromwell (Jan. 15, 1923) (on file
with author). See also Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell to Charles E. Hughes, U.S.
Secretary of State. (Dec. 12,1922) (on file with author) (noting that State Depart-
ment would not comply with the request to include indemnification in the U.S. 's
position at Lausanne, and yet still pressing that the request be forwarded to the U.S.
representatives at Lausanne in case a similar issue is raised in Lausanne by other
delegations on behalf of foreign insurances companies); Letter from William Phil-
lips, U.S. Under-Secretary of State to Sullivan & Cromwell, (Jan. 15, 1923) (on file
with author) (stating that it is in receipt of the prior requests. The letter states that
the request will be forwarded to the American mission at Lausanne but further
advocacy for indemnification is unlikely); Letter from Charles E. Hughes, U.S.
Secretary of State to American Mission at Lausanne, (Jan. 16, 1923) (on file with
author) (forwarding New York Life's requests and stating the U.S. State Depart-
ment's position on the issue); Letter from Joseph C. Grew, Special Mission of the
U.S., Lausanne, to Charles E. Hughes, U.S. Secretary of State (Jan. 29, 1923) (on
file with author) (noting receipt of the New York Life correspondence forwarded
by the State Department and stating that should the issue of life insurance indemni-
fication be contemplated at the Lausanne Conference, the U.S. mission will inform
the State Department immediately).
16 Letter from W. Buckner, supra note 115. See MORGENTHAU SR., supra note 56,
at 339.
117 Id.
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I. The 1917 Russian Revolution
In February 1917 the Russian Revolution began, forcing the abdication of
Czar Nicholas II and the ascendancy of a provisional government that took
the reins of the collapsed empire with promises of a new liberal state."' l
Although many hailed this revolution a democratic revolution and an end to
the three hundred year Romanov dynasty, there were many questions about
the role of Russia in the Great War, as well as in the Caucasus. 1 9 In the
second stage of the Russian revolution, Vladimir Lenin seized power and
demanded a withdrawal of Russian forces from the Turkish-Russian
front. 121 As part of this plan, Lenin also demanded Armenian self-determi-
nation, but the realistic implication was that the Armenians in the Caucasus
would lose their shield from further Turkish advances.' 2'
J. Treaties and Diplomacy
1. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
The Young Turk leadership was aware of the unrest in Russia and the op-
portunity that the withdrawal of the Russian forces presented for Turkish
forces to move east. 122 As Russia's turmoil continued, the newly established
Soviet leadership under Lenin acquiesced to the Central Powers and Turk-
ish demands by signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as an attempt to end the
war and possibly spread the socialist ideology.1 23 The main provisions of
the treaty included: (1) Russian renunciation of sovereignty over what
would later be termed the Soviet Eastern Bloc; (2) recognition of Ukraine's
independence; (3) self-determination of the Armenian provinces in the Ot-
toman Empire "in agreement with neighboring States, [sic.] especially Tur-
'IS See SHEILA FITZPATRICK, THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 40 (3d rev. ed. 2008):
Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, The Februarv Revolution, in CRITICAL COMPANION TO THE
RUSSIAN RI.voi 1 lION 1914- 1921, at 48-61 (Edward Acton, Vladimir lu. Cherniac\
& William G. Rosenberg eds. 1997).
119 See Hovannisian, Armenia's Road to Independence, supra note 90, at 283.
120 See id. at 283; SIMON PAYASLIAN, TIlE HISTOR'R OF ARMENIA: FROM THE ()R1-
GINS TO THE PRESENT 148 (2007): RONALD GRIGOR SUINY, LOOKING TOWARD ARA-
RAT: ARMENIA IN MODERN HisT(oRY 123 (1993).
121 See WALKER, supra note 35, at 248: PAYASILIAN, supra note 120, at 148: SuNY.
supra note 120, at 123.
122 See WA .K.R. supra note 35, at 250: MICHAI. BOBELIAN, CiILDREN OF ARME-
NIA 33 (2009); Hovannisian, Arnenia's Road to Independence, supra note 90, at
283 (discussing the turmoil in Russia).
123 See JACOB SCIAPIRO & JAMIS THOMSON SIi 0TWI1 I ., MOo)IRN CONTEMPORARY
EUROPIAN HISTORY 1815-1922 747-49 (1922).
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key; (4) independence for Georgia and Finland; (5) payments by Russia to
Germany for losses suffered.124 For the Turkish forces, this treaty opened
the door for expansion eastward over the Armenian plateau and into the
formerly Russian-controlled Armenian territories.125
2. The Armenian Republic (1918-1920) and Diplomacy
In the spring of 1918, the Armenian volunteer battalions who were sup-
ported in their efforts by peasants, tradesman, and clergy, halted the Turkish
offensive 75 miles from the Armenian city of Yerevan.'126 On May 28, 1918,
the Armenian National Council, a quasi-governmental administration of the
Armenian population in the region, declared the independence of the Re-
public of Armenia with a bare document that cited the "grave circum-
stances" but omitted any statements of freedom or rights. 27 As an
independent state, the Armenian Republic sought to develop infrastructure
that could respond to the famine and epidemics spreading throughout the
population, as well as develop relationships with neighboring states and the
west that could guarantee territorial security.
In January 1919, when the war ended, the leaders of the Allied and
the Central powers gathered in Paris for a conference that would draft the
agreement to finalize the terms of peace and establish a world organization
that would maintain the peace.128 The Paris Peace Conference declared:
because of the historical mis-government by the Turks of
subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians
and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Pow-
ers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine
and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish
124 Id. at 749: MICHAEL GRAHAM FRY, ET AL., GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS AND DIPLOMACY 185-88 (2002). Germany later renounced the treaty when it
signed the Treaty of Versailles at the Paris Peace Conference. See MICHAEL GRA-
HAM FRY, IT AL., supra this note, at 188-89; Hakan Kirimli, Diplomatic Relations
Between the Ottoman Empire and the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, 1918-21. 34
MinDLi, EASTERN STID. 201, 227 (1998).
125 See WAIKI.R, supra note 35, at 254.
'(, See BoBFiLIAN. supra note 122, at 34.
127 SIMON VRATZIAN. HAYASTANI HANRAP'I1tTIUN (The Republic of Armenia)
131-32 (1928). See also Hovannisian, Armenia's Road to Independence, supra note
90, at 298-99.
128 See ERIK GOLDMAN. TIlE FIRST WORLD WAR PEACE SETTLEMENTS, 1919-1925,
at 9 (2002): Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia, in TiIF ARMENIAN
P1 OPLE FROM ANCIFNT TO MODERN TIMES VOL. 2, 319 (Richard G. Hovannisian
ed., 1997).
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Empire .... [and] subject to the rendering of administra-
tive advice and assistance by a mandatory power 129
The declaration put forth the concept of a mandatory power that
would guarantee the security and viability of the newly formed states that
emerged from the former Ottoman Empire and would operate on behalf of
the newly formed League of Nations. 3 " This declaration represented the
only statement that the Paris Peace Conference provided regarding the
newly independent republic, as well as the survivors of genocide.13
Although the mandate system was implemented in certain geo-
graphic areas by France and Britain, 3 2 British Prime Minister Lloyd George
suggested that the United States should take responsibility for the mandate
for Armenia, while the other Allied powers took on other areas of the for-
mer Ottoman Empire. 33 President Woodrow Wilson accepted the mandate
for Armenia subject to the consent of the United States Senate." 4
When President Wilson returned the United States, he faced the
formidable task of lobbying the Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and
the mandate for Armenia. This effort was supported by a group of Arme-
nian-Americans, politicians, and high-ranking government officials in
Washington who had formed the American Committee for the Indepen-
dence of Armenia.13 5 Among these individuals was Vahan Cardashian, a
young lawyer who received his law degree from Yale University in 1908
and had taken on the task of lobbying the United States government on
129 See 3 U.S. DEP'T )1 S1 ATI-. PAPIk5 RELATING O THE- FORFIGN Ri IATIONS OF
THE UNITEI STATES: THE PARIS PE-A(. CONFI1RENCE 1919, at 795-96 (1943).
130 See generally Andrew J. Crozier, The Establishment of the Mandates System
1919-25:Some Problems Created by the Paris Peace Conference. J. OF CONTI Nl'.
His'I., VOL. 14, No. 3, pp. 483-513 (Jul., 1979). See also HEArHER L hIR WAGNER.
Tii- DIVISION OF FHE Miri)I.i Es's Tmu TREATY OF SEVRES 88-89 (2004).
131 See Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia, supra note 128, at 320.
132 The precursor to the mandate system was the secret 1916 Sykes-Picot secret
agreement between the British and French that allocated control over the eastern
territories after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. See YALI .supra note 22. at 253-54.
133 Vahan Cardashian, The Turkish Question and Armenia, 108 ANNALS AM.
A('AD. PoI.. & SoC. SCI 141, 143-44 (1923): 1 RICHARD G. HOVANNISIAN, THiu
R iIJUBLI(" 01 ARMENIA 323 (1971).
1,4 See 3 HOVANNISIAN, supra note 133, at 324. See also JAmi.s B. (Gll)NI-) , A
MANDAJIk FOR ARME NIA (1967).
135 See RoBERT GEORGE KooiAKIAN, SiRUGGi;ILI FOR JUSTICE: A STORY OF THE
AMERICAN COMMIIIlF .OR THE. 1Nl)FrPENDEN('F. OF ARMENIA, 1915-1920, at 97
(2008).
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behalf of the Armenian people. I' Through the efforts of eyewitness govern-
ment officials like )avis and Morgenthau, as well as Protestant missiona-
ries and relief organizations, the American public became aware of the
plight of the Armenians.' 7 President Wilson promoted the mandate in ap-
pearances throughout the United States, but his isolationist adversaries did
not support the vision of an American mandate for Armenia. 138 The United
States Senate, led by Henry Cabot Lodge, delivered a defeat to President
Wilson and rejected the American mandate by a vote of 52 to 23.'1
3. The Treaty of S vres (1920)
In February 1920, the Allied powers came together in London to draft a
peace treaty with Turkey that would address the post-war conditions of the
Ottoman Empire and the Armenian Question.14" At the London conference
it became apparent that the Armenian Question had been altered by the
withdrawal of the American mandate for Armenia and the still pending
questions regarding refugees, territorial borders, and continued harassment
and massacres of the survivors.' 41 Although the war was over, during the
London conference, representatives received reports that the Ottoman mili-
tary was targeting Armenian survivors of the genocide living in the Otto-
man Empire. 142 The Allied powers realized that this treaty could only be
imposed by force, but were unwilling to commit their own resources. 4 -
136 See BOBELIAN, supra note 122, at 41-42. See generallv VARTKI S YEGHIAYAN,
VAHAN CARDASHIAN: ADVOCATE EXTRAORDINAIRE FOR TIHE ARMENIAN CAUSI,.
(2008). Cardashian (no relation to the late attorney Robert Kardashian, or his
daughters), born in 1883, attended American missionary schools in the Ottoman
Empire until he arrived in the United States in 1902. After graduating from Yale
University, he initially practiced law in New York City and was appointed to a
position in the Ottoman Embassy. In 1915, he received word that his mother and
sister had fallen victim to the massacres of the Armenians. After a confrontation
with the Ottoman Ambassador, Cardashian resigned his position and dedicated his
advocacy efforts to bringing awareness to the plight of the Armenian people.
137 See BAL AKIAN, supra note 5, at 358; Dennis R. Papazian, The Changing Amneri-
can View of'the Armenian Question: An Interpretation, 39 ARMENIAN REVIEW 47,
51-53, 57-58 (Winter 1986).
131 See BoBELIAN, supra note 122. at 45; BAtAKIAN, supra note 5. at 360.
'39 See BAILAKIAN, supra note 5, at 361; 59 CONG. REC. 8073 (1920).
140 See RICHARD G. HOVANNISIAN, Tiui REP[JRLIC OF ARME NiA 20-23 (1971); GRA-
HAM FRY, IA AL., supra note 124, at 191.
'41 See HOVANNISIAN, supra note 140, at 23-27, 42.
42 See id. at 42-43.
13 See id. at 69-70.
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The conference reconvened in April 1920 in San Remo to complete
the Turkish peace treaty. The terms of the treaty relevant to Armenia pro-
vided that: (1) Turkey recognized Armenia as a free and independent
state; 44 (2) the boundaries between the two countries would be determined
by President Wilson; 45 and (3) Turkey recognized the injustice of 1915 and
promised to facilitate the return of non-Turkish subjects who were forcibly
driven from their homes by fear of massacre since 1914.146 The San Remo
draft of the Treaty of Savres was signed by representatives of Turkey, Ar-
menia, Great Britain, France, and Italy on August 20, 1920.147 This treaty
was never implemented.
4. The Treaty of Lausanne (1923)
From 1920 to 1923, the post-World War I environment in the Near East
was still experiencing geopolitical shifts, as well as renewed interests by the
Allies who had divided up the oil fields in the area amongst themselves
through the mandate system. 148 Although American public sympathy for the
Armenians and their failed settlement was strong, the political strategy
moved more strongly toward "dollar diplomacy."'149 Mustafa Kemal Ata-
turk, a member of the Young Turks who had participated in the massacres,
renounced the Ottoman Sultan's signing of the Treaty of S~vres and the
principle of Armenian autonomy. 150 Ataturk and his supporters renewed
their nationalist agenda and assumed Turkish leadership by attacking the
Armenian Republic in the east and the Greek administration in western
Anatolia. I 1
144 See The Peace Treaty of S vres, art. 88, Aug. 10, 1920.
145 See id., art. 89.
146 See id., art. 144.
147 See Allies Are Ready to Compel Turks to Accept TreatY, N.Y. TIMES Apr. 22,
1920 (on file with author and Times archives).
141 See BALAKIAN, supra note 5. at 366: ANTONY AN(HIE, IMPERIAI.ISNI, SOVER-
FIGNTY, AN) III MAKING OF INTI -R.NATIONALL L\\\ 115-95 (2005) (describing the
mandate system of the League of Nations).
149 ANGiui., supra note 148, at 115-95. The term dollar diplomacy refers to the
foreign policy of strengthening American commercial and trade interests by creat-
ing stability abroad. U.S. Dept. of State Office of the Historian, Dollar Diplomacy,
1909-1913, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/DollarDiplo (last visited
Jan. 27, 2011).
150 See BAI AKIAN, supra note 5, at 323. See also JONES, supra note 102, at 112.
151 See BAILAKIAN, supra note 5, at 327-28: KARA(;UELJIAN & AURON, supra note
6, at 57 (2009).
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Even though the Turkish massacres of ethnic minorities continued,
particularly in the province of Cilicia 52 and the multi-ethnic city of
Smyrna, 15, the Allied response shifted. In Smyrna, Ataturk's forces went
door-to-door murdering Greek and Armenian families as the Allied war-
ships looked on from the Aegean Sea."'' Recognizing that Ataturk repre-
sented the new leadership for the Turkish population as well as the victor in
Smyrna, the United States was pressured into drafting a new "second-
chance" treaty for Turkey. 55
In 1922, the Lausanne Peace Conference convened in Switzerland
to provide a new Allied peace treaty with Turkey after the Turkish national-
ist movement under Ataturk had rejected the Treaty of Svres and taken
control of the leadership. 56 The key Allied representatives, Great Britain
and France, and to a lesser extent, the United States, sought to include in the
treaty commercial trade initiatives with the new Turkish leadership.
As part of this effort to address commercial interests, New York
Life lobbied the State Department and the American representatives at Lau-
sanne to include language regarding the outstanding life insurance policies
held by Armenian victims' families. New York Life sought to impose an
obligation of indemnification on the Turkish representatives for the "losses
suffered by such [life insurance] companies through the premature death of
152 See Armenian Villages Besieged By Turks, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 12, 1920 (on file
with author and Times archives), Americans Give Up Orphans to Turks N.Y.
TIMIs. Jun. 16, 1920 (on file with author. Times archives).
151 In the early twentieth century, Smyrna (presently known as Izmir) was a city on
the Aegean coast with a multi-ethnic population of Greeks, Armenians, and Turkish
Muslims. From 1919 to 1922, under the Allied partitioning of the Ottoman Empire,
Greece took administration of the city of Smyrna and its surrounding areas in part
due to the large ethnic Greek population. In 1922, the Turkish nationalist move-
ment under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk attacked Greek forces, slaughtered the Greek
and Armenian inhabitants, and burned the city. This Turkish attack and brutal mas-
sacre is often referred to as the "Burning of Smyrna." See YALE, supra, note 22, at
283-87. See also SmyNrna Now Faces Plague and Famine, N.Y. Times Sept. 20,
1922 (Times Archival search and on file with author).
154 See Sm rna Burning, 14 Americans Missing 1,000 Massacred as Turks Fire
City, N.Y. TIMES Mar. 15, 1922, (Times archival search and on file with author).
See also MARJORIE DOBKIN, SMYRNA 1922: THE DESTRUCTION OF A CITY (1998):
PETERSON, supra note 101, at 129-31.
155 BALAKIAN, supra note 5, at 369; HUI sri HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY,
AND S.ii:-DETERMINATION: THE AccoMMODATION 01 CONFI.ICTING RIGHTs 83-84
(1990).
1516 See PETERSON, supra note 101, at 132. YA.E, supra note 22, at 288. See,
KARAGU[1ZIAN & AURON, supra note 6, at 60.
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Armenian and other clients formerly resident on Ottoman territory who
were massacred or deported."v 7 The Secretary of State informed New York
Life that it was unwilling to comply with their request but conceded to
inform the American representative at Lausanne of this request, perhaps, in
case a similar request was raised by the French representatives."'8
The Turkish delegates firmly insisted that any discussion of the Ar-
menian Question, Armenian autonomy within its borders, or mention of
massacres would foreclose the possibility of any agreement. 59 The Allies
backed down, with the result that the Treaty of Lausanne abolished the Ar-
menian homeland in modern-day Turkey, re-established the Greco-Turkish
boundaries, and adopted the concept of a homogenous Turkish Republic,
effectively airbrushing the Armenian Genocide from history-at least for
awhile.160
K. Building a New Life in America
In the aftermath of the Armenian Genocide, survivors were scattered
throughout Europe, the Middle East, South, and North America.1 61 They
were mainly women and orphaned children who were haunted by the dehu-
157 See Marootian et al. v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 99-cv-1207 3 (C.D. Cal. filed
Nov. 1999), PLTF120I and PLTFI202 (on file with author). Letter from Joseph C.
Grew, Special Mission of the United States of America, Lausanne to U.S. Sec'y of
State (Jan. 23, 1923) (on file with authors).
158 See Marootian et al. supra note 157; Letter from Sullivan Cromwell on behalf
of New York Life to Sec'y of State (Dec. 13, 1922).
159 See ATAMIAN, supra note 94, at 246. This policy was the first indication of
Armenian Genocide denial by Ataturk's leadership as well as his successors. Taner
Akcam notes that there is a strong link between the establishment of a new Turkish
Republic, and the Armenian Genocide because many of the perpetrators rose to
leadership in the new republic, and gained economically from the Armenian Geno-
cide. See TANER AKUAM, DIALOG(tji- ACROsS AN INFERNAT1 ONAL Di\ IDE: Ess 's
TOWARD A TuRKIsH-ARMENIAN DIALOGUE 92-95 (2001) (The Genocide of the
Armenians and the Silcnce of the Turks).
160 See BAIAKIAN, supra note 5. at 370. Ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne h\
the U.S. Senate was initially delayed by a vocal minority of pro-Armenian Sena-
tors, Armenian-American lobbyists, and supporters seeking to prevent ratification
and establish a U.S. presence in Turkey that would guarantee the safety of the local
population. See AI.XANDIR DI CoNIm, EitNI(TFif RACE, AND AMERI('AN FOR-
IIG(;N Poi.icY: A Hisi ORY 95 (1992): Vahakn N. Dadrian, The Historical and Legal
Interconn c tions Between the Armenian Genocide and the Jewish Holocaust: From
Impunity to Retributive Justice. 23 YAIL J. INT'i, L. 503. 5 11-16 (1998).
'(, See BiW)I IAN, supra note 122, at 107-109. It is estimated that in 1920 there
were 45,000 Armenian refugees in Greece. 90.000 in Lebanon and Syria, and
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maniing brutality of the Genocide and had little or no resources for re-
building their lives again. The diaspora survivors, despite the magnitude of
the tragedy, sought to rebuild their lives and communities. Although these
survivors remembered their exl)eriences and often penned memoirs, the
consensus was that the great powers of the world had failed the Armenians
and that calls for justice would be futile.1'12
From 1920 to 1965, Armenian communities throughout the world
and particularly in the United States rebuilt their communities by establish-
ing churches, community centers, schools, weekly newspapers, and organi-
zations dedicated to cultural, athletic, and scouting activities.16 3 During this
era, these communities focused on maintaining ethnic cultural and linguistic
heritage in their new homelands.
In the late 1950s and the 1960s, the American cultural environment
changed with the civil rights and anti-Vietnam war movements. By this
time, a new generation of Armenians had come of age with a re-energized
sense of historical justice. The sons and daughters of the survivors of the
Armenian Genocide, i.e. the first generation, were now the proud natives of
the United States. Many were graduates of America's best institutions of
higher learning. A large number served in the Armed Forces during World
War II and many were decorated heroes. Throughout the war years, they
had witnessed the atrocities of the Nazism in a very personal way. To them,
the Holocaust was the tragic replay of what their parents and their grandpar-
ents had endured.1' 4
65,000 in France, as well as thousands more in Argentina, Canada, and the United
States.
162 See DONAI.D Bi UXHOM, THE GR.Ar GAME OF GENOCIDE: IMPERIALISM, NA-
TIONAISM, AND THE DiESTRUCTION OF THE OTTOMAN ARMENIANS, 219 (2005);
Lorne Shirinian, Survivor Memoirs of the Armenian Genocide as Cultural History,
in REMEMBRANCE AND DENIAL: TiE CAS Oi TiEi ARMENIAN GENOCIDE 166 (ed.
Richard G. Hovannisian, 1999). It has been observed that survivors of large scale
massacres, such as the Jewish Holocaust and the Armenian Genocide, often exhibit
..survivor syndrome" where the individual has feelings of guilt, anxiety, and reac-
tive depression. See Kristin Platt, Witnessing the Catastrophe, in GENOCIDI: Ap-
PROA('IIES, CASI SiuIIS, AND RISPONSES 269-70 (eds. Graham C. Kinloch & Raj
P. Mohan, 2005).
163 See Interview with (name withheld), Armenian-American Community Leader,
in Washington, D. C., (Sept., 2010).
64 The first wave of Armenian immigration to America took place from 1890 to
1930, where Armenians sought to flee from the Sultan Abdul Hamid It's mas-
sacres, the Young Turk violence, and the massacres later perpetrated by Ataturk in
Smyrna. In America. Armenians initially settled in New York. Worcester (Massa-
chusetts), Boston, Providence. Hartford, Philadelphia, Troy, Chicago, and Fresno.
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Another generational milestone for the children of the Armenian
Genocide survivors was the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 65 The word "genocide"
was first coined by a Jewish-Polish lawyer, Raphael Lemkin, in his book
Axis in Occupied Europe, published in 1943 by the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace.166 Lemkin had analyzed the recurrence of ethnic
mass annihilation throughout history including, the massacres of the
Armenians. 6 7 Through publications, presentations, and intense lobbying,
Lemkin fought to have genocide recognized as an international crime by the
United Nations through the 1948 Genocide Convention Treaty. 68 The sign-
ing of this treaty was a first significant post-war step toward justice because
the crime of genocide was given statutory recognition.
The first generation was composed primarily of merchants, craftsmen, shopkeepers,
skilled laborers, and some farmers. Although the first generation Armenians had
typical immigrant experiences, the second generation integrated into American so-
ciety and often assumed a new American identity but in many cases, still main-
tained an inwardly Armenian character. The best example of this new Armenian-
American identity is that of the Pulitzer-prize winning playwright and author Wil-
liam Saroyan. A native of Fresno, Saroyan authored many short stories about his
family life and Armenian community life in Fresno. California that were uniquely
Californian, and yet also Armenian. See generally WILLIAM SAROYAN, My NAME
IS SAROYAN 22-23 (James H. Tashjian ed. 1983).
165 See United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, U.N. T. S. 78.
166 See LE MKIN, supra note 3, at 79 (Lemkin's definition of genocide was that of a
"coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential founda-
tions of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups them-
selves."); POWIR, supra note 3. at 17-23 (2002); see generally YAIR AURON, Tin.,
BANALIlY (Of. DENIAL 45-6 (2003) [hereinafter BANALITY OF DENIAL].
167 See POWER, supra note 3, at 17; WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 24-30 (2000).
168 The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide describes genocide as "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group." See Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277. The Genocide Convention went into effect after the twentieth nation
ratified the treaty. The United States became a party to the treaty on November 25,
1988 duc to the perseverance of Senator William Proxmire (D-WI). From 1967 to
1986, every day that the Senate was in session, Senator Proxmire would rise to
advocate the passage of this U.N. Convention. When it was finally ratified, the
Senator had given a total of 3,211 speeches in favor of ratification. See POWER,
supra note 3, at 155-69.
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On April 24, 1965, in an unprecedented coordinated effort, Armeni-
ans around the world gathered to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of
the genocide and to call for justice. 6 9 The most notable of these demonstra-
tions took place in Soviet Armenia, where students and faculty led a sponta-
neous public commemoration of the genocide that attracted more than a
hundred thousand people in the center of the capital of Yerevan.170 Similar
demonstrations took place in Italy, Canada, Syria, Egypt, France, Australia,
and throughout the United States. The initial spark of this political move-
ment went beyond demonstrations and entered the political arena when
forty-two members of Congress, including Senator Edward Kennedy and
then Representative Gerald Ford delivered speeches in the legislative cham-
bers and on the Congressional Record commemorating the Armenian
Genocide. 171
The Turkish government responded to the 50th anniversary com-
memorations with outrage and complete denial that any genocide had taken
place in 1915. In the aftermath of the Genocide and World War 1, the Turk-
ish government undertook a campaign to erase any trace of Armenians by
destroying medieval Armenian churches, monuments, cemeteries, and
changing the names of towns, villages, and geographic locations. 72
Through a campaign of denial, Turkish leaders sought to revise history by
persuading journalists, teachers, and public officials to blame the victimized
Armenians and wartime conditions for the government's actions during the
1915-1920 period. 73 After the 1965 commemorations, the policy of Geno-
cide denial arrived in the United States through Turkish government fund-
ing of public relations campaigns that sought to influence U.S. foreign
169 See BLUXIIOM, supra note 162, at 215-16.
170 This demonstration was particularly courageous in light of the Soviet prohibi-
tion of studying, speaking publicly, or tangibly acknowledging the Genocide. See
Interview with (name withheld), Armenian-American Community Leader, in
Washington D.C., (Sept., 2010).
171 See BOBiIAN, supra note 122, at 127.
172 BLUXHOM, supra note 160, at 211, 228. See also ROBERT BEVAN, THE DE-
STRUCTION OF MEMORY: ARCHIECTURE AT WAR (2006).
173 See ALTRON, BANALITY OF DNIAI. supra note 166 at 47. Auron also notes the
Turkish government efforts to influence foreign and academic policy in Israel. He
describes one instance where the Turkish government attempted to disrupt an aca-
demic conference addressing the Holocaust and the Armenian Genocide in Tel
Aviv with threats to the safety of Jews in Turkey.
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policy and the funding of American university endowments aimed at influ-
encing scholarship on the topic.
174
More than 50 years after a genocidal campaign that was so effective
it provided a blueprint for Hitler, 175 the perpetrator country continued to
deny culpability1 76 and the entire episode, despite brief periods of attention,
largely continued to lurk outside the periphery of American and world con-
sciousness.1 7 7 In this sense, the Armenian genocide was arguably more ef-
fective than the Jewish Holocaust of the Third Reich in that the Axis
perpetrators were punished,7 8 Germany acknowledged its culpability,
7 9
and all but the most under-educated know of Hitler's barbarism. 8 0 By con-
174 See BLUXHOM, supra note 160, at 211, 228. See also Michael J. Kelly, Geno-
cide: The Power of a Label, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 147, 150 (2007-2008)
(discussing recent Turkish efforts to thwart U.S. legislative recognition of the Ar-
menian Genocide).
175 See infra text and accompanying note 331.
176 See infra text and accompanying notes 296-99 (Turkey denies Armenian Geno-
cide ever occurred and criminally punishes use of term).
177 See and accompanying notes 303 (Armenian Genocide gets little or no mention
in high school history but Jewish Holocaust and Nazi atrocities widely written on
and known).
171 See and accompanying notes 304-306 (noting Nuremberg trials and other pun-
ishment of Nazis).
179 See infra text and accompanying notes 305 (noting German acknowledgment of
evils of Holocaust, Nazism, prejudices).
180 Or are at least aware that Hitler was an evil man. In stark contrast to the Young
Turks and the Armenian genocide, which is hardly referenced at all in contempo-
rary American writings, although there are some exceptions. See, e.g., POWER,
supra note 3, at ch. l(bestselling book addresses Armenian genocide): AKCAM,
supra note 4; ARARAT (Alliance Atlantis 2002) (movie in general release addresses
Armenian genocide in flashbacks interspersed with personal stories).
Hitler references-even wildly inappropriate Hitler references-are com-
mon. Most recently, conservative media commentator Glenn Beck's comparisons
of President Barack Obama to Hitler have served as the most extreme example of
such misplaced invocations of Hitler. See DANA MILBANK, Tears of a Clown:
Glenn Beck and the Tea Bagging of America 117-26 (2010) (describing Beck's
frequent Hitler references in challenging the political viewxs of President Obama
and others). Even without Beck's over-the-top use of the Hitler metaphor, there is
little shortage of similar (if less extreme) attempts to invoke Hitler or Nazism as
synonymous with great evil. See, e.g., JONAH GOLDBERG, LIBERAL FASCISM: THE
SE'RI, I HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN L, I-ROM MUSSOLINI TO Tile POLITICS OF
CIHANGE 317-57 (2007) (describing how Hillary Clinton's policy views, while not
"evil," are susceptible to the same "totalitarian temptation" that motivated Hitler
and the Nazis); Living Centers of Texas, Inc. v. Penalver, 256 S.W.3d 678 (Tex.
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trast, the Young Turks and their allies of the early twentieth century ap-
peared to have escaped judgment and buried the episode as well as its
victims.
II. TH[-. ARMI NIAN GENOCIOF INSURANC[ LITIGATION
A. Is There a Client?
In 1987, Vartkes Yeghiayan, an Armenian-American attorney in southern
California, read about the infamous request for the list of insurance policies
by the Turkish authorities in Ambassador Morgenthau's book.'' Yeghiayan
recognized that there was a potential cause of action for claiming those
outstanding insurance policies.8 2 According to Yeghiayan, "[t]he question
was do we have a client?" He contacted the State Department, and began
searching the U.S. Archives for any clues of unpaid insurance policy bene-
fits. '8 More than six hundred U.S. documents from the era mentioned Ar-
menian insurance policies. Yeghiayan decided to place advertisements in all
2008) (Texas Supreme Court's finding of incurable error in closing argument that
compared opposing trial counsel to participants in Nazi Germany's T-4 Project "in
which elderly and infirm persons were used for medical experimentation and
killed"): State v. Walters, 588 S.E.2d 344, 366 (N.C. 2003) (finding prosecutor's
argument improper because "using Hitler as the basis for the example has the inher-
ent potential to inflame and to invoke passion in the jury, particularly when defen-
dant is compared to Hitler in the context of being evil"). Of course, media debate or
political campaign rhetoric can sometimes be excessive. See Howard Kurtz, Obama
Adviser Quits Over 'Qff the Record' Crack at Clinton, WASH. Posi., Mar. 8, 2008,
at Cl (noted journalist Samantha Power, author of a deservedly Pulitzer Prize-win-
ning book on genocide (POWER, supra note 3) refers to Hillary Clinton as a "mon-
ster" during interview with British television, precipitating her forced resignation as
an Obama campaign advisor). But notwithstanding the excesses of some commen-
tators, even the most inappropriate Hitler references serve to illustrate the degree to
which a negative concept of Hitler as personifying evil is well established.
181 Telephone Interview with Vartkes Yeghiayan, Principal, Yeghiayan & Associ-
ates (Mar. 27, 2009).
182 Id. The existence of these insurance policies was further established by corre-
spondence between the insurance companies and the U.S. State Department. Fac-
simile copies of these letters were published in a book entitled, THE ARMENIAN
QuE-sION AND INTERNATIONAl, LAW by S. Toriguian that was widely circulated
within the Armenian community worldwide. See TORIGUIAN, supra note 112.
183 See Telephone Interview with Vartkes Yeghiayan, supra note 181. Principal,
Yeghiayan & Associates (Mar. 27, 2009).
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of the Armenian newspapers throughout the Diaspora and in response, re-
ceived nearly a thousand responses. 84
One of these responses came from Alice Asoyan, a woman in her
late eighties living in Irvine, California."8 5 She had in her possession a life
insurance policy purchased by her uncle, Setrak Cheytanian, on July 13,
1910, in Harput, Turkey. 8 6 Asoyan explained that in 1913, when she and
her mother immigrated to the United States to join her father, Asoyan's
mother brought with her a copy of her brother-in-law's insurance policy for
safekeeping.8 7 When Asoyan and her mother left the Ottoman Empire, her
uncle Setrak was living in Kharpert (modern day Harpoot) with his wife,
their two children, and his parents. A few years after arriving in New York,
Asoyan's mother, Yeghsa Marootian, learned about the massacres of the
Armenians. 88
In 1925, Yeghsa Marootian received word that her brother-in-law
and his family had perished. Yeghsa attempted to collect the life insurance
benefits by contacting the company headquarters in the New York. The
insurance company declined to pay the benefits to Yeghsa asserting that
there was no proof of the insured's death. In 1956, having moved to Los
Angeles with her family, Yeghsa obtained a death certificate from the Ar-
menian Patriarch in Istanbul, the administrative authority for the commu-
nity, stating that Cheytanian died in June 1915. She sent this certificate to
the insurance company who responded by asking her to visit their Pasadena
office to discuss the matter. There is limited information about whether
Yeghsa went to visit New York Life and how they responded, but the insur-
ance policy was left unpaid.
After her mother's death in 1982, Asoyan inherited the shoebox
containing the original life insurance policy, payment stubs, and the more
recent communication between Yeghsa and New York Life. Asoyan
brought the old shoebox of materials and showed Yeghiayan, who must
have felt as if he had located the Holy Grail or the lost treasure of the
Flying Dutchman. Yeghiayan immediately explained to Asoyan his plans
on a class action lawsuit and the responsibilities of a class representative.
184 See id.
185 See id. Upon discussing the possibility of a lawsuit against New York Life, Ms.
Asoyan stated "maybe this is why God kept me alive for so long."
186 See id.
87 See id.
88 The U.S. Consul, Leslie A. Davis, was stationed in Harpoot from 1915 to 1917.
His report on the events that took place during his assignment as well as numerous
dispatches provides vivid descriptions of the treatment and suffering of the Armeni-
ans in Harpoot/Kharpert. See DAvis, supra note 107.
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She responded, "'I've been wondering why God has kept me alive all these
years. Go ahead and file." But by the time that the lawsuit was filed, Alice
Asoyan died and the new Cheytanian policy beneficiary was Martin Maroo-
tian, Alice's younger brother, a retired pharmacist from Pasadena, Califor-
nia. Marootian was born in the United States and had never known his
uncle, but in his new role in the forthcoming litigation, he found himself
taking on the role as the sole survivor of his extended family.
B. The Armenian Life Insurance Policies
The insurance policy typically sold to Armenians in Turkey was a form of
mixed life insurance-endowment policy that paid three thousand French
francs at the time of the insured's death or in twenty years, with an addi-
tional payment of dividends depending on whether the insured, out-lived
the contract's twenty year term. 89 For example, each July, Cheytanyan, a
35-year-old father of three, paid the annual insurance premium of 155
French Francs, roughly $28 in 1915 American dollars and $601 in today's
dollars.'90 The policy provided that when the insured died, the legal heirs
may collect the amount of three thousand French francs at the New York
Life offices in Paris.' 9' Although the policy was originally written in
French, Cheytanian, who spoke exclusively Armenian and Turkish, signed
his name and initialed the appropriate lines in Armenian only. 192 The exclu-
189 See Pl. 's Opp'n to Del. 's Mot. To Dismiss, Decl. of M. Marootian, and Exhib-
its A & B, Premium Payments and Insurance Policy, Marootian v. New York Life
Ins. Co. No. 99-12073-CAS-Me, Docket # 33. (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 2, 2000). See
also HIUONUT, supra note 79, at 36-38 (noting general absence of war risk exclusion
in New York Life policies: after onset of Spanish-American War, New York Life
continued to provide coverage for war-related deaths but charged an additional pre-
rnium to policyholders in military service.
190 See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF TilE FEIDRAL RESERvE SYSTEM, BANKING AND
MONETARY STATISTICS 1914-1941, at 670 (1943) (listing average yearly interna-
tional exchange rate for France in 1915): Bureau of Labor Statistics. Table Contain-
ing History of CPI U.S. All Items Indexed and Annual Percent Changes From
1913 to Present. http://www.bls.gov/cpi/tables.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2011) (list-
ing average annual Consumer Price Index for 1915 and 2010).
191 See PI. 's Opp'n to Def. 's Mot. To Dismiss, Decl. of M. Marootian, and Exhib-
its A & B. Premium Payments and Insurance Policy, Marootian v. New York Life
Ins. Co. No. 99-12073-CAS-Me, Docket # 33, (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 2, 2000).
912 Neither Turkish, nor the Armenian language share a common written alphabet
with French or English. The Turkish language, at the time, was written with the
Arabic script, and the Armenian language was and still is written with a unique
alphabet of 36 characters created in 405 A. D by an Armenian monk and scholar,
Mesrob Mashdots. See VAHIAN M. KURKJIAN, A HISToRY OF ARMENIA 108-10
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sions listed in the standard form policy included death due to the insured's
participation in war or in a duel, as well as suicide.1 93 The policy also listed
ajurisdictional forum selection of the "civil Courts of France," even though
the insured's and beneficiary's election of residence was "Harput,
Turkey."' 9 4
The conditions and clauses listed in the policy created a strong in-
ference that this insurance contract was a standard form geared specifically
to a European consumer and European beneficiaries, who, if necessary,
could freely travel to Paris. Due to the travel restrictions on Armenians in
Turkey, which required permits to move from town to town or province-to-
province, it is unlikely that the policy was tailored to the needs or circum-
stances of the individual Armenian policyholder. Moreover, assuming that
the agent knew of the circumstances, the policy's first condition states that
"no agent has the right to change or modify, in the name of the Company,
the present contract of insurance. These powers belong only to the Presi-
dent, or Vice-Presidents or Secretaries and the Treasurer of the
Company. ' ' 195
(2008); V H. HAGOPIAN, 0)1-FOMAN-TURKISH CONVERSATION-GRAMMAR 3-5
(1907) (The author of this book was likely a victim of the Armenian genocide).
193 See Pl.'s Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. To Dismiss, Decl. of M. Marootian, and Exhibits
A & B, supra note 191. Premium Payments and Insurance Policy, Marootian v.
New York Life Ins. Co. No. 99-12073-CAS-Me, Docket # 33, (C.D. Cal. filed Oct.
2, 2000).
194 See id.
195 See id. Because of the practically unreasonable burden of traveling from Turkey
to Paris to collect life insurance death policies of this type would probably be
deemed unconscionable by most American courts. See JEFFRF W. S II NIPEI. STEM-
PF1, ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 4.08 (discussing unconscionability generally and
noting that contract terms are unconscionable if achieved through deception or tak-
ing advantages of weaker party and that particular terms can be substantielN un-
conscionable as well as procedurally unconscionable). See also E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTI, CONTRACTS §§ 4.26-4.29 (4th ed. 2004): Arthur Allen Leff, Uncon-
scionabilitv and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. RE,- 485
(1967) (introducing concepts of procedural and substantive unconscionability).
Courts frequently state that a contract term must be tarred by both procedural and
substantive unconscionabilty to be unenforceable. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). However, there is not logical
reason why substantive unconscionability alone cannot suffice to empower courts
from enforcing a contract.
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C. The Lawyers
Vartkes Yeghiayan was the son of a wealthy Armenian family, most re-
cently from Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia, and had attended boarding school in
Cyprus. .' 9 He came to the United States in 1954 and enrolled at the Univer-
sity of California, Berkley as a history major. As a student, he often heard
Armenian-American students discuss their families' stories of survival and
hardship but, having been raised in a sheltered environment, he had no un-
derstanding of the Genocide or any of the events that left such an indelible
mark on his classmates' lives. In 1961, when Yeghiayan's father died, his
mother finally explained that Yeghiayan's father survived the Genocide as a
young boy and moved to Ethiopia later in life. Yeghiayan's mother had no
other details about his father's survival and the family he presumably lost.
After studying law at the University of California, Hastings and
graduating from Lincoln Law School, Yeghiayan started his legal career at
the public-interest firm, California Rural Legal Assistance, where he gained
invaluable experience in transforming public policy through class action
lawsuits. Although later on Yeghiayan shifted his career to that of a sole
practitioner specializing in personal injury cases, Yeghiayan's experience in
class action litigation provided him with the necessary background for
Marootian's case.
Realizing the costs and manpower required for a successful class
action lawsuit, Yeghiayan searched for a partner with a larger firm and re-
sources to take on New York Life. Yeghiayan first turned to the late Eugene
R. Anderson, a founding member of Anderson Kill & Olick, P. C., who had
extensive experience in insurance litigation as well as Holocaust insurance
recovery cases. Yeghiayan also collaborated with Roman Silberfeld of Rob-
ins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, who made the initial contact with New York
Life. The response was an offer of settlement. But Yeghiayan sought a
larger resolution that involved publicity for the underlying issue.
In May 1999, Yeghiayan was joined by Brian Kabateck, a plain-
tiffs' attorney with extensive insurance and class action experience.
Yeghiayan felt comfortable with Kabateck because Yeghiayan thought that,
though distant, Kabateck's Armenian-American heritage provided a better
understanding of the underlying objective. In turn, Kabateck recommended
the addition of William Shernoff to the team because of his background
with Holocaust-era insurance litigation. At this stage, the workload was di-
vided according to each attorney's expertise: Kabateck and his firm drafted
I" See Interview with Vartkes Yeghiayan, supra note 181. (Mar. 27. 2009). Unless
otherwise indicated, unattributed personal background information concerning at-
torney Yeghiayan is based on this interview or litigation documents.
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the briefs. Shernoff organized the negotiations, and Yeghiayan oversaw the
process and maintained contact with the plaintiffs.
D. The New York Life Insurance Litigation
1. Framing the Case
Nearly seventeen years after finding the first policy, Yeghiayan filed a class
action against New York Life Insurance Company in November 1999 with
twelve named plaintiffs in the Federal District Court for the Central District
of California. 197 The complaint alleged six claims for relief against the in-
surance company, including unjust enrichment, breach of contract, breach
of good faith and fair dealing, and unfair and fraudulent business prac-
tices.' 98 The plaintiffs and their attorney prepared to take on the insurance
company by litigating the issue of New York Life's profiting from the
Turkish perpetration of the Armenian Genocide. Although many of the
plaintiffs were well over eighty years old, litigating the genocide issue and
demanding some form of even symbolic justice was supremely important
for the victims and for Yeghiayan. The case was assigned to Judge
Christina Snyder. Within weeks, Yeghiayan filed an amended complaint, to
which New York Life responded with a motion to dismiss. The litigation
also raised issues of class action certification, forum selection, and the stat-
ute of limitations.
2. Procedural Skirmishes
In March 2000, New York Life responded to the amended complaint with a
motion to dismiss for improper venue under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 12(b)(3)199 and asserted that the subject policies' express forum-selec-
tion clauses precluded litigation in the United States. Citing Bremen v.
Zapat Qff-Shore Co., New York Life argued that the subject policies con-
tained mandatory forum selection clauses requiring any claims arising from
the policies to be brought in the courts of London and Paris.200 New York
Life further argued that no exception to enforcement, such as fraud, undue
influence, or "overweening bargaining power," applied in the case at hand
and in light of the commercial origins of the policy transactions, the Euro-
197 See Complaint, Marootian v. New York Life Ins. Co. No. 99-12073-CAS-Me,
Docket # 4, (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 18, 2000).
198 Id.
199 Under Fii). R. Civ. P 12(b) (3), a court may consider evidence outside of the
pleadings without necessarily construing the pleadings as true. See Argueta v.
Banco Mexicano, S. A., 87 F.3d 320, 324 (9th Cir. 1996).
200 Motion to dismiss at 3-5.
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pean courts would be better suited to resolve the dispute. The insurer also
argued that the United States lacked sufficient connection to the dispute
because the policies were issued by the insurance offices in France and
England to individuals residing in the Ottoman Empire. 2°1
New York Life attached to their motion several declarations of
French and British lawyers in support of the motion to dismiss. In one dec-
laration, a French lawyer explained that French courts recognized and en-
forced forum selection clauses in international contracts, even if neither the
dispute nor the parties have any contacts with France. 2 12 Furthermore, the
same lawyer noted that the concept of forum non conveniens does not exist
under French law. 21 3 Similarly, a British lawyer provided that under the
English common law "contractual jurisdiction clauses" would be enforced
by the English courts and no particular words of construction were neces-
sary to make the clause enforceable. 2°14
In addition to questions regarding forum selection clauses and juris-
diction, the motion to dismiss highlighted the statute of limitations as an-
other obstacle for the plaintiffs' recovery. Immediately upon the filing of
the defendant's motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs' legal team approached
California State Senator Adam Schiff-°5 and Chuck Poochigian 2(16 to de-
21 New York Life also filed declarations by French and British lawyers providing
background information in regards to the British and French approach to forum
selection clauses and the procedures for filing claims available to the plaintiffs.
However, a review of these declarations as well as the plaintiffs' expert declara-
tions provided in opposition to the motion reveal that the legal framework for juris-
diction abroad remained open to debate.
2' See Declaration of Bruno Leurent and Accompanying French Legal Authority
in Support of Defendant New York Life's Motion to Dismiss, Marootian v. New
York Lite Ins. Co. No. 99-12073-CAS-Me, Docket # 9, p. 2 (C.D. Cal. filed Mar.
10, 2000).
203 Id.
204 See Declaration of Andrew Charles Crouchman and Accompanying English
Authority in Support of Defendant New York Life's Motion to Dismiss. Marootian
v. New York Lie Ins. Co. No. 99-12073-CAS-Me, Docket # I1, p. 2-3 (C.D. Cal.
filed Mar. 10, 2000).
205 Former California State Senator Adam Schiff later won the congressional elec-
tion in the fall of 2000 as a democratic candidate running against the incumbent
Republican Congressman James Rogan. The electoral race for the 27th district was
widely recognized as one of the costliest in terms of campaign spending which had
topped $10 million. James Bennet, Is the Choice Between These Two Guys Worth
$10 Million?, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 22. 2000.
Although President Clinton is credited with persuading the Republican
House Speaker Dennis Hastert to prevent a House floor vote on this resolution, it is
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velop a legislative solution that would extend the statute of limitations. 20 7
Working with legislative counsel, Vartkes Yeghiayan and the Armenian
National Committee crafted Senate Bill 1915, the Armenian Genocide Vic-
tims Insurance Act.20 8 The purpose of this legislation was to assert and so-
lidify California's state interest in the rights of Armenian Genocide victims
and their heirs based on its large Armenian-American population.
highly unlikely that in a deeply divided political environment the Republican leader
would bow under pressure from the President. A former Republican member of the
House Rules Committee later revealed that when it became apparent that passage
was likely, in a backroom discussion minutes before the vote, Congressman Rogan
was asked whether passage of the Armenian Genocide resolution was vital to his
reelection. Rogan expressed confidence that he could win re-election, and the sup-
port of the large Armenian-American constituency in his district, without a vote on
the resolution. After Speaker Hastert pulled the resolution from the floor vote in
October 2000, Rogan lost the election. The implication was that the Armenian-
American community in southern California expressed their anger with the Repub-
lican Party by voting for Adam Schiff, and sending a strong message that there
were consequences for political backroom deals. Interview with (name withheld),
Armenian-American Community Activist, in Washington D.C., (Jan. 3. 2010).
A similar non-binding resolution, H. Res 252, was introduced by Repre-
sentatives Adam Schiff, Frank Pallone, Mark Kirk, and George Radanovich in the
1 th Congress (2009-2011), which called upon the President to ensure that U.S.
foreign policy reflect the appropriate understanding of human rights, genocide, and
the U.S. record regarding the Armenian genocide. On March 4, 2010, the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, chaired by Representati\e Howard Berman. voted to
recommend passage of the resolution by the entire House. In the (not so) lame-duck
session of Congress ending in December 2010, H. Res. 252 had garnered a majority
of bipartisan support in the House of Representatives based on member-to-member
confirmation and 'whipping' efforts. Although it appeared that there would be no
public opposition from the White House and State Department while the Turkish
lobby seemed caught off guard, the House leadership failed to schedule a \ote.
206 Former Senator Charles "Chuck" Poochigian represented the eastern parts of
the central California, from Bakersfield to Lodi, in the California State Assembly
and later the California State Senate.
207 Telephone Interview with Vartkes Yeghiayan, supra note 181. Principal,
Yeghiayan & Associates (Mar. 27, 2009). Telephone Interview with Steven
Dadaian, Armenian National Committee, Western Region (Oct. 16, 2009).
208 Telephone Interview with Vartkes Yeghiayan, supra note 181. Principal,
Yeghiayan & Associates (Mar. 27, 2009). KARAtI IIIlAN & AURON, supra note 6,
at 90-91. The bill number was presumably derived from the year that the Armenian
Genocide began. New York Life did not actively challenge the constitutionality of
S. B. 1915, even though it had several opportunities to do so.
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California Senate Bill 1915 extended the statutory limitations for
filing Armenian Genocide era insurance claims and required California
courts to retain jurisdiction. Specifically, beneficiaries of Armenian Geno-
cide era insurance policies purchased between 1875 and 1923 could bring
legal action to recover their claims in California as the proper forum until
December 31, 1)10. 21)" The California Senate legislation provided the plain-
tiffs with the necessary tools for overcoming the issues raised in the motion
to dismiss.
The legislation made its way through the California Senate Judici-
ary committee, received positive votes in the House and Senate, and went to
the governor's desk, with the motion to dismiss essentially put on hold due
to successive requests for continuance. In June 2000, then Senator
Poochigian informed the court that tentative timeline for legislative action
on S. B. 1915 was August and in fact, it reached the governor in September
2000.
On October 2, 2000, the Armenian insurance plaintiffs filed an op-
position to New York Life's motion to dismiss by arguing that the forum
selection clauses and statute of limitations were unenforceable and invalid.
Specifically, plaintiffs argued that S.B.1915 extended the statute of limita-
tions for filing claims under these policies and directed California to retain
jurisdiction. The plaintiffs' opposition framed the case as "an insurance
bad-faith case brought by representative members of a class of 10,000 eth-
nic Armenians, the majority of whom live in California." The opposition
continued by laying out a very succinct history of the Armenians in the
Ottoman Empire, the Armenian Genocide, and the capitulary treaties that
allowed New York Life to do business in the Ottoman Empire. Through this
historical framework, the plaintiffs argued that in the aftermath of the Ar-
menian Genocide, New York Life delayed and eventually denied valid in-
surance claims and thus, deprived genocide survivors of vital financial
resources.
The plaintiffs further argued that the forum selection clauses were
invalid at the time the parties contracted because they were standard forms
209 See California Civ. PROC. CODE § 354.4 (West 2000). This legislation was
modeled largely on California's Holocaust Victim's Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA)
which was passed into law in 1999. See Telephone Interview with Steven Dadaian,
Armenian National Committee, Western Region (Oct. 16. 2009). The only signifi-
cant differences between the two statutes is that HVIRA required insurers doing
business in California to disclose the names of all Jewish policyholders in Nazi-
controlled Europe. However, in American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S.
396 (2003), the Supreme Court declared HVIRA unconstitutional because it inter-
fered with U.S. foreign policy, specifically the German Foundation agreement.
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likely printed outside the Ottoman Empire and the chosen forums were geo-
graphically distant from the Armenian provinces of the Ottoman Empire.
Furthermore, the travel restrictions on Armenians living in the Ottoman
Empire would have made it impossible for the policyholders to petition the
courts in Europe. Therefore, in light of the unequal bargaining power of the
parties and the political and historical context of the Ottoman Empire, the
plaintiffs argued that the forum selection clauses were unenforceable. The
plaintiff's also argued that under Bremen t. Zapata, the enforcement of the
forum selection clause was discretionary where it would be unreasonable.
The plaintiffs' expert declarations painted a different picture of the
French and British forum selection clauses. A British barrister clarified that
the English courts would only exercise jurisdiction over resident litigants or
litigants that could be served within the jurisdiction. For litigants outside
the jurisdiction, the parties would apply for permission to serve process.
According to rules enacted in May 2000, such permission would only be
granted if the court was "satisfied that England and Wales is the proper
place in which to bring the claim." Thus, the plaintiffs' expert declaration
demonstrated that geographic convenience, costs, contingent-fee arrange-
ments, and legislative interests all weighed in favor of the British court
refusing to exercise jurisdiction over the litigants and their claims. The dec-
laration also highlighted that the forum-selection clause appeared to be part
of a standard form and did not provide any language of exclusivity of
forum.
Similarly, the plaintiffs' French expert also explained French courts
would not exercise jurisdiction due to the lack of contacts with France. Spe-
cifically, the French lawyer explained that the insurance policy contracts
included clauses for the "election of residence" as the location where the
contracting party would receive notices, in this case, France. However, the
election of residence of France became invalid in 1925 when New York
Life ceased doing business in France. Without residency in France or any
connection with France, the plaintiff's expert explained the French courts
would not exercise jurisdiction.
After briefing of the motion to dismiss, the parties returned to the
negotiation table for setlement talks that lasted several months. 2 0 As part
of that process, New York Life provided to the plaintiffs print-outs of poli-
210 New York Life retained Walter "Wally' Karabian as outside counsel primarily
for the negotiation process. Karabian hailed from Fresno. California and was a
former California Assemblyman and later majority leader for the democratic cau-
cus in the California Senate. Yeghiayan describes the moment of walking into the
ncgotiation and encountering Karabian, known for his political activism on behalf
of the Armenian-American community, a "'nightmare."
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cies retrieved from their archives. 21' Although it was common practice by
insurance companies to periodically purge their records, New York Life had
maintained the archive of index cards detailing policies held by Armenians
from the Ottoman Empire.'2 2 This archive was saved pursuant to a note,
with no known author, directing that the records were never to be purged. 2'3
The key outstanding issues between the parties during negotiation
were class certification, value of the policies, and interest calculation. On
April I1, 2001, New York Life and Kabateck distributed press releases an-
nouncing a general settlement between the parties, however, Yeghiayan's
name was missing. -' 4 In this initial settlement, New York Life agreed to pay
$7 million to the claimants and $3 million to Armenian civic organiza-
tions.2 15 When Yeghiayan received news of the announcement, he was
shocked and angry because his clients, particularly the Marootians, had not
agreed to the settlement.
In response and through an article placed in the Los Angeles Times,
Yeghiayan announced that Kabateck and Shernoff were being replaced with
Mark J. Geragos 2' 6 and that any previously announced settlement was re-
jected by the plaintiffs. 217 Yeghiayan also made it clear in the article that,
from his perspective, the sticking points in the negotiation was the calcula-
tion of interest. He believed that $7 million was not enough and stated,
"They kept this money for 87 years. They invested this money. They prof-
ited with this money. What would be fair would be for them to return the
money with the profits."2' 8 According to Yeghiayan's calculations the $7
211 Telephone Interview with Vartkes Yeghiayan. supra note 181. Principal,
Yeghiayan & Associates (Mar. 27, 2009). See Beverly Beyette, He Stands Up In
the Name of Armenians, L. A. TiM,.s, April 27. 2001, at El.
212 Telephone Interview with Vartkes Yeghiayan, supra note 181. Principal,
Yeghiayan & Associates (Mar. 27, 2009).
213 Id.
214 Joseph B. Treaster, Insurer to Pav Armenian Massacre Claims, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 12. 2001, at A24.
215 Beyette, supra note 211.
216 Interview with Vartkes Yeghiayan, Principal, Yeghiayan & Associates (Nov.
27, 2009).
217 See Beyette, supra note 211. Interview with Vartkes Yeghiayan. supra note
216. Principal, Yeghiayan & Associates (Nov. 27, 2009).
218 Interview with Vartkes Yeghiayan. supra note 216. Interview with Vartkes
Yeghiayan, Principal, Yeghiayan & Associates (Nov. 27, 2009) ("They kept this
money for 87 years. They invested this money. They profited with this money.
What would be fair would be for them to return the money with the profits.")
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million settlement would amount to thirty-two dollars per year for eighty-
seven years to each of two thousand five hundred claimants. 219
Geragos, an Armenian-American attorney known for his celebrity
criminal-defense practice, brought a new dynamic to the lawsuit through
increased media attention. 221 Eventually, Geragos convinced Yeghiayan to
bring Shernoff and Kabateck back into the legal team and to the negotiating
table. On November 28, 2001, the parties met at the downtown Los Angeles
federal courthouse for a last-ditch effort in bringing about a settlement. Al-
though many of the attorneys on both sides were in agreement on the terms,
Yeghiayan refused any further settlement proposals. He ended further dis-
cussions with the statement, "I'm not going to sign. Let's go to court."
Yeghiayan, along with the Marootians, entered Judge Christina
Snyder's courtroom for a ruling on the motion to dismiss. The defendant's
motion to dismiss was denied. The ruling explained that all forum-selection
clauses were subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness and under
Bremen v. Zapata Oil, there are three exceptions for enforcing a facially
valid forum-selection clause. 221 Accordingly, the clause was unenforceable,
if (1) the selected forum is "gravely difficult and inconvenient" that the
complaining party will" for all practical purposes be deprived of its day in
court;" (2) the clause was a product of "fraud, undue influence, or over-
weening bargaining power;" or (3) enforcement would contravene a strong
public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by
statute or by judicial decision222
Following The Bremen analysis, the district court held that the fo-
rum selection clauses were fundamentally unfair because forcing the plain-
tiffs to bring their claims in English or French courts would effectively
deprive them of a judicial remedy due to the inconvenience. 223 Additionally,
the court held the forum-selection clauses to be fundamentally unfair be-
cause socio-historic factors of the Ottoman Empire and language barriers
219 Id.
220 Helen Gao, Genocide Settlement Disputed; Insurer Challenges California Ju-
risdiction, L. A. DA ,Y Ntiws, Aug. 3, 2001. at N3 (noting addition of Geragos, the
"high profile attorney" with a "string of prominent clients," to legal team represent-
ing Armenians in suit against New York Life).
221 Marootian v. New York Lite Ins. Co. (C.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2001, No. 99-12073)
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22274, *9 (citing MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U.S. 1, 12-18(1972)).
22 Id.
221 Marootian v. New York Life Ins. Co. (C.I). Cal. Nov. 28, 2001, No. 99-12073)
2001 U.S. Dist. ILEXIS 22274, *18.
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realistically prevented the plaintiffs from reading and understanding the
specific clause as well as physically accessing the selectcd-forums.
22 4
3. New York Life Unsuccessfully Asserts Sovereignty and Foreign
Affairs Defenses
The court also addressed the constitutionality of California Code of Civil
Procedure § 354.4, which extended the statute of limitations for Armenian
insurance claims, finding it controlling and not inconsistent with the U.S.
Constitution or the powers of the national government. 225 Citing the deci-
sion in Gerin, Global Reinsurace Corp. of America v. Low,,22( the court
interpreted the foreign affairs preemption doctrine narrowly. Unless the
plaintiffs were a foreign government or the effect of the legislation would
be more than incidental, the foreign affairs preemption doctrine did not ap-
ply. 227 Specifically, the court held that
Section 354.4: (1) is not intended to influence the affairs of
Turkey, or any other country; (2) is not a form of economic
sanction backed by significant assets; (3) has not been
shown likely to be followed by other states; (4) has not
elicited protests from any foreign country; and (5) has not
been shown to directly conflict with any federal law. 22 8
Based on this analysis, the court held that section § 354.4 was con-
stitutional as an expression of public policy and that New York Life's mo-
tion to dismiss for improper venue was denied.
4. New York Life Settles
The court's decision effectively sent the parties back to the negotiating ta-
ble, this time with the media spotlight on New York Life. 229 From 2002 to
2004, various settlement efforts and mediation sessions failed to move the
parties any closer to reaching an agreement. Eventually, the plaintiffs' attor-
neys turned to the California insurance commissioner, John Garamendi, for
'24 Id. at *23.
225 Id. at *25.
226 140 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 2001).
227 Marootian v. New York Life Ins. Co. at *35-36.
'28 Id. at *39.
2'1 Yeghiayan and New York Life's relations were strained by the end of 2001. In
light of the perceived intransience, Yeghiayan attempted to publicly shame New
York Life through the media as well as through public appearances and protests.
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assistance as a mediator.2 30 Garamendi flew to New York to meet with the
New York Life chairman, Seymour Sternberg, and to see if the deadlock
could be broken. According to Yeghiayan, the New York Life chairman
made an offer through Garamendi and explained that the plaintiffs would
not see -a penny more." 231
On January 28, 2004, the two sides announced a settlement of the
lawsuit for a total of $20 million. 232 According to the terms, $11 million
was set aside for potential claims by the heirs of 2,400 policyholders, $3
million was to be distributed to nine Armenian charitable organizations and
$6 million was allocated for attorneys' fees and administrative costs. As
part of the claims distribution plan, the plaintiffs' attorneys were directed to
set up a website with information regarding the policyholders. Although the
collective settlement amount was impressive, the resulting average payment
per policyholder works out to only S4,583.33 based on an estimated 2,400
policyholders-hardly a litigation windfall.
230 Garamendi had assisted in negotiating similar settlements on behalf of Holo-
caust victims as an American regulator to the International Commission on Holo-
caust Era Insurance Claims. See Joseph B. Treaster, National Briefing-West:
California: Attack on Holocaust Panel Chief, N.Y. Tirvu-s (Sept. 26, 2003), at A18.
231 Interview with Vartkes Yeghiayan, supra note 216. Principal. Yeghiayan & As-
sociates (Nov. 27, 2009).
232 See Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Settlement Agreement,
Marootian v. New York Lifte Ins. Co. No. 99-12073-CAS-Me. Docket # 208 (C.D.
Cal. filed Feb. 19, 2004). Two attorneys who were separately representing individ-
ual members of the class on a pro bono basis (John Pridjian and Ste\en Dadaian)
filed objections to the settlement. Their objections xkcre based on the patent unfair
nature of the settlement amount. which they argued was based upon the face 'alues
of policies at the time, and not the modern contemporary' value. They also objected
on the basis that the settlement failed to require Newk York Life to disoorge itself of
the substantial gains that money earned them during the intervening 89 years.
These objections were ultimately overruled by Judge Snyder "ho stated that it was
her belief that the Insurer may argue that without a demand and a rejection any
claim lor interest for the ensuing years may not be obtainable. Telephone Interview
with Steven Dadaian, Armenian National Committee, Western Region (Jan. 13,
2011). See Preliminary Objections: Notice of Appearance and Intent to Appear at
Final Approval Hearing; Joinder in Motion Regarding Class Notice, Marootian v.
New York Lite Ins. Co. No. 99-12073-CAS-Me, Docket # 233 (C.D. Cal. filed Jun.
14, 2004).
2012 STONEY ROAD OUT OF EDEN 55
E. The Munich Re Litigation an1( the Oscillating Hegemony o/ the
Foreign Aff/iirs Del/'nse
In contrast to New York Life, which settled in the face of litigation setbacks
and socio-political pressure, Munchener Ruckversicherungs-Gesellsschaft
Aktiengesellschaft AG, better known as Munich Re, fought at the appellate
level and was initially rewarded for its efforts in resisting any compromise
with the beneficiaries and descendants of Armenian life insurance policy-
holders. Munich Re, the sixth largest insurance company and the largest
reinsurance company in the world, 233 is the successor in interest to Victoria
Versicherung AG and Ergo Versicherungsgruppe AG, two insurers that also
sold policies to Armenians in Turkey prior to the Genocide.23 4
Responding to a class action filed by Vazken Movsesian in 2003,
Munich Re declined to discuss settlement to any significant degree and
raised a number of technical legal defenses 233 to the policyholder 23 6 claims,
including the perhaps unsurprising contention that the statute of limitations
had expired.
233 BUSINI SS MoNrIOR INTERNATIONAl. LT)., GIRMANY INSURANCE Ri powr 2011,
at 5 (2010).
234 See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian 1), 578 F.3d 1052 (9th
Cir. 2009).
235 By labeling the Munich Re defenses "'technical," we arc not attempting to pre-
judge their merits as in the oft-heard layperson's complaint that a party in litigation
"won on a technicality." Technical defenses may reflect meaningful social policies
protecting litigants, ensuring finality, foster efficiency, and so on. But a technical
defense, in our lexicon, is one that does not address the merits of the dispute. In the
Armenian Genocide Insurance litigation, the merits concerned whether the defend-
ants had issued life insurance policies to persons who had subsequently died and
whether the insurers had paid the policies' required death benefits to the benefi-
ciaries of the victims. To our knowledge, neither Munich Re nor any of the other
insurers denies that they issued many policies, that the persons insured are no
longer alive, and that they have not (absent litigation compulsion) paid the death
benefits provided by the policies. In other words, the insurers tacitly concede that
they were paid non-trivial amounts of premium, have been able to invest the money
for approximately one hundred years, and have failed to honor the contracts they
issued. Under these circumstances, one would logically hope that any technical
defenses raised by these insurers would need to be quite compelling to be allowed
to succeed.
236 Although the term "policyholder" most accurately means the person who
purchases and owns an insurance policy, we also use it for ease of reference in
describing the litigation even though the plaintiffs were of course not the
policyholders.
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Specifically, Munich Re contended that the action should be gov-
erned by the standard four-year statute of limitations in such breach of con-
tract matters, 237 rather than the extended statute of limitations provided by
the California Legislature's amendment to California Code of Civil Proce-
dure § 354.4, which specifically gave descendants of persons impacted by
the Armenian Genocide until the end of 2010 (subsequently extended to
237 Under what might be termed generic California law free of any special sociopo-
litical considerations, the statute of limitations for contract actions is four years. See
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337(1) (West 2011). In California, an insurer's bad faith
can give rise to actions in tort and in contract, so plaintiffs may elect which theory
they will pursue. See Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn., 426 P.2d 173.
178 (Cal. 1967); Archdale v. Am. Int'l. Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d
632, 647-48 n.19 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). Accordingly, the statute of limitations pe-
riod may be two years for actions in tort under CAL. CIv. PROC. COD § 339(1)
(West 2011). or four years for actions in contract under CAL. Civ. PRO" CODE
§ 337(1) (West 2011). See Archdale, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 647-48 n.19, 652. General
personal injury tort claims have a two-year limitations period. See CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE § 335.1 (West 2011). To the extent that claims against an insurer sound in
fraud, the applicable statute of limitations is three years. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 338(d) (West 2011).
California limitations law requires plaintiffs to bring a claim within the
prescribed limitations period "after the cause of action shall have accrued." See
CAL. CIv. PROC CODE § 312 (West 2011). Generally, "a cause of action accrues at
'the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements."' Fox v.
Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 110 P.3d 914, 919 (Cal. 2005). However, there are
exceptions to the rule. One important exception is known as the "discovery rule"
that "postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has
reason to discover, the cause of action." See id. See also Doe v. Roman Catholic
Bishop of Sacramento, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 597, 602 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). Such rule
"may be expressed by the Legislature or implied by the courts." E-Fab, Inc. v.
Accountants, Inc. Servs., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 9, 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). In addition, as
in most states, the running of the statute of limitations under California law is sub-
ject to tolling (suspension of the running of the statute) if there has been fraudulent
concealment by the defendant, provided that the plaintiff acted with reasonable
diligence. See Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S. A., Inc., 151 P.3d 1151, 1159 (Cal.
2007). See also Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, A. G., 526 F Supp. 2d 1068 (C.D.
Cal. 2007) (addressing statute of limitations issues, including potential application
of discovery rule, tolling, and equitable estoppels against defendants, finding plain-
tiffs not to have made requisite showing to trigger these doctrines, but permitting
plaintiffs to amend complaint).
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December 31, 2016) to commence litigation.238 Although the extended stat-
ute of limitations was obviously applicable law, Munich Re contended that
the extension was unconstitutional in that it "interferes with the [United
States] national government's conduct of foreign relations.- 2 9 Trial judge
Christina Snyder rejected the argument 240 but was reversed in the Ninth
Circuit panel's initial 2-1 decision in favor of Munich Re24'--which, in a
surprising turn, was then reversed when a member of the panel changed her
vote.' 4' Munich Re obtained review before an en banc Ninth Circuit, which
essentially reinstated the first panel decision, ruling that California's exten-
sion of the statute of limitations was subject to field pre-emption because it
conflicted with the federal government's foreign policy, in particular the
desire to enhance relations with Turkey as an ally by resisting congressional
and state reference to the Genocide.2 43
In its first decision in the case [Movsesian f], the Ninth Circuit
panel majority held that the extended limitations period violated the foreign
affairs doctrine in that it conflicted with U.S. Executive Branch policy
"prohibiting legislative recognition of an 'Armenian Genocide. ' " 2 4 The
238 See Movsesian 1, 578 F.3d at 1052-54 (recounting the history of California's
Senate Bill 1915 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess. )): CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 354.4 (West
2011) (current deadline for filing is Dec. 31, 2016).
239 Id. Movsesin 1, 578 F.3d at 1053.
240 See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, No. CV-03-09407-CAS-JWJ
(C.D. Cal. June 6, 2007) (order granting in part and denying in part defendant's
motion to dismiss the second amended complaint).
241 See Movsesian 1, 578 F.3d at 1053; (f. id. at 1063 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
242 See Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG (Movsesian I1), 629 F.3d 901 (9th
Cir. 2010); discussed infra text accompanying notes 276-81.
243 See Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, Movsesian v. Victoria
Versicherung AG, No. 07-56722 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2009) and (Movsesial Ii), 670
F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012) (en bane). Because of the size of the Ninth Circuit, it has
adopted the practice of providing "en banc" review by a panel of eleven judges
rather than the entire Circuit membership, which numbered 25 judges as of March
19, 2012.
244 See Movsesian 1, 578 F.3d at 1056. Munich also argued that the foreign affairs
doctrine preempted the California law because of the World War I-related Claims
Agreement of 1922 and the War Claims Act of 1928. but the panel did not reach
this issue. See 578 F.3d at 1053. However, in a lengthy opinion in similar litigation
against German banks, a federal trial court found the Claims Act arguments con-
vincing. See Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank. A. G., 526 F.Supp. 2d 1068, 1079-
1088 (D.C. Cal. 2007). However, the Deirnenjian Court rejected the banks' argu-
inent that the litigation was barred by the "act of state" doctrine, which forbids
litigation in U.S. courts from rendering an adjudication that negates a foreign
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panel majority based its conclusion on a multi-episode pattern of U.S. Presi-
dents discouraging Congress from passing resolutions using the term "geno-
cide" or criticizing Turkey, which has been seen as a useful or even
necessary ally in the Middle East, particularly when the second Iraq War
was active, 245 because of the U.S. use of Turkish airspace and facilities. 246
The Movsesiun I panel majority seemed particularly impressed by
the Bush Administration's response to the House's 2007 resolution, which
included a joint letter from Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and Defense
Secretary Robert Gates to House leaders in which
the Secretaries underscored the importance of Turkey's
contributions to the war in Iraq. . . .The Secretaries noted
that when the French Assembly voted in favor of a similar
bill, the Turkish military cut off contact with the French
military and terminated defense contracts under negotiation
[and] warned that '[a] similar reaction by the Government
of Turkey to a House resolution could harm American
troops in the field, constrain our ability to supply our troops
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and significantly damage our ef-
forts to promote reconciliation between Armenia and
Turkey[.] ' 47
state's law. See Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, A. G, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
96772, at *73-*94 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2006).
245 We deem the period from the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq to the present as the
"Second" Iraq War to distinguish it from the 1991 Gulf War. In 2009, the U.S.
announced and commenced a gradual withdrawal of troops from Iraq and ushered
in a period of relatively few American casualties in Iraq. The Iraq War. after being
initially a very hot, largely conventional war during the first month of the 2003
invasion subsequently went through various periods of increased and reduced actix-
ity and American casualties, with notable periods of Iraqi "insurgency." Things
improved as a result of the 2007 "surge" of additional troops and the "Anbar
Awakening" that enlisted Sunni Muslim tribal leaders against the insurgents, deliv-
ering better peacekeeping control of the country. Although as this is written the
Iraq War appears to have receded from American public consciousness, it provided
many periods of high intensity violence and active U.S. troop maneuvers. See gen-
era/h" DiX-IER FII.KINS. Tiii. FoRiVER WAR (2008): BOB W(0u)OI\ARD, TIE WAR
WITHIN: A SECRF1l Wti i Housi HisToR 2006-2008 (2008): RAJIV CItAN-
IDRASIKARAN , lMIuPLIAI LIFE IN TE EMERAI . CII: INSIIF IRAQ S GREEN ZONI
(2006). See also James Fallows. Blind Into Baghdad. ATEIANTI(" MONTHI.'. Jan./
Feb. 2004, at 52 (describing chaos that ensued in the inmediate aftermath of initial
U.S. success in defeating Iraqi troops and deposing Saddam Hussein).
246 See Movsesian I, 578 F.3d at 1057-61.
2,17 Id. at 1058-59.
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Discussing "several failed House Resolutions, H. R. Res. 106,
110th Congress (2007), HR. Res. 193, 108th Congress (2003), 11. R. Res.
596, 106th Congress (2000)," the Movsesian I panel noted that *'[e]ach of
these resolutions formally recognized the 'Armenian Genocide' land that]
[elach time, the Administrations of President [George W.] Bush and Presi-
dent [Bill] Clinton took specific action, privately and publicly, to defeat
these measures."' IThe panel opinion quoted a letter from President Bill
Clinton to then-House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.):
[I] am deeply concerned that consideration of H. Res. 596
at this time could have far-reaching negative consequences
for the United States. We have significant interests in this
troubled region of the world: containing the threat posed by
Saddam Hussein; working for peace and stability in the
Middle East and Central Asia; stabilizing the Balkans; and
developing new sources of energy. Consideration of the
resolution at this sensitive time will not only negatively af-
fect those interests, but could undermine efforts to en-
courage improved relations between Armenia and Turkey -
the very goal the Resolution's sponsors seek to advance. [I
urge] in the strongest terms [that the House] not bring this
Resolution to the floor at this time. -24 9
The majority also noted a similar letter from a State Department
official in response to House Resolution 193, introduced in 2003,1() view-
248 Id. at 1057.
24) Id. (quoting a Letter from President William J. Clinton to House Speaker Den-
nis Hastert on a Resolution on Armenian Genocide, 3 Pub. Papers 2225-26 (Oct.
19, 2000)).
250 "An official from the State Department," never named in the Movsesian I panel
opinion, wrote:
I am writing to express the [Bush] Administration's opposition to
the working of H. Res. 193 of April 10, 2003 [W]e oppose
HR 193's reference to the "Armenian Genocide." Were this
wording adopted it could complicate our efforts to bring peace
and stability to the Caucasus and hamper ongoing attempts to
bring about Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. We continue to be-
lieve that fostering a productive dialogue on these events is the
best way for Turkey and Armenia to build a positive and produc-
tive relationship. Declarations such as this one, however, hinder
rather than encourage the process.
See id. at 1058.
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ing the Bush "Administration's opposition to House Resolution 193 [as]
based solely on two words found in the resolution: 'Armenian Geno-
cide.'"251 The panel was also aware that the government of Turkey sought
to have the California statute overturned and had written to the Ninth Cir-
cuit urging this result.252
Movsesian I regarded this executive concern over displeasing Tur-
key as sufficient evidence of an established U.S. foreign policy to require
the courts to strike down California's extended statute of limitations for
Armenian Genocide-related insurance claims, analogizing the case to Amer-
i can Insurance Ass'n v. Garanendi'2 3 in which the U.S. Supreme Court
"recognized for the first time that 'presidential foreign policy' itself may
carry the same preemptive force as a federal statute or treaty."' 4 In
Garamendi, "[u]nlike in previous cases, the presidential foreign policy was
not contained in a single executive agreement but was 'embodi[ed]' in sev-
eral executive agreements, as well as in various letters and statements from
executive branch officials at congressional hearings." '255  Quoting
Garamendi, Movsesian I found that the letters to Congress reflected a suffi-
ciently established Executive Branch policy and ruled that "[lt]he exercise of
the federal executive authority means that state law must give way where
... there is evidence of clear conflict between the policies adopted by the
two." 256
251 Id.
252 Id. at 1055 (noting a Letter from Turkish Ambassador Nabi Sensoy to Molly
Dwyer, Ninth Circuit Court Clerk, but declining to take judicial notice of the
letter).
253 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
254 Movsesian 1, 578 F.3d at 1056. Where U.S. foreign policy is reflected in a
treaty (which must be ratified by the Senate as well as signed by the Executive) or
in an executive agreement, there is significant precedent stating that conflicting
state law is preempted. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (find-
ing that claims against han for the expropriation of property were barred by a U.S-
Iran agreement to secure the release of hostages taken in the 1979 seizure of the
U.S. Embassy in Tehren); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942) (finding
a national executive compact with Soviet Union valid and extinguishing state
claims): United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937) (upholding the
same compact).
255 Movexin 1, 578 F.3d at 1056.
256 Id. at 1056 (citing Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 423.) The Movsesian panel also
noted that:
Section 354.4 was modeled after § 354.5 and § 354.6, which ex-
tended the statute of limitations until 2010 for Holocaust-era in-
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The Movsesian I court found a clear conflict "on the face of the
statute" because by using the term Armenian Genocide, "California has de-
fled the President's foreign policy preferences."-2 1 California's extension of
the statute of limitations for lilc insurance claims by displaced Armenians
had, by using the word "genocide," run sufficiently afoul of U.S. foreign
policy to be struck down, precluding the Movesian plaintiffs from making
use of the elongated limitations period.25 To the Movsesian / panel, at least
at first blush, the case was essentially a repeat of Grtanwindi, 21 9 in which
the U.S. Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision marked by atypical division
within the Court -2( had invalidated California's Holocaust Victims Insur-
ance Relief Act of 1999 [-HVIRA"] that required "any insurer doing busi-
ness in that State to disclose information about all policies sold in Europe
between 1920 and 1945 by the company itself or any one 'related' to it.-' '
surance claims and World War 1I slave labor claims, respectively.
Sen. Jud. Comm., analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1915 (1999-2000
Reg. Sess.) May 9, 2000, pp. 2. 4. Both of these sister statutes
have been found unconstitutional, because they interfered with
the national government's foreign affairs power. Deustch v. Tur-
net-, 324 F.3d 692. 716 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding § 354.6 unconsti-
tutional): Steinberg v. Int. Comm. on Holocaust Era Ins. Claims,
133 Cal. App. 4th 689, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 944 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)
(finding § 354.5 unconstitutional).
Movsesian 1, 578 F.3d at 1054-55 (italics in original).
217 Movsesian 1, 578 F.3d at 1060.
258 See id. at 1056, 1062-63. Because there remained issues as to whether the regu-
lar statute of limitations for contract claims (without the extension for Armenian
Genocide insurance claims enacted in 2000) might be tolled or the insurers stopped
from asserting a limitations period defense, the case was remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings. Id. at 1063. Without doubt, however, the Molissian I panel
decision was big victory for Munich Re and a likely harbinger of success in the
litigation in light of the practical problems the plaintiffs will have attempting to
present claims on which the ordinarily applicable statute of limitations appears at
first glance to have expired more than eighty years ago.
251 See id. at 1060-62 ("As in Garanendi, the express presidential foreign policy
and clear conflict raised by § 354.4 are 'alone enough to require state law to
yield."') (citing Garamnendi, 539 U.S. at 425).
260 Justice Souter authored the Garamendi majority opinion and was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy. and Breyer. Justice Gins-
burg countered with a powerful dissent joined by Justice Stevens and, perhaps sur-
prisingly, by infrequent allies Justices Scalia and Thomas. See 539 U.S. at 430-43
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
26 1 Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396. 401 (2003).
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As discussed below, the Movsesian I majority's initial assessment
is subject to serious criticism, not only because of its failure to appreciate
the distinctions between the instant matter and the HVIRA provisions at
issue in Garamendi, but also because of its eagerness to expand a most
problematic area of American jurisprudence-arguably excessive judicial
deference to the Executive Branch. 26'2 Addressing these defects in a brief,
but thought-provoking dissent to the Movsesian I opinion, Judge Pregerson
noted that states have traditionally enjoyed wide authority to regulate insur-
ance and that state regulation designed to enforce insurance contract com-
mitments serves a substantial state interest:
The strength of this traditional state interest weighs against
preemption in a case, such as the case before us, where
there is doubt about the clarity of the conflict between state
law and federal policy. Indeed, there is no conflict. I can
find no evidence of any express federal policy forbidding
states from using the term "Armenian Genocide."The ma-
jority accurately states that the "federal government has
made a conscious decision not to apply the politically
charged label of 'genocide' to the death of Armenians dur-
ing World War I. Nowhere, however, does the majority
point to any evidence of an express federal policy barring
states from so doing.
There is no express federal policy forbidding California
from using the term "Armenian Genocide" in the course of
exercising its traditional authority to regulate the insuranceindustry.26,3
The Movsesian plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing en banc. ' 6
While the petition was pending, the initial panel decision received signifi-
262 See infra Part LII.B.3.
263 Movsesian 1, 578 F.3d at 1063 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). See also 578 F.3d at
1063 ("The majority's reliance on Deustch v. Turner, 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003).
is misplaced. Whether California has, while acting within its authority to regulate
the insurance industry, intruded upon the province of the federal government has no
bearing on the existence of, or conflict with an, express federal policy applicable to
the states.") (italics in original).
264 Sec Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, Movsesian v. Victoria
Versicherung AG, No. 07-56722 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2009). Because of its size, the
Ninth Circuit has established a modified procedure for discretionary en banc review
before a group of eleven circuit judges, rather than providing en banc review by the
entire 29-judge Court of Appeals. See 9TH CR. R. 35-3: 28 U.S. C. § 44(a) (2011).
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cant scholarly criticism".1 Particularly biting was Professor Michael Ram-
sey's critique of Movsesian as exhibiting excessive deference to the
executive that gives the President an unofficial power to make law by de-
cree',' in violation of longstanding iconic precedents such as Youngstown
Sheet & Tube v. SawvYer,2- 11 the famous steel mill seizure case, Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 21'5 and most recently, Medellin v. Texas, ' which he read
as reining in the potential mischief of the Garamendi decision relied upon
by the first Movscsian majority. 2 1 Professor Ramsey persuasively argued
265 See, e.g., Herbert R. Reginbogin, Litigating Genocide ofthe Past, 32 Loy. L. A.
INTAI & Coo..ip. L. RLv. 83 (2010); Harut Sassounian, Genocide Recognition and a
Quest for Justice, 32 Loy. L. A. INr'L & CoMP. L. Rrv. 115 (2010). The entire
issue of this Review was devoted to issues of justice regarding atrocities committed
against minorities, in effect putting the Armenian Genocide and efforts at recom-
pense for the crime on a par with the Nazi Holocaust directed toward Jews and
other atrocities.
266 See Michael D. Ramsey, International Wrongs, State Laws and Presidential
Policies, 32 Loy. L. A. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 19 (2010). Subsequent scholarship
has also been highly critical of Movsesian I and expansive application of field pre-
emption based on the foreign affairs power, which lacks a textual basis in the Con-
stitution. See, e.g., Carolyn A. Pytynia, Note, Forgive Me, Founding Fathers for I
Have Sinned, A Reconciliation of Foreign Affairs Preemption After Medellin v.
Texas, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1413, 1433-34, 1441 (2010); Arnir M. Tikriti,
Note. Beyond the Evecutive Agreement: The Foreign Policy Preference Under
Movsesian and the Return of the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power in Norton Simon,
38 PEPP. L. REV. 755 (2011). But see Matthew Schaefer, Constraints on State-Level
Foreign Policy: (Re)Justfving, Refining and Distinguishing the )ormant Foreign
Affairs Doctrine, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 201 (2011) (generally supporting broad
notions of field preemption pursuant to foreign affairs doctrine). See also Michael
Aaron Granne, Two-Dimensional Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption, 44
VAL. U.L. REv. 863 (2010) (advocating refinement of preemption doctrine but un-
clear as to impact in case like Movsesian).
267 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Youngstown), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
In Youngstown, the Court in a 6-3 decision struck down President Truman's seizure
of American steel production facilities, which the President had attempted to justify
as necessary to the Korean War effort. See Ramsey, supra note 266, at 28-29.
268 Dames & Moore v. Regan. 453 U.S. 654 (1981). In Dames & Moore, the Court
unanimously rejected a challenge to President Reagan's negotiated resolution se-
curing the release of American Embassy personnel imprisoned in Iran, finding the
case distinguishable from Youngstown. See Ramsey, supra note 266, at 29-31.
269 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 4901 (2008). In Medellin, the Court ruled that
Texas state criminal law was not displaced by executive authority. See Ramsey,
supra note 266, at 36-40.
270 See Ramsey, supra note 266, at 41-43.
64 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 18
that the initial panel decision in Movsesian was severely flawed, not only as
a matter of constitutional law, but as a matter of nuanced interpretation of
precedent in that (as interpreted by Medellin), Garamendi did not require
dismissal of the Movsesian claims in view of the differing nature of the
reporting requirement imposed on insurers in Garamendi and the mere ex-
tension of the statute of limitations for state law contract claims in
Movtsesian.271
Simultaneously, the Movsesian plaintiffs, their counsel, and politi-
cal allies could have considered seeking re-enactment of the extended limi-
tations period shorn of the troublesome term "Armenian Genocide," but did
not pursue this option in earnest. 272 A fair reading of Movsesian I suggests
that the first panel decision might have been different and found no conflict
pre-emption for the extended limitations period if it had not contained the
"politically charged" term that arguably was the sole basis for Executive
Branch opposition during the past fifteen years. 273
The Movsesiu, rehearing petition remained pending for nearly 18
months without action. The effort to obtain insurance proceeds for the de-
scendants of Armenian Genocide victims appeared to have hit a seemingly
definitive roadblock.' 74 There also appeared to be no significant movement
in favor of a negotiated reparations methodology for victims as took place
regarding similar insurer failures to honor policies issued to European
Jews. 275 It appeared that as a practical matter, the New York Life settlement
271 See id. at 35-38.
272 See Telephone Interview with Vartkes Yeghiayan, Yeghiayan & Associates,
lead attorney in Marootian v. New York Life (March 20, 2009 & No\. 27. 2009).
273 See Movsesian 1, 578 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that Executive
Branch opposition to resolutions condemning actions against Armenians during
1915-1923 period focused almost exclusively on term "Armenian Genocide" and
fears of strong Turkish reaction to use of term).
274 There are, of course, considerable practical difficulties in attempting to over-
come a statute of limitations defense by Munich Re or other insurers in the absence
of extension by California legislature. See Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, A. G.,
526, F.Supp. 2d 1068. 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (while not completely foreclosing
tolling and estoppel arguments concerning limitations period made by plaintiffs
alleging wrongful, opportunistic conversion by banks of Armenian assets in con-
spiracy with Turkish government, the Court suggests great difficulty for plaintiffs
seeking to overcome ordinary statute of limitations applicable to such actions):
Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, A. G., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96772 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 25, 2006), at *108-42 (similar but more extensive discussion of limitations
period issues).
275 See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 397-402 (2003) (discussing
these efforts and their impact on the Court's decision regarding California
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would be the only compensatory victory in the Armenian Genocide insur-
ance litigation.
Then, without warning, the Movsesian I panel reversed itself as
Judge Dorothy Nelson changed her vote, producing the Mov'sesian I! opin-
ion in which formerly dissenting Judge Harry Pregerson was now the ma-
jority opinion author, while Movsesian I author the late Judge David
Thompson became the dissenter in Moi'sesian !I.276' As one might expect,
Movscsian 11 lies in diametric opposition to Movsesian 1, almost as if the
two majority opinions were issued from different planets. Although high-
lighting the common reality that adjudication is a highly pragmatic enter-
prise in which "the law" can hinge on the current preferences of a singly
human being wearing a judicial robe, 277 Movsesian 11 is unusual in that
such complete reversal of a panel opinion usually comes only at the
hands of an en banc court composed of a larger and different mix of
judges. In Movsesian II, the about-face came solely because of Judge
Nelson's change in position. 278 Because the change emanated from the same
HVIRA); STUART EIZENSTAT, IMPFRFECT JUSTICI (2003); MICIIAEI R. MARRUS,
SONI: MEASURE O1 Jtts-t:: Til- Ho OCA[tSI ERA Ri srIrTUTI(N CAMPAIGN 01 TuE
1990s (2009).
276 See Movsesian I1, 629 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2010). Judge Thompson died on Feb-
ruary 19, 2011 after taking ill while at an appellate panel sitting in San Francisco.
He was 80 years old and had served on the Ninth Circuit for 25 years. See Carol. J.
Williams, David R. Thompson des at 80; Reagan appointee to 9th Circuit, L. A.
TIMrs, Feb. 23, 2011, available at http://articles.latimes.com/news/obituaries/la-
me-judge-david-thompson-20110223.
277 Since the legal realist movement of the 1930s, this is hardly a radical observa-
tion but it nonetheless is jarring (although pleasantly so in having the better rea-
soned Movsesian I replace Movsesian I) to see a single vote so dramatically shift
the locus of the law regarding an issue. But se SETH STERN & STEPHEN WFRMIEI,,
JiSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 278 (2010) (noting the frequency with
which Justice Brennan in conversation with his law clerks would hold up five fin-
gers, indicating that the outcome of a case under review depended upon a bare
majority of the Court reaching a consensus as to the result).
217 Although it is unusual to have a single judge change positions so dramatically
in the same case, at the same stage of review (as opposed to after remand and
additional developments of record), it is not dramatically rare and has occurred
with more far-reaching consequences. See, e.g., NOAH Fri.DMAN, SCORPIONS 115-
21 (2010) (describing Justice Owen Roberts' change in attitude toward reach of the
Commerce Clause of Justice Owen Roberts, the "switch in time that saved nine"
that in turn ushered in the modern era of expansive interpretation of the Clause and
the constitutional reach of federal government power). But the Roberts change in
position occurred over the course of two Court terms (albeit a period of time less
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panel, there remained the prospect of rehearing en banc, which later
transpired. 79
Shifted from dissenter to majority author in Movsesian II, Judge
Pregerson expanded on his analysis to produce a sound opinion that could
serve as a useful template for the future by requiring that there be an "ex-
press federal policy" barring the state legislative action as a prerequisite to
striking down such legislation on foreign affairs grounds,280 In contrast to
the summary dissent in Movsesian I, the Movsesian II majority opinion de-
tailed the mixed signals sent by the national government regarding the Ge-
nocide -a history in which presidents have both urged Congress to be
sensitive to Turkish interests, but have also been happy to stand in solidarity
with Armenian-Americans in remembering the Genocide. 218 Although
pushed back by the White House in 2003 and 2007 when considering ex-
press resolutions about the Genocide, "the House of Representatives [had]
had done so in the past [in 1975 and in 1984]."' - In addition, noted the
Movsesian II opinion, nearly forty states have officially recognized the Ge-
nocide without federal government opposition. 283
than that between Movsesian I and Movsesian I) and was reflected in two different
cases.
279 See Movsesian Ill, 670 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
280 See, 629 F.3d at 903. 905-908.
281 See id. at 905-907 (noting that although there are "informal presidential com-
munications" discouraging the use of the term "Armenian Genocide." including
executive opposition to 2003 and 2007 resolutions about the Genocide, such com-
munications are not "sufficient to constitute an express federal policy." Id. at 906.
However, President Clinton and President Obama when Senators, both recognized
and condemned the Genocide. See id. at 907-908. "The Executive Branch has re-
peatedly used terms virtually indistinguishable from- the term Armenian Genocide.
Id. at 906-908 (citing examples of President Clinton in 1998, President Reagan in
1981, and statements of then-Senator Obama). In addition, in 2009. "President
Obama publically remembered 'the 1.5 million Armenians who xvxere [] massacred
or marched to their death in the final days of the Ottoman Empire. '" Id. at 907.
282 See id. ("In 1975, the House observed a day of remembrance for 'all v ictims of
genocide, especially those of Armenian ancestry.'" H.J. Res. 148, 94th Congress
(1975). In 1984, the House similarly recognized "victims of genocide. especially
the one and one-half million people of Armenian ancestry." H.J. Res. 247, 98th
Congress (1984).
283 See Mov'sesian II, 629 F.3d at 907. See also Plaintiff's Response to Petition for
Rehearing En Bane at 4 n.2, Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 629 F.3d 901
(2010) (No. 07-56722) (listing state proclamations regarding remembrance of Ar-
menian Genocide).
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Although there have been federal executive efforts to tread lightly
because of concerns over relations with Turkey, Movsesian 11 emphasized
that "not every executive action or pronouncement constitutes a proper in-
vocation of that potentially preemptive policy-making power, ' '284 by citing
Medilli, v. Te-kas285 and giving a restrained construction to Garamend28
6
Consequently, the Movsesian I court rejected Munich Re's argument that
California's extension of the statute of limitations was barred by "conflict
preemption ' 281 or "field preemption" '28 with national foreign affairs policy.
The Movsesian I court also rejected Munich Re's preemption defense
based on the 1922 Claim Agreement governing debts owed to Americans
by Germany and the 1928 Settlement of War Claim Act: "The insurance
284 Movsesian II, 629 F.3d at 906. See also Ramsey, supra note 266, at 20. The
Movsesian I approach is consistent with Professor Ramsey's criticism of Movse-
sian I and suggested methodology, but is more deferential to federal executive
power in that the Movsesian I majority, despite being unwilling to yield to infor-
mal or unclear expressions of presidential sentiment, appears to be willing to yield
to sufficiently concrete and formal expressions of presidential authority while Pro-
fessor Ramsey would require deference only in areas where the executive has been
expressly given lawmaking power because in matters of domestic policy, "the Pres-
ident is not a lawmaker."
285 552 U.S. 491 (2008). See also Ramsey, supra note 266, at 41-43 (discussing
Medillin v. Texas at length in relation to Movsesian I).
286 American Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003). The Movsesian I
approach is consistent with Professor Ramsey's criticism of Movsesian I and sug-
gested methodology (see Ramsey, supra note 266) but is more deferential to federal
executive power in that the Movsesian 11 majority, despite being unwilling to yield
to informal or unclear expressions of presidential sentiment, appears to be willing
to yield to sufficiently concrete and formal expressions of presidential authority
while Professor Ramsey would require deference only in areas where the executive
has been expressly given lawmaking power because in matters of domestic policy,
"the President is not a lawmaker." See Ramsey, supra note 266, at 20. Am. Ins.
Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
'87 See Movsesian 11, 629 F.3d at 905-909. (Stating "we cannot conclude that a
clear, express federal policy forbids the state of California from using the term
'Armenian Genocide."').
288 See id. (Stating "California's attempt to regulate insurance clearly falls within
the realm of traditional state interests" and is not subject to field preemption, which
"would only apply if a 'State were simply to take a position on a matter of foreign
policy with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility.'"
(quoting Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420, n. 11)).
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policies were the private property of insured American citizens of the Otto-
man Empire, not German debts owing to American citizens."-S1
Now relegated to a dissenter's role, Judge Thompson reiterated his
majority opinion arguments from Movsesian I, in particular arguing that the
Movsesian II decision was in tension with Supreme Court precedent such as
Garamendi, as well as Ninth Circuit decisions exhibiting greater concern
over impact of state laws in seeming tension with presidential prefer-
ences.11 Based on the Thompson dissent, Munich Re successfully peti-
tioned for rehearing before the Ninth Circuit en banc, 29 I a move supported
2", See Movsesian II, 629 F.3d at 908. Expanding on this explanation and distin-
guishing potentially adverse precedent, the court concluded that
Munich Re's reliance on Deutsch v. Turner, 324 F.3d 692 (9th
Cir. 2003), is misplaced. In Deutcsch, we invalidated a California
statute that allowed World War II slave laborers to bring war-
related claims against wartime enemies of the United States.
Deutch, 324 F.3d at 712. We held that California's attempt to
create a private right of action for war-related injures intruded
upon the federal government's exclusive power over matters re-
lated to war. Id. at 712-716. Here, in contrast. § 354.4 does not
implicate the government's exclusive power o\er war. Section
354.4 covers private insurance claims, not wartime injuries.
Furthermore, as the district court noted, the Claims Agreement
was signed before the end of the Armenian Genocide. We
reject Munich Re's assertion that the Claims Agreement, which
resolved claims from the concluded fighting in World War I, has
any bearing on life insurance policies issued to citizens of the
Ottoman Empire. The Claims Agreement and War Claims act
therefore do not preempt § 354.4.
d. at 908.
290 See Movsesian 11, 629 F.3d at 910-12 (Thompson, J., dissenting). In addition to
his reading of Garatnendi as blocking the California law, Judge Thompson noted
several U.S. Supreme Court cases highly deferential to executive authority in for-
cign affairs (id. at 910) and made particular note of relatively recent Ninth Circuit
cases viewed as inconsistent with Movsesian II. See id. at 911. See. e.g.. Von Saher
v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954. 965-68 (9th Cir. 2010)
(affirming the district court's holding that a California statute dealing \\ ith recoery
of art stolen by Nazis was preempted because the statute "intrudes on the federal
government's power to make and resolve war"): Deutsch \. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d
692, 715-16 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding unconstitutional California statue providing
recovery to World War II slave laborers because the statute intruded on the federal
government's power to resolve war claims.).
2' See Petition for Rehearing En Banc, filed by Munich Re in Movsesian v. Victo-
ria Versicherung AG, 629 F.3d 901 (20 10) No. 07-56722 (arguing that the Movse-
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by the government of Turkey. 2 In February 2012, the en banc Court, in
what might be called Movsesian I//, reinstated Movsesian I's holding of
field pre-emption, finding California's extension of the statute of limitations
for these insurance claims in too much tension with U.S. foreign policy. );
Although better crafted than the initial panel decision in Movsesian
1, and stripped of some of that decision's efforts to elevate correspondence
to the level of national policy, Movsesian III is sweeping in its application
of the foreign affairs doctrine, aggrandizement of even informal Executive
Branch action, and disregard for traditional state prerogatives. Movsesian
III held California's Code of Civil Procedure §354.4 pre-empted by the for-
eign affairs power of the national government because "even in the absence
of any express federal policy, a state law still may be preempted under the
foreign affairs doctrine if it intrudes on the field of foreign affairs without
addressing a traditional state responsibility."
Although the foreign affairs power of the national government is
well established and has been invoked to strike down state law deemed
inconsistent with U.S. foreign policy, Movsesian III, despite being clothed
in precedent, is seriously flawed. The en banc Ninth Circuit erred in first,
regarding California's elongated statute of limitations as an "intrusion" on
sian II holding "'is both incorrect and a danger to U.S. Interests" and accusing
California of attempting "to establish its own foreign policy - which chooses sides
in a dispute between Turkey and Armenia ") .
21' See Petition for Rehearing En Bane, filed by The Republic of Turkey in Movse-
sian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, No. 07-56722. United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit (Jan. 3, 2011). See also Scbnem Arsu. Turkey Seethes at the
U.S. Over House Genocide Vote, N.Y. TIMI..s, Oct. 12, 2007, at A12 (labeling of
"Armenian killings as genocide is considered an insult against Turkish identity"
and "a crime.") (quoted in Munich Re Petition for Rehearing,. supra note 290, at 4
n.1). But see Brief of Amici Curiae Human Rights Orgs. in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees & in Opposition to Rehearing En Bane at 17-18, Movsesian 11, 629 F.3d
901 (2010) (No. 07-56722 ("Turkey cannot create [U.S. state and federall foreign
policy conflicts.").
29 See text accompanying note 417, infra, discussing extensive line of cases re-
flecting considerable deference to Executive Branch concerns of congressional or
state action impinging on foreign affairs. Although Movsesian I and Judge Thomp-
son's dissent in Movsesian 11 are in our view disturbingly incorrect in their legal
analysis, the fact remains that Judge Thompson or others (including, perhaps, five
or more Supreme Court Justices) have a considerable body of law upon which they
may draw to make a colorable (if incorrect) argument for precluding California's
extension of the statute of limitations for Armenian Genocide insurance claims. See
Movsesian I11, 670 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
2_11 See id. at 1072.
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foreign affairs and second, refusing to accept regulation of the statute of
limitations for contract or insurance claims as a traditional state responsibil-
ity. Remarkably, Movsesian III did not even cite Medellin v. Texas, the U.S.
Supreme Court's most recent exploration of the foreign affairs power in
conflict with state law.2
95
Although the California legislature was obviously taking a position
in opposition to the Genocide and its consequences, and using language the
riled Turkey, this is hardly much of an "intrusion" on U.S. foreign policy.
Nothing about the California law interferes directly with national govern-
ment dealings; the law does not in any material way interfere with Ameri-
can trade or military objectives.
To be sure, the Movsesian III Court was able to cite seemingly
favorable precedent to support its decision. But on closer examination, all
of these instances in which preemption was imposed are distinguishable
from California Code of Civil Procedure § 354.4, in that these other cases
involved significantly more entanglement in foreign affairs by either the
state itself or courts required to adjudicate the state law.2 96 By contrast,
29b See id. at 1073-74 (extensively discussing American Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi.
539 U.S. 396 (2003), but never mentioning Medellin v. Texas. 522 U.S. 491
(2008), which arguably revised the doctrine and constricts the precedential value of
Garamendi). See also Ramsey, supra note 266: Tikriti, supra note 266, Pytynia,
supra note 266.
296 See Movsesian III, passim. See, e.g.. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S.
396 (2003) (preempting California law requiring reporting hy insurers of status of
benefit payments pursuant to policies issued to policyholders impacted hy Holo-
caust): Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (finding Oregon probate law pre-
empted); Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010)
(finding preempted California law permitting claims to recover art looted during
Holocaust): Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2_003) (striking down a
California law providing right of action to prisoners of war conscripted into forced
labor).
Garainendi is distinguishable because the disclosure regulations v ere
viewed as rehashing and thus undermining a substantial federally led effort that had
obtained an omnibus settlement of Holocaust-related insurance claims against Eu-
ropean insurers. As Movsesian III acknowledged, Garamendi is actually a "con-
flict" preemption case because of perceived direct conflict between California's
Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act and the federal settlement efforts, and is not
a field preemption case. But the Movsesian III Court found Garamendi instructive
regarding field preemption. Nonetheless, Garamendi is not controlling precedent
mandating the Movsesian Ill result.
While the Movsesian III Court was being so broad and legal realist in its
assessment of Garamendi, it might have taken the time to note that Garatnendi was
2012 STONEY ROAD OUT OF EDEN 71
a 5-4 opinion with a powerful dissent by Justice Ginsburg. Garaniendi barely found
conflict preemption in spite of the ar guably adverse federal actions on the same
topic, a conflict lacking in Alovsesian. And since Garalnendi was decided, Chief
Justice Rehnquist (who was part of the majority), and Justices Souter (who au-
thored the opinion), ()'Conner (also in the majority), and Stevens (one of the dis-
senters) have left the Court and been replaced by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan. And Justice Roberts authored the Medellin v. Te.as
opinion that has been interpreted by scholars as restricting the scope of Garamendi.
Under these circumstances, it seems inappropriate to read Garatnendi broadly as
precedent justifying field preemption of a state's lengthening of its statute of limita-
tions for pursuing life insurance claims merely because this is done to aid a particu-
lar adversely affected group and is done with nomenclature (use of the term
"genocide") that is bothersome to an ally.
Zschernig is distinguishable because the Oregon probate law permitted
aliens to inherit only if their own countries granted similar rights to American citi-
zens, which in turn imposed significant burdens on American courts and made it
"unavoidable" that courts would occasionally criticize other nations in ways
viewed as undermining national foreign policy. See 389 U.S. at 440-41.
Deutsch v. Turner Corp. differs from Movsesian in that this portion of the
California statute, although adjacent in the California Civil Procedure Code to the
section at issue in Movsesian, was read by the Ninth Circuit panel as creating a
cause of action for prisoners of war forced into slave labor. See 324 F.3d at 706-
709. In addition, there had been federally led efforts to achieve a resolution of the
problem. See 324 F.3d at 713-16. By contrast, the beneficiaries of Genocide-era
insurance policies already had available to them a common law action for breach of
contract and the statute merely extended the time limit for bringing this already
existing cause of action. In addition, there has been no formal U.S. government
effort to obtain payment for the beneficiaries of the policies. Further, although the
litigation in Deutsch was directed at corporations rather than the enslaving govern-
ments. there was overt coercion between the defendant companies and the govern-
ments enslaving war prisoners. Although the insurer defendants in Movsesian took
unfair opportunistic advantage of the dislocation caused by the Genocide, there is
no evidence that they overtly cooperated with the Turkish government in the
killings.
Von Salter, which struck down CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.3 is closest to
Mov.sesiani and perhaps not particularly distinguishable in that both the Von Saher
Court and the Movsesian III Court acknowledged that regulation of stolen property
was a traditional area of state responsibility. But both the Von Saher and Movsesian
III Courts found preemption because the "real purpose" of the respective statutes
was to assist the heirs of Holocaust and Armenian Genocide victims and that this
meant that California could not make a "serious" claim to addressing an area of
traditional state responsibility. See Movsesian III at 1074. Distinguishable or not,
these portions of Von Saher and Movsesian III are just plain wrong. Statutes of
limitation and other establishment or abrogation of contract, property, or tort rights
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§ 354.4 simply permits courts to perform the common judicial function of
adjudicating an insurance contract claim because of a lengthened statute of
limitations. 2117
Indirectly, of course, the use of the "genocide" terminology is up-
setting to the government of Turkey, as evidenced by the government's sub-
mission of briefs aligned with Munich Re.2 98 But such indirect offending of
another sovereign, although undoubtedly creating difficulty for U.S. diplo-
mats, seems to stop well short of "intrusion." 299 A serious inconsistency of
the "intrusion" argument is the national government's longstanding failure
to attempt to muzzle California and forty other American states that have
passed resolutions or issued proclamations condemning the Armenian Ge-
by a state remains a traditional state function regardless of the state's motivation.
Lengthening a statute of limitations does not suddenly fall outside the realm of
traditional state regulation when the motivation is to assist those displaced by
human rights violation any more than if the state had taken similar action for vic-
tims of floods, earthquakes, or hurricanes. Similarly, the language a state uses when
taking such action cannot in and of itself interfere with U.S. foreign policy. To the
extent that it does, both First Amendment rights of expression (enjoyed by states
just as much as by corporations or individuals) and Tenth Amendment rights of
state autonomy in a federal system would appear to preclude evisceration of the
statute due to its allegedly inflammatory language.
297 See Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1, 11-12 (lst
Cir. 2010) (enforcingMassachusetts statute of limitations notwithstanding the argu-
ment that it was inconsistent with U.S. policy regarding Nazi looting during World
War II).
298 See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curie of the Republic of Turkey in Support of Appel-
lants' [Munich Re'sl Petition for Rehearing En Banc in Movsesian III, No. 07-
56722 (Jan. 13, 2011) (on file with authors and Buffalo Human Rights Law Review)
(urging reversal of Movsesian 11 and preemption of Cal. Civ. Code § 354.4).
299 Foreign nations like Turkey. which are more centralized and less federalist than
the U.S., may have difficulty understanding that in America. the national gover-
ment is more limited in its powers. The federal government may dislike certain
state laws and its judiciary may ultimately refuse to enforce them, but there is little
practical ability to make state governments toe Washington's official line. To some
extent, the task of U.S. diplomats is to educate foreign allies as to this practical
reality of American government. Further, California is by far the nation's largest
state, accounting for more than twelve percent of its population. Presidential candi-
dates, particularly Democrats, probably cannot win the White House without the
electoral votes of California, which has a significant and politically influential Ar-
menian-American population. Despite the importance of Turkey to Mideast policy,
there is functionally little or nothing that can be done to muzzle California and its
Armenian community just as there is little that can be done to pull the national
government away from its embrace of Turkey for geopolitical reasons.
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nocide30 1° These are undoubtedly just as offensive to Turkey as California's
Code of Civil Procedure § 354.4, but Washington has done essentially noth-
ing to attempt to prevent or overturn those criticisms, nor has it publically
apologized to Turkey for those resolutions. 311
Against this backdrop, it is hard to take seriously the notion that
this California's statute using the words "Armenian Genocide" constitutes
pre-emptible intrusion in foreign affairs while similar language in other
state legislative or gubernatorial actions does not. States in criticizing the
Genocide, including California's language in § 354.4, are not attempting to
interfere with U.S. foreign policy, but rather are merely criticizing it, which
should not in a free society constitute state action that can be struck down
by a federal court. Movsesian III thus intrudes on state autonomy as a
means of punishing its legislature for using statutory language viewed as
intemperate.
One difference between California Code of Civil Procedure § 354.4
and Genocide resolutions, of course, is that § 354.4 provides entre to the
courthouse for the beneficiaries of life insurance policies sold to victims of
the Genocide. But this access to enforcement of contract rights is not di-
rected against the government of Turkey (nor, as we far as we can tell, any
Turkish citizens) but only against the insurers who sold the policies and
then opportunistically increased their profit by taking advantage of the mass
extermination of the policyholders followed by the disruption of World War
30 See Brief of Armenian Bar Association, et al. in Movsesian tI, No. 07-56722,
Addendum A (Feb. 11, 2011) (on file with authors and Buffalo Human Rights Law
Review) (listing recognition of Armenian Genocide by Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan. Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Wash-
ington, and Wisconsin as well as California, with several states recognizing and
condemning the Genocide on multiple occasions).
301 Admittedly, the thought of the United States apologizing to a foreign country
because 80 percent of its member States has criticized the foreign country's slaugh-
ter of innocent civilians seems more than a bit ludicrous. But if the U.S. govern-
ment was as serious as it purports to be about befriending Turkey and thwarting
such state efforts, one would logically expect as least an apology-and perhaps
efforts to cut off federal funding to states critical of the Genocide. None of this has
happened, further suggesting that despite the soapbox posturing of various political
actors regarding the Genocide and the importance of appeasing Turkey, state criti-
cisms of Turkey or the Genocide have no discernibly significant impact on U.S.
foreign policy.
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I and its aftermath, aided by a continuing cover-up of the mass killings.
Permitting plaintiffs to sue German insurers is a far cry from giving plain-
tiffs a right of action against a foreign ally in the face of national govern-
ment disapproval.
Limitations periods have long been recognized as a classic domain
of the States. 1 2 Likewise, contract law is largely state law, as is insurance
law. The state-based nature of insurance law is further enshrined in the fed-
eral statutory law of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 30 3 Movsesian III disre-
garded this largely because it found the language of the statute (the use of
the term "'Armenian Genocide") overly at odds with current U.S. govern-
ment diplomacy and because the motive underlying the statute was not one
of general law reform but instead an obvious attempt to assist descendants
of victims of the Genocide and to call attention to the atrocity: "[I]t is clear
that the real purpose of section 354.4 is to provide potential monetary relief
and a friendly forum for those who suffered from certain foreign events." 30 4
102 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (holding that under the
Erie Doctrine, federal courts presiding over cases where federal jurisdiction is
founded upon diversity of citizenship must apply state law of limitations rather than
federal common law doctrine of laches). Under Erie/York, it is clear that state stat-
utes of limitations are "'substantive" rather than procedural and reflect substantive
state policy. Consequently, enactment of §354.4 as part of California's Code of
Civil Procedure does not remove its substantive status nor diminish §354.4 as an
expression of state law and policy that covers state enforced contract rights.
303 The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §1101 et seq.. provides that federal law
generally does not govern insurance except to the extent that insurance is unregu-
lated by relevant state law. In all states, including California, insurance is a regu-
lated industry. State insurance law is displaced only if applicable federal law
expressly overrides state insurance law. See e.g., United States Dept. of Treasury v.
Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 (1993); JEFFREY W. STEMPI',, P'TER NASH SWISHER & ERIK
KNUTSEN, PRINCU'IES OF INSURANCE LAW 213-24 (4th ed. 2011) (also discussing
limited federal regulation of insurance in portions of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act. 15 U.S. C. § 313, which does not apply to
affect state statutes of limitation applicable to suits to collect insurance benefits).
304 Moivsesian III, at 1175. In an accompanying footnote, the Court weakly at-
tempts to wash its hands of complicity in the Turkish government's denial of its
version of the Holocaust by stating that "-Iwlc express neither agreement nor disa-
greement with the California legislature's viewpoint. We simply observe that Cali-
fornia's main goal in enacting section 354.4 was to provide redress for individuals
who were, in its view, victims of a loreign genocide, and that that goal falls outside
the realn of traditional insurance regulation." Id. at 1175 n.4. As discussed below,
the Court is simply incorrect. Regulation of limitations periods and efforts to mod-
ify or remove practical barriers to meritorious claims do not become any less of a
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Even if one were to accept the Movsesian III Court's implicit sug-
gestion that these are motives warranting corrective action by the federal
judiciary (we think, quite to the contrary, that the California legislature'.
motives were admirable), this reasoning ignores that, unless precluded by
the Equal Protection Clause, state governments traditionally have been free
to vary statutes of limitations so long as there is a rational reason and to
take remedial action when prompted by exceptional circumstances. Section
354.4 satisfies these criteria because it extends the limitations period in or-
der to remedy problems posed by external events (e.g., the Genocide, World
War I, silencing and displacement of victims, difficulty obtaining docu-
ments, World War 11, the Cold War) that realistically delayed the opportu-
nity for life insurance beneficiaries to exercise their rights to benefits on
policies sold to Armenians in Turkey prior to the Genocide.
Like remedial legislation designed to protect victims from sharp in-
surance adjustment practices after a flood, earthquake, or hurricane, § 354.4
responds to special circumstances so that claims to be heard on the merits
rather than defeated because external events acted to discourage or prevent
earlier claims. This is classic state legal activity, just as much so as setting a
tort statute of limitations at four years and a contact statute of limitations as
six years (or vice versa). It is also classic state legal activity just as much as
any state regulation simplifying proof of loss for victims of a natural disas-
ter or establishing a center for facilitating claims. Such traditional state ac-
tivities would become no less legitimate if the states in doing so took
rhetorical shots at "'unresponsive insurers" or "harassing adjustment prac-
tices."They become no less traditional state functions when the rhetoric in-
volves "Armenian Genocide."
Similarly, the use in a state law of terms found objectionable by a
foreign power clearly cannot overcome the core presumption of states rights
in the American federal system, a presumption given textual support by the
Tenth Amendment.30 5 Although that Amendment is seldom used to strike
down otherwise valid federal legislation, it should be given at least enough
judicial deference to prevent invalidation of state law in the absence of a
direct conflict with federal law or clear and reasonably concrete foreign
policy propounded by the federal government. Instead, Movsesian III struck
traditional state function when those barriers are the result of crimes against hu-
manity or stem from a state's revulsion over the criminal activity creating the
barriers.
305 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." See
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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down California law through application of a frighteningly broad notion of
"field" preemption °0 6 which it conceded, "is a rarely invoked doctrine."
30 7
1II. THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION AND LEGISLATION IN A HOBBESIAN
WORLD OF RFALPOLITIK
A. A Seemingly Perfect Crime
The Armenian Genocide 3 8 is perhaps the most successful atrocity in his-
tory. Turkey succeeded in its grim mission of killing or displacing the vast
306 Field preemption is distinguished from "conflict" preemption in that "[ulnder
conflict preemption, a state law must yield when it conflicts with an express federal
foreign policy" while under field preemption, or "dormant foreign affairs preemp-
tion," a state law may be invalidated because it "intrudes" on the national govern-
ment's power over foreign affairs without sufficient justification according to a
traditional state prerogative. See Movsesian III, at 1071-74. See also Deutsch v.
Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 709 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003) (using the term "dormant
foreign affairs preemption" to describe field preemption in the absence of direct
conflict between state law and federal law or express foreign policy).
307 Movsesian III, at 1075.
08 As readers have undoubtedly noticed by now, we do not hesitate to refer to the
events in Ottoman Turkey of1915-1923 as the "Armenian Genocide," in capital
letters similar to the nomenclature and treatment of the Nazi "Holocaust" directed
toward Jews. As previously outlined, the historical evidence of a state-sponsored
campaign seeking to exterminate Armenians (a/k/a "genocide") is undeniable. See
supra Part I.H. The term Armenian Genocide is not excessively melodramatic but
provides an accurate description of the episode. To be sure, the term is charged and
carries with it highly negative connotative value, which undoubtedly explains the
Turkish government's rear guard action attempting to eradicate the term. just as it
once attempted to eradicate the people.
While we find this sort of political "spin" relatively common, it seems
particularly absurd to see this sort of unqualified denial of reality and even more
absurd to watch the United States Executive Branch regularly participate in the
charade. We like to think we are not naive about the realities of foreign affairs,
even though the ability of governments to make and break alliances can ama/e
even the most jaded observer, a trait well captured in George Orwell's classic illus-
tration of a politician who in mid-speech switches the identities of an ally and foe
due to intervening circumstances. See Gi,.LRGF (RWII I , NINI-TEEN Ei(itTY-FOUR
180-82 (1949).
But the attempt by Turkey and the U.S. Executive Branch to avoid evcn
the use of the term Armenian Genocide has an unrealistic, almost infantile, quality
reminiscent of the wizarding establishment in the popular Harrv Potter series. See
e.g., J. K. ROWlING, HARRY Po0ni_.r AND Till SORCERER'S STONE (1998). Through-
out these seven books, the establishment (portrayed in particular by the bureau-
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majority of its Armenian population. The bulk of the Armenian wealth was
seized by state or other individual non-Armenians taking advantage of the
opportunity to convert or loot properties of the victims." ' The Genocide
was also a successful public relations campaign by the Young Turk govern-
ment that proved popular with the bulk of the populace, stirring Turkish
nationalism and ethnocentrism.Ill Nearly 100 years later, neither the current
Turkish government nor any discernable portion of the Turkish citizenry
will even acknowledge that this "shameful act" even took place." 1 Turkey
is in full-scale denial: "identifying [the] Armenian killings as genocide is
considered an insult against Turkish identity [and] a crime under Article
301 of the Turkish penal code."31 2 Modern Turks are taught a history that is
cratic and infiltrated Ministry of Magic) is an often or even largely ineffectual
group when faced with the evil wizard Voldemort. The wizards and witches
gripped by conventional wisdom regularly refuse to refer to Voldemort by name, an
avoidance strategy sensibly rejected by Potter, an aspect of the books intended to
convey to young readers the common sense view that people, societies, and govern-
ments should not be so intimidated by evil that they are unwilling to refer to it
plainly. The U.S. political establishment, including its judicial system, would do
well to draw the same lesson.
309 See supra Section I.H (describing the Genocide); AiMENIAN Goi,(iO'l' A, supra
note 3 (survivor describes attacks on Armenians and confiscation or conversion of
their property); AKCAM, supra note 4, at 149-204 (2006) (describing Genocide and
its effects): supra Part L.H (describing the Genocide).
310 See supra Section J.G (describing rise of Young Turks and use of scapegoating
of Armenians to increase and maintain government popularity): see AKCAM, supra
note 4, at 82-148 (noting degree to which emerging Turkish nationalism and de-
monizing of Armenians fed off one another and popularity of persecution of
Armenians): MOi,(ENrtHAU, supra note 56 at 290 ("[The Young Turks'] passion for
Turkifying the nation seemed to demand logically the extermination of all Chris-
tians - Greeks, Syrians. and Armenians."). See supra Part I.G (describing the rise
of the Young Turks and use of scapegoating of Armenians to increase and maintain
government popularity).
311 See AKCAM, supra note 4, at 303-76.
312 See Sebnem Arsu, Turkey Seethes At the U.S. Over House Genocide Vote. N.Y.
TIME s (Oct. 12, 2007) at IA, col. 4, available at 2007 WLNR 20039812 (cited in
Brief of Munich Re in Movsesian I at p. 5). See Arsu, supra note 292. Munich Re,
apparently reading the temperature of the Ninth Circuit bench better than we ever
could, quoted the Times article and emphasized the criminalization of any mention
of the Genocide as evidence of the degree to which any American invocation of the
term ran counter to the asserted national government policy of appeasing Turkey to
further foreign policy ends. As discussed above the argument resonated with two
appellate judges, at least in Movsesian I. See supra text accompanying notes 244-
46. We had expected that American jurists, trained in a system that privileges and
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more than revisionist-it indoctrinates the population in a falsehood (denial
of the Genocide) in a manner usually seen in only the most closed of socie-
ties. 3 And, for the most part, there were no sanctions of note imposed on
Turkey. 3' 4
Although there were noises to this effect in the aftermath of World
War I, Turkey ultimately paid essentially no price for the Genocide despite
backing the losing side in the War.3 1 - Little has changed in a century despite
protects free expression, would be uniformly appalled at the suggestion that be-
cause Turkey attempts to silence debate on the issue, the American national gov-
ernment should be able to gag American state legislatures as well.
Turkish government and society sensitivity to criticism is apparently not
reserved for only criticism by outsiders. As a student in Turkey in the 1970s, Clark
University Professor Taner Akcam was imprisoned for criticizing the government
"before escaping and immigrating to Germany." Since publication of A SHAMEFUL
ACT (supra note 4), he "has received numerous death threats from Turkish ultrana-
tionalists, who have also vandalized his Wikipedia page and called him a terrorist."
See Andrea Fuller, A Turkish Scholar Talks About the Armenian Genocide, CHRON-
ICLE HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 28, 2010, available at http://chronicle.com/article/5-min-
utes-With-Taner-Akcam-a/64847.
3 Although Turkish government and society deserve strong criticism for their
century-long refusal to admit and attempt to rectify the errors of 1915-23, it has
since the reign of the Young Turks, particularly Ataturk, been a largely secular
success story, particularly when compared to other countries in the Middle East and
Central Asia, in that it historically has had less corruption, more freedom, a better
economy, better education, and a more progressive society than many of its neigh-
bors. See Michael Winter, The Modernization of Education in Kemalist Turkey, in
ATATORK AND THE MODERNIZATION OF TURKEY 192-93 (Jacob M. Landau ed.,
1984); GRAHAM E. FJLI[.R, THE NEW TURKISH REPtJBI C: TURKEY AS A PIVOrAL
STATE IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 6, 55, 83, 91 (2008): E. Fuat Keyman & Senem
Aydin Dfizgit, Europeanization, Democratization and Human Rights in Turkey, in
TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: PROSPECTS FOR A DIFFICULT ENCOUNTER 69,
71 (Esra LaGro & Knud Erik Jorgensen eds., 2007): Mustafa Acar, Towards a
Synthesis of Islam and the Market Economnv? The Justice and Development Party's
Economic Reforms in Turke, 29 EcoN. AFF. 16, 18 (2009); Jeffrey C. Dixon, A
Clash of Civilizations? Examining Liberal-Democratic Values in Turkey" and the
European Union, 59 BRIT. J. OF Soc. 681, 686-87, 699 (2004). To a significant
degree, Turkey s backward and strident views on the Armenian Genocide are out of
character.
3I4 See supra text accompanying notes 293-98: AKCAM, supra note 4, at 349-76;
BAI.AKIAN, supra note 5, at 363-92.
315 See supra text accompanying notes 159-60 AKCAM, supra note 4, at 349-76:
BAI.AKIAN, supra note 5, at 363-92.
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episodic but harsh criticism from human rights advocates. 1I6 As of early
2012, it appears that the only tangible punishment of Turkey for the atroci-
ties perpetrated is some reluctance to admit it into the European Union in
the absence of acknowledgment of its crimes, although cynics are perhaps
justified in believing that if the Turkish economy becomes sufficiently sta-
ble, it will ultinmately gain EU membership even in the absence of any ad-
mission or apology for the Genocide.1' 7 Any Turkish recognition, remorse,
or reparations regarding the Genocide seem unlikely in the foreseeable
future.
Indeed, one of the signal characteristics of the Armenian Genocide
as contrasted with other past atrocities is that the perpetrators have both so
steadfastly denied their crimes and been left largely unpunished and un-
remembered. 31a By contrast, Germany-which was "inspired" by the suc-
316 See supra text accompanying notes 293-345; AKCAM, supra note 4, at 349-76;
BAr AKIAN, supra note 5. at 363-92; POWER, supra note 3, at xix, 1-17.
317 See, e.g., Knud Erik Jorgensen & Esra LaGro, Conclusion and Perspectives:
Whither Turkey's Accession,, in TURKEY AND Tim; EUROPFIAN UNION: PROSPE(TS
FOR A DIFFICULT ENCOUN'IFR 221, 222 (Esra LaGro & Knud Erik Jorgensen eds.,
2007) ("In order to stall the process, the EU or some of its member states will try to
dwell on the Cyprus issue, and even if the Cyprus issue is resolved there will be
other issues - for example, the Armenian genocide issue Hence negotiations
will be determined by the degree to which the Turkish government is ready to make
political concessions."); Gtilnur Aybet, Turkey and the EU After the First Year of
Negotiations: Reconciling Internal and External Policy Challenges, 37 Sr.cumrY
DIALOGUE 529, 547 (2006) (describing Turkey's offer of full membership in the
EU as a likely "acceptance/reiection" determination, regardless of whether Turkey
adopts each EU-proposed reform); Anna Hakobyan, Armenia: 'Genocide' on the
Agenda, TRANSITIONS ONILINE, Dec. 20, 2004 ("Istanbul's recognition of the mur-
der of Armenians from 1915 to 1917 as an act of genocide may be on the agenda
when Turkey begins talks on accession to the European Union, but likely only as a
side issue."): Paul Kubicek, Turkish Accession to the European Union: Challenges
and Opportunities, 168 WORMD AFFAIRS 67, 75 (2005) (suggesting that Turkey's
progress in complying with the Copenhagen Criteria will be the basis for its accept-
ance or rejection by the EU, rather than the Armenian genocide). See also M.
Cherif Bassiouni, Justice and Peace: The Importance of Choosing Accountability
over Realpolitik, 35 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 191, 194-95 (2003) (describing how
realpolitik of the 1930s trumped the recognition of, and accountability for, the Ar-
menian genocide).
318 It appears that many if" not most history textbooks used in American high
schools, for example, contain no significant discussion of the Armenian Genocide.
For example, the European History course materials used in the Green Valley High
School (Henderson, Nevada) International Baccalaureate program appears to makes
almost no mention of the Genocide and generally portrays the Young Turk govern-
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cess of the Armenian Genocide during the Third Reich 3 19-was severely
punished for its actions during World War II,120 while German society to-
day has an ethic of apology and shame regarding the Jewish Holocaust.
32
'
ment that administered the Genocide in a favorable light. See JOHN P. McKAY,
BENNETT D. HILL & JOHN BUCKLER, A HISTORY OF WESIERN SOCIETY: FROM
ABSOLUTISM TO THE PRESENT (7th ed. 2003) (no mention of Armenian Genocide
but omission arguably results from Western European focus in that there is also
little discussion of Ottoman Empire), PALMER & COLTON, supra note 1, at 657,
710-11, 791-93 (brief discussion of Armenian massacre of 1894 and 1915 Geno-
cide; Ataturk (Mustapha Kemal) and Young Turks portrayed in favorable light).
See ilso note 97, supra, regarding modern connotations of "Young Turk" label.
3 ,' When questioned as to whether his persecution of Jews and other disfavored
groups might be excessive and invite retaliation by other nations and the world
community, Adolph Hitler is said to have replied that because Turkey had never
been called to account for the Armenian Genocide, Germany was unlikely to face
negative repercussions in its drive toward a "final solution" of exterminating Jews.
See WILLIAM A. S('t1ABAS, supra note 167, at 1, n.2: Bassiouni, supra note 302, at
191, 195: Vahakn N. Dadrian, supra note 160, at 503, 530-541. Mussolini took a
similar view. See Not Just Hitler's Fool, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 21, 2009, at 55
("His mistress even recorded a remark by Mussolini in 1938 that foreshadowed the
Final Solution: 'I shall carry out a massacre, like the Turks did'-an apparent allu-
sion to the mass killing of Armenians in 1915.").
320 See TELFORD TAYLOR. THI ANATOMY 01; THE NURI.MBI.R(i TRIAl.S: A PER-
SONAL MEMOIR (1992) (U.S. war crimes prosecutor describes trial and punishment
of Nazi war crimes and human rights abuses); ABBY MANN, JUDGMENT AT NTREM-
BERG (2002); HANNAH ARENDT, EICtIMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BA-
NALITY OF EVIL, 120-23, 133-34, 231 (1963) (describing trial of Nazi war criminal
Adolph Eichman by Israel, famously terming robotic manner in which Germans
complied with Hitler's directives the "banality of evil."). See also MARK W. JANIS,
AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 256-61 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing Nu-
remberg trials); GEOFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMEs AGAINST HUMANITY: Ttil STRUG-
GILE FOR GLOBAL JUSTrICE 244-55 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing Nuremberg trials):
SCHABAS, supra note 167, at 43-52 (discussing Nuremberg trials and genocide
prosecutions of Germans after trial of major war criminals).
'21 See, e.g., EI.AZAR BARKAN, Ti-a GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTItLTION AND NEGOTI-
AlTING HISTORICAL INJtJSI('I.s 29 (2000) ("One could say that Auschwitz became
the German emblem of the war because as their history and guilt became their
contemporary identity, it symbolized for the Germans their own guilt and complic-
ity."): Roy L. Brooks. The Age of Apology, in WttEN SORR)' ISN'T ENOUGH: THE
CONTROVERSY OVER APoI (I!,s & REIPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJU STICE 3-4 (Roy
L. Brooks ed., 1999) ("German society is a much better place today because
Gcrmans have been forced, and have forced themselves, to face their guilt with
deep humility and penitence. So painful and enduring is the moral stain on the
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On a political level, then, the Armenian Genocide succeeded. In
this instance, crime did indeed pay for those fomenting and supporting the
Genocide. Crime also appears to have paid for a variety of private actors
able to capitalize on the slaughter and displacement of the Armenian popu-
lation. Some of the Genocide's gangsters or opportunists took Armenian
tangible property: land, homes, businesses. Banks allegedly wrongfully re-
tained Armenian deposits that did not escheat to the state or worked with
the state to convert Armenian property. 2 And, of course, insurers who sold
policies to Armenians have for the most part been able to pocket the premi-
ums, retain any investment income, and pay nothing or only a fraction of
the value of the policies sold in spite of the undeniable fact that covered
losses have taken place.121
The Armenian Genocide is also widely regarded as a "success" in
that it paved the way for other state-sponsored atrocities by demonstrating
that a government bent on assault and murder of a segment of its population
could achieve its goals with near-impunity so long as it was sufficiently
ruthless in executing its crimes and remorseless in denying guilt. 32 4 The
German soul that it may lend some truth to Socrates' argument that it is better to be
the victim than the perpetrator of an injustice."); MARY FULBROOK, GERMAN NA-
TIONAL IDENTITY AIFER THE HoiEOCALJST 48-78(1999) ("The absorption in constant
confessions of guilt, the state of permanent penance, almost prevented West
Germans from admitting anyone else to their community of the agonized soul.");
KARl. JASI'I Rs, lIIi QtJESliON O1 GERMAN GUILT (E. B. Ashton trans., 1947) (dis-
tinguishing concepts of German guilt concerning the Holocaust). But see Michael
Slackman, American Sues Ev-Nazi Over Killings, but Germany Doesn't See a War
Criminal, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 8, 2010 at A9, col. I (Bernhard Frank, "once a trusted
aide to Heinrich Himmler, the second most powerful man in Nazi Germany," has
never been punished for his presumed involvement in Nazi atrocities at the "man-
agement'" level because Frank did not individually and personally harm Jews).
322 See Deirmenjian v. Deutsche Bank, A. G., 526 F.Supp. 2d 1068 (C.D. Cal.
2007) (contending that German bank defendants collaborated with Turkish govern-
ment to launder and conceal Turkey's illegal confiscation of Armenian wealth);
KARAGUI /1IAN & AURON, supra note 6. at 99, 113; BOBELIAN, supra note 122, at
29.
123 See supra Part I.D-E (describing New York Life and Munich Re litigation).
124 BALAKIAN, supra note 5, at 299-392: AKCAM, supra note 4, at 368-76; Robert
F. Melson, The Armenian Genocide as a Precursor and Prototype of Twentieth
Century Genocide, in Is THE HOLOCAUST UNIQUE? PERSPECTIVES ON COMPARA-
TIVi GENOCIDE 88, 126 (Alan S. Rosenbaum 3d ed. 2009) ("[Tlhe Armenian Geno
cide approximates the Holocaust; but at the same time its territorial and national
aspects, which distinguish it from the Holocaust, make it an archetype for ethnic
and national genocides in the Third World, as well as in the post-Communist
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Genocide provided a blueprint to the Nazis and other governments. 32 5 Even
when crimes of this type are in public view, such as the Chinese attack on
peaceful demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, governments that deny the
event, minimize its carnage, or invent an excuse for the action have been
able to largely ride on without substantial punishment and perhaps even
without sustained criticism.326
states."): David Matas, Prose'uting Crimes Against Huanit* v: The Lessons of
World War , 13 FORDHAM INT'I. L.J. 86, 104 (1989-1990) ("Nothing emboldens a
criminal so much as the knowledge he can get away with the crime. That was the
inessage the failure to prosecute for the Armenian massacre gave to the Nazis.").
125 See POWER, supra note 3, at 1-20: DADRIAN, supra note 4, at 402 (describing
Armenian Genocide as a blueprint for the Holocaust): Dadrian, supra note 160, at
504. 532-35, 537-38, 542 (describing Armenian Genocide as a blueprint for the
Holocaust); Melson, supra note 309, at 126. 133-36 (describing Armenian Geno-
cide as a "prototype" for the Nigerian and Bosnian genocides).
326 Modem China serves as a disturbingly excellent example of this problem. De-
spite the highly visible mass slaughter of peaceful demonstrators in June 1989,
China continues to be accepted in the world community, continues to hold a seat on
the United Nations Security Council, continues to freely trade with the West. par-
ticularly the United States, and has never expressed so much as a moment of regret
regarding the Tiananmen atrocity. See, e.g., WARREN I. COHEN, AMERICA'S RE-
SPONSE TO CHINA 232-62 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing the United States' continued
engagcment with, and overall deference towards. China despite China's refusal to
acknowledge any wrongdoing in the Tiananmen massacre). In similar fashion, Rus-
sia appears to have vigorously persecuted minorities and political dissidents while
incurring few sanctions in return. See ElWARD LUCAS, THE NEW COILD WAR: Pr-
TIN'S RUSSIA AND Till THREAT TO THE WEST xxiii(rev. ed. 2009) ("Yet Western
policy remains paralyzed. Russia's most threatening behavior- bullying neighbors.
stitching up the energy market, turning money into power in Western Europe -
remains, in effect, unchecked."): William M. Burke-White. Human Rights and Na-
tional Security: The Strategic Correlation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 249, 278-79
(2004) ("In relations with Russia, U.S. policymakers have largely overlooked Rus-
sian human rights practices in Chechnya due to Russia's important role on numer-
ous issues-ranging from the intervention in Kosovo to the global war on terror."):
Jeffrey Kahn, Vladimir Putin and the Rule of Law in Russia. 36 GA. J. INT'I, &
COMtP. L. 511, 537-40 (2008), David J. Kramer, A Russia Reset with Human Rights,
WAS[I. POST, Sept. 20, 2010, at A 15 (discussing the Obama Administration's pol-
icy of rejecting "linkage" between human rights issues and the relationship between
the United Stales and Russia). Saudi Arabia and other Third World countries have
an institutionalized policy of subjugating women and overtly discriminating against
those who refuse to adopt the dominant national religion but the allegedly human
rights-conscious U.S. is only too happy to purchase its oil and to commit American
troops to defending it, including ousting Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. See ROBERT
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To be sure, the Armenian Genocide has its competitors in this meta-
phoric race for most evil government-sponsored activities) 27 Genghis Khan
is reported to have inflicted cruel, tortuous death on those who would not
surrender to his horde."I The Spanish Inquisition tortured and killed many
in what is often regarded as an exercise in paranoid religious hysteria.
329
B\i ,R SI.EEI'IN(; \VITiI Ttii DEVIL: How WASINGT(oN SO)LDl) OUR Sotl I.(R SAIJI
CRUDE 169, 185, 201, 212 (2003) (noting Washington's e\cr-present tendency to
overlook Saudi Arabian wrongs); TOBY CRAIG; JONES, DESERr KINGDOM: How On
AND WA' FR FoR;i) MOD[RN SAUDI ARABIA 33 (2010) ("Islince World War II,
when the kingdom's oil riches became clear, the U.S. government has placed a high
priority on the security and stability of the Saudi reginc, no matter its brutality or
excesses."). But (f RAC(.ln BRONSON, TIICKIR THAN OnI: AMFnw(A'S UNIFASY
PARTNERSHUI' wITn SAUDI ARABIA 255-62 (2006) (advocating continued engage-
ment with Saudi Arabia, rather than detachment and a simple determination that
"the regime is corrupt, morally bankrupt, illegitimate, and irredeemable").
327 See generally Powln., supra note 3.
328 See Timothy May, The Mongols at War, in GENGHIS KHAN AND THE MONGOL
EMPIRI 195 (William W. Fitzhugh et. al. eds.,2009) ("Psychological warfare, par-
ticularly in the lorm of terror, underlay the Mongol form of 'diplomacy:' enemies
were offered the choice to submit or die."); PAUL RATCHNIVSKY, GENGIS KHAN:
His LIFE AND Li..G;A('Y 163(Thomas Nivison Haining trans., 1992) (noting Genghis
Khan's custom of ordering the massacre of entire towns who resisted him); JEAN-
PAUL Roux, GENGIUS KHAN AND THE MONGorI EMPIRE 29 (Toula Ballas trans.,
2003) (describing terrible massacres and destruction by Genghis Khan and the
Mongols). See also JAMIs.s A. MICHENER, CARAVANS 170-71 (1963) (recounting
popular legend through Central Asia that when enemy soldiers refused initially to
surrender and were eventually captured, Genghis had them all packed into a large
pit until all died of asphyxiation, dehydration, hunger or other injuries). But ci.
JACK WEATHERFORD, GENGHIS KHAN AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD
115 (2004) ("[ajlthough the army of Genghis Khan killed at an unprecedented rate
and used death almost as a matter of policy and certainly as a calculated means of
creating terror Itlhe Mongols did not torture, mutilate, or maim."). Comparisons
between Genghis Khan and the perpetrators of the Holocaust and the Armenian
Genocide are not new. In fact, the principals of both the Holocaust and the Arme-
nian Genocide reportedly drew inspiration from Khan's "murderous legacy." See
Dadrian, supra note 160 at 542-47 ("[t]here can be no doubt that the example of
Genghis Khan impacted the organization and implementation of both the Armenian
and Jewish genocides.").
32" See HENRY CHARLES LEA, A HISTORY OF THE INQUISITION OF SPAIN 499-534
(1966) (discussing the fanaticism for religious conformity embodied in the Spanish
Inquisition and its "conscientious cruelty"). But cf HENRY KAMEN, THE SPANISt
INQUISIION: A HISTORICAL REVISION 276 (1997) (painting more complex picture
of the role and origins of the Spanish Inquisition and stating that "a good part of the
84 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 18
General Sherman tore apart much of the American South in marching to the
sea as part of future President, then-General Ulysses Grant's plan to destroy
the fighting capability of the Confederacy.30 The English government of
Inquisition s zeal for religion was little more than active xenophobia"): EDWARD
PETERS, INQU ISIION 86-104 (1988) (noting the Spanish Inquisition's constraint in
imposing the death penalty and its concern with the intent of the accused as com-
pared with other courts of that era); HELEN RAWIINGS, THE SPANISH INQUISITION I
(2006) (reexamining the Spanish Inquisition's "reputation for being a barbarous,
repressive instrument of racial and religious intolerance that regularly employed
torture as well as the death penalty as punishments and severely restricted Spain's
intellectual development for generations" and the image of the "Black Legend" that
portrayed "Spain as a nation of fanatical bigots").
330 See NOAH ANDRE TRI1)I,.AU, SOUTHERN STORM: SHERMAN'S MARC-t TO THE
SEA (2008); LEE KENNETI, SHERMAN: A SOLDIER'S Lii.E 257-82 (2001): BURKE
DAVIS, SII.RMAN'S MARCH (1980). When criticized for his harsh tactics, Sherman
famously replied "war is hell." See ANNE J. BAIL.EY, WAR AND RUIN: WILLIAM T.
SHERMAN AND THE SAVANNAH CAMPAIGN 134 (2003). And Sherman was not en-
tirely off base. Both international law and conventional morality commonly distin-
guish between injuries inflicted in battle or in a theatre of war and those imposed as
part of state or mob violence just as criminal law distinguishes between premedi-
tated killing and self-defense. However, in systematically destroying much of the
infrastructure of the South as part of his basic troop movements, Sherman arguably
crossed the line from warrior to terrorist.
Lest Yankee partisans become too annoyed at this suggestion, we note that
one might defend Sherman's seeming vandalism on the utilitarian ground that such
tactics brought an earlier end to the Civil War and therefore saved lives and prop-
erty overall. Perhaps. But we are skeptical. A similar debate has long surrounded
the American decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. We
remain uncomfortable with the utilitarian justification for arguably gratuitous kill-
ing and destruction. But this argument has long been accepted by the U.S. and has
empirical support. Japan quickly surrendered after the atomic bombings, an accel-
erated end to the War that surely created benefits, although perhaps not enough to
balance the large loss of civilian life. See, e.g., ROBI-RI JAY LIFrON & GRIG
MITCHEL., HIROSHIMA IN AMERICA: FIlm YEARS OF DENIAl (1995) (describing
negative moral, psychological, and political effects resulting from the "official nar-
rative" of the Hiroshima bombing): HIROSHIMA IN HISTORY: THE MYTHS OF REVI-
SIONISM I (Robert James Maddox ed., 2007) (challenging "Hiroshima revisionists"
who dispute President Truman's reasons for authorizing the Hiroshima bombing):
Gabriella Blum, The Laws of War and the "Lesser Evil" 35 YALE J. INT'I L. I. 24-
31 (2010) (discussing Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings as a case study to debate
humanitarian justification for violations of the laws of war). The fire-bombing of
Dresden, Germany in World War 11 presents similar issues. See A. C. GRAYLING,
AMONG Til, DIAl CIiEs: TIHE HISTORY AND MORAl LEGACS' OF THE WWII
BOMBING OI CIVILIANS IN GIRMANY AND JAPAN 183-88, 247-70 (2006): Richard
2012 STONEY ROAD OUT OF EDEN 85
the nineteenth century fueled by anti-Irish sentiment, enacted policies that
exacerbated famine conditions in Ireland."l Germany largely succeeded in
wiping out the Hereros of Africa when it determined to scize their land.3 32
In the twentieth century alone, we have seen the Stalinist Soviet Union es-
tablish an infamous system of Gulag imprisonment for political dissi-
dents," the Third Reich engaged in mass extermination of Jews,"" and the
atrocities attending the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. 335
In addition, of course, state-sponsored oppression of disfavored
groups appears perennially to fly tinder the radar while some totalitarian
Overy, The Post-War )ebate, in FIREST(ORM: TinL BOMIBING OF DRIESI).N 1945 123-
42 (Paul Addison & Jeremy A. Crang eds., 2006): Mark Selden, A Forgotten Holo-
caust: U.S. Bombing Strategy, the Destruction ot Japanese Cities, and the Ameri-
can Way of War From the Pacific War to Iraq, in BOMBING CIVII IANS: A
TwENI.TIi-CENIt RY HisroRy 80-82 (Yuki Tanaka & Marilyn B. Young edis..
2009): FREDERICK TAYILOR, DRESDEN: TUESDAY, FEBRUARY- 13, 1945, 401-17
(2004). See also DAVID IRVING, TiE DESTRUCTION Oi, DRESDEN (1964) (addressing
the circumstances of the Dresden bombing and debate surrounding the decision);
KURT VONNEGUT, SILAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE 146, 166-67, 169-70 (1969) (presenting
the fire-bombing of Dresden as excessive, gratuitous violence by Allies that pur-
ported to be morally superior to Nazis).
3 1 See JAMES LOUGHI.IN, THE BRITISIH MONARCHY AND IRELAND: 1800 TO TIn.1
PRESENT 62-63 (2007); George L. Bernstein, Liberals, the Irish Famine and the
Role of the State, 29 IRISH HIST. STUD. 513-36 (1995). See also JONATHAN SWIFE,
A MoI)si PROPOSAL FOR PREVENTING TIlE CHILDREN OF POOR PEOPLE IN IRE-
ILAND FROM BEING A BURDEN I) THEIR PARENTS OR COUNTRY, AND FOR MAKING
TIEM BENEFICIAl TO THEI PUBLICK (1729), reprinted in Till BASIC WRITINGS Ot
JONATHAN SwIFr 345-54 (Claude Julien Rawson ed., 2002) (parodying outrageous
English treatment of Irish by suggesting that Irish famine be rectified through can-
nibalistic consumption of Irish newborns).
332 See Rachel Anderson, Redressing Colonial Genocide Under International Law:
The Hereros' Cause of Action Against Gernany, 93 CAtL. L. REV. 1155 (2005).
333 See Al LKSANDR 1. SOLZHENITSYN, TilE GtULA(; ARCIHPI.AGO (Thomas P
Whitney trans., 1973); STEVEN ROSI-I ELDE, RIED HOI.OCAUtST 63-77 (2010).
334 See supra text accompanying notes 305-306; M1IIAEI. BURLEIGH, THE TIRD
REICH: A NEW HISTORY 571-62 (2000): HENRY FRIEDILANDER, TtII ORIGINS OF
NAZI GENOCIDE: FROM EUTIHANASIA 10 THE FINAl SOLUTION (1995): SAuL FRIED-
LANDER. THE. Yl ARS OF EXTERMINATION (2007); GERALD REITIINGER, TilE FINAL
SOLUTION: THE ATTEMPT TO EXTERMINATE Till, JEws Ot EUROPE (1961). See also
WILLIAM L. SHIRER, TIlE RISE AND FALl OF THE TIRD RI('H 946. 978 (1960)
(describing the Holocaust).
5 See Power, supra note 3, at 391-474: PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEl P.
SCtHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE? WAR CRIMES AND AC'OUNTABII.ITY IN THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA 39-61 (2002).
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regimes, in addition to repressing their citizens generally (e.g., Iraq under
Saddam Hussein, Spain under Francisco Franco 336) appear occasionally to
succeed in effectively lobotomizing them through a relentless, comprehen-
sive cult of brainwashing (e.g., China under Mao Zedong, North Korea of
Kim Jung-I). 3 7
One might make similar criticisms of the less visibly homicidal but
oppressive behavior toward disadvantaged socio-economic groups. Slavery,
particularly the widespread trade in African slaves, stains the great Euro-
pean powers, nearly all of the Western Hemisphere, and even Africans
"I See STANLEY G. PAYNE, Till. FRANCO REGIME 1936-1975 209-28 (1987): Mad-
eleine Davis, Is Spain Recovering its Memory? Breaking the Pacto del Olvido, 27
HUMAN RTS. Q. 858, 860-62 (2005). See also HtiGii THOMAS, THE SPANISH CIVIL
WAR (Harper & Row rev. ed. 1977); Editorial, An Injustice in Spain, N.Y TIMES.
Apr. 8, 2010, at A18 (concluding that "Spain's best-known investigative magis-
trate, Baltasar Garzon," a ,jurist with noted human rights credentials. "[was] prose-
cuted in a politically driven case that should have been thrown out of court" for
daring to examine the "disappearances" that took place during Franco era). Chile
under the infamous Augusto Pinochet presented similar issues. See NAOMI ROHT-
ARRIAZA, THE PINOCHET EFFECT: TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF HU\IAN
RIGHTS 74-77 (2005) (describing the trail of dead and missing as a result of Chile's
"Caravan of Death"): MARK ENSALACO, CHILE UNDER PINOCHET: RECOVERING
lHE TRUTH xi (2000) ("Repression was policy in Chile under Pinochet, just as it is
policy in any authoritarian regime. Repression was a matter of state. and it "xas
conducted relentlessly and ruthlessly."): Jonathan Kandell. Augusto Pinochet, 91,
Dictator Who Ruled by Terror in Chile, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2006, at 1
(stating how, under Pinochet's rule, "more than 3,200 people were executed or
disappeared, and scores of thousands more were detained and tortured or exiled.").
337 See LIANG HENG & JUDITH SHAPIRO, SON OF THE REVOLUTION (1983) (describ-
ing oppression and abuses of Mao's Cultural Revolution): MIKE KIM. ESCAPING
NORTH KOREA: DEFIANCE AND HOPE IN THE WORLD'S MOST REPRESSIVI, COUNTRN
10-18 (2008) (describing North Korean brainwashing techniques): Grace M. Kang,
A Case for the Prosecution of Kim Jong Ilfor Crimes Against Humanity, Genocide,
and War Crimes, 38 COLJM. HUM. RTs. L. Risv. 51, 53-63 (2006) (describing
North Korea's human rights violations within its "unique regime structure that re-
sembles a religion"): Choe Sang-Hun, Nimble Agencies Sneak News Out of North
Korea, INT'I HERAILD3 TRIB., Jan. 25, 2010, at I ("[wlhile North Korea shutters
itself from the outside - it blocks the Internet, jams foreign radio broadcasts and
monitors international calls - it releases propaganda-filled dispatches through the
government's mouthpiece, the Korean Central News Agency."): Blaine Harden,
North Korean Prisons Have Become a System off Extortion, Refiugees Say, WASH.
Posr., Oct. 6, 2009, at All (describing how "brutal treatment" in North Korean
prison camps represses political opposition and facilitates extortion by government
officials).
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themselves as many tribes sold their brethren to slave traders, many of
whom were Arab."', Even after the American Civil War resulted in the abo-
lition of slavery, both de jure and de facto discrimination against blacks was
rampant until the civil rights revolution of the 1960's -  and pockets of the
United States continue to glorify the Confederacy. 4 ' The United States'
treatment of its indigenous population was often cruel and could be charac-
terized as genocidal. 34' And throughout the world, second-class treatment
and even harsh persecution of women by governments and powerful,
respected social institutions is common.14 2 More recently, actions of the
"I' S'e Hi t;tt TIhoMAS, Tiii SILAVI. TRAi)i: Tini Si O FY 01 llt ATLANTIC SILAVE
TRADE, 1440-1870 (1997): EwAR BAIL,, SiLAVIS IN Till FAMILY (1998).
139 See TA",I oR BRANCH, PILI AR (}i FIRE: AMERICA IN TIlE KING YEARS 1963-65
(1998): TA IOR BRANCH, PARiNG THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THIE KING YEARS
1954-63 (1988).
4 Actually some rather large pockets of the U.S., including prominent states adja-
cent to the nation's capital. See Jon Meacham, Op-Ed., Southern Discomfort, N.Y.
TiMirS. April 11, 2010, WEEK IN REVIEW, at 12, (noting Virginia's designation of
April 2010 at "Confederate History Month," which the governor described as a
celebration of those "who fought for their homes and communities and Common-
wealth." Celebrating the Confederacy and its defense of a traditional southern way
of life is merely a bad mask fbr continued racism, or at least racial insensitivity, by
a surprisingly, disappointingly large number of' Americans:
Advertently or not, Ithe Governor] is working in a long and
dispiriting tradition. Efforts to rehabilitate the Southern rebellion
frequently come at mornents of racial and other social stress, and
it is revealing that Virginia's neo-Confederates are refighting the
Civil War in 2010 [while the nation's first black President is in
office and pursuing a legislative agenda regarded as too progres-
sive by manyl. As the sesquicentennial of Fort Sumter ap-
proaches in 2011, the enduring problem for neo-Conlederates
endures: anyone who seeks an Edenic Southern past in which the
war was principally about states' rights and not slavery is search-
ing in vain, for the Confederacy and slavery are inextricably and
forever linked.
See id.
341 See PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUESr: THi, UNBROKEN
PAST OF IHi AMERICAN WEST (1987): HUGH THOMAS, CONQUEST: MONT/uMA,
CORTS, AND Tinwl FALL OF OLD MEXICO (1993).
342 See A HISTORY OF WOMEN: TOWARD A CUILTURAL IDFNTITY IN THE TWENTiII
CENTURY (Francoise Thebaud et al. eds.. Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1994); Mau-
reen Dowd. Op-Ed., Worlds Without Women. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2010, WEEK IN
REVIEW, at 12 (arguing that religion is often used to systematically discriminate
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United States in the incarceration and "enhanced" interrogation of terrorism
suspects has been characterized as war criminality. 43
But without minimizing any of these wrongs, one can make a good
case that the Armenian Genocide is different in degree and outcome. As
compared to other totalitarian governments, Turkey inflicted death and de-
struction against a targeted group on a larger, more intensely violent scale
than found in other such atrocities and achieved phenomenal "success" in
terms of lives destroyed with little loss to the perpetrators and fellow trav-
elers. Perhaps only the crimes of the Third Reich approach it in that regard,
although a case can be made that the Soviet Union (particularly under Josef
Stalin) and Genghis Khan's rolling conquests were in the same league. But
Genghis Khan's carnage can arguably be described as war. He did not at-
tempt to wipe out a subgroup of his own countrymen. Sherman's "march to
the sea" also took place as part of war. The Massacre at Tiananmen was
obviously tragic, but had relatively few victims and was not prompted by
ethnic dislike for the demonstrators. 344
against women. "To circumscribe women, Saudi Arabia took Islam's moral codes
and orthodoxy to extremes not outlined by Muhammad; the Catholic Church took
its moral codes and orthodoxy to extremes not outlined by Jesus. Negating
women is at the heart of the church's hideous-and criminal-indifference to the
welfare of boys and girls in its priests' care."); Rod Nordland & Taimoor Shah,
Afghan Police Arrest Suspect In Disfiguring of 18-Year-Old, N.Y. TIMi s. Dec. 8,
2010, at A6, ("When Bibi Aisha's nose and ears were cut off by her husband and
her in-laws, no one ever expected much to be done about it, especially because it
happened in a remote area under Taliban control." Her offense against the social
order of rural, tribal Afghanistan was running away from her abusive husband, with
whom her marriage was arranged by their respective families When she was an
infant. After she ran away, her relatives returned her to the husband.).
341 See DAVID Coi,, ENIMY AtlIENS (2003). See generally JANE MAx I R. TIL
DARK SIDE: THE INSI)IE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A
WAR ON AMERICAN IIEAILS (2008). See also RICHARD A. CiLARKE, AGAINST Ai
ENEMIES: INSIDE AMFrICA'S WAR ON Ti RROR (2004).
344 Although ethnic differences and the ability to delnonize disfavored persons as
"the other" unworthy of respect or legal protection played a role. The Chinese go\ -
eminent intentionally selected troops from a distant recion to break up the demon-
strations. The troops were thus of a different ethnic group and spoke a sufficiently
different dialec that they could not communicate with the demonstrators, who had
been described to the troops is "counter-revolutionaric'" attempting to overthrow
the government rather than demonstrators seeking greater personal freedoms for the
citi/cnry. See Nicholas D. Kristof. Reporter's Notebook; )eng to Retire in the U.S.,
And Other Chinese Rumors, N.Y. TiMis. May 23, 1989, at AI (describing students'
concerns about Chinese government's possible use of troops from remote regions
2012 STONEY ROAD OUT OF EDEN 89
The atrocities of the Balkans during the 1990s, principally the Ser-
bian ethnic cleansing directed toward Croats, Albanians, and Muslim Bos-
nians, has much in common with the Armenian Genocide, but appears to
have been smaller in scale regarding the deaths and dislocation inflicted.
The Balkan atrocities can be categorized as war-related, although the pre-
vailing view is that Serbia-sponsored, Serb-led ethnic cleansing akin to ge-
nocide provides a more accurate description."' The Nazi Holocaust appears
to approach the Armenian Genocide in terms of scope and impact, which is
perhaps unsurprising since Hitler was to some extent following Turkey's
playbook. 346 However, although the Nazis focused closely on a particular
ethnic group over a sustained period, they also abused other "out groups,"
that were political (e.g., communists, union leadership) rather than ethnic or
social.
Most important, however, is that in the other instances most similar
to the Armenian Genocide, the perpetrating regime was not only displaced
but there was also a period of truth and reconciliation, with prosecution of
leading offenders and at least a symbolic calling into account of those re-
sponsible. In short, the perpetrators were ousted, ejected, subjugated, and
punished by forces representing the victims or the world community. Con-
centration camps were liberated. A defeated genocidal Germany was occu-
pied by Allied troops and remade into a country conscious of human rights
and the risk that ordinary people could do monstrous things.347 Serb-led
who speak different dialects). See also Bernard E. Trainor, Crackdown in Beijing;
Civil Warfior Army?, N.Y. TIMIs., June 6, 1989, at A16 (noting belief that the
troops from remote regions would not be able to identify with students' concerns or
would likely believe Chinese government's explanation that students were
counterrevolutionaries).
3-5 See general/v POwER, supra note 3, at 391-502: WILLIAMS & SCHARF, supra
note 320.
346 See sul)ra text accompanying notes 304 (Hitler used the Armenian Genocide as
a model and drew confidence from it because perpetrators were never punished).
341 Unless, perhaps, they work in the banking or insurance industries. It is of
course more than ironic and almost shocking that German companies such as Mu-
nich Re and Deutsche Bank would fight so hard to avoid paying Armenian Geno-
cide victims based not on any merits-based defense but on the technical grounds
that they should not be accountable due to successfully avoiding prosecution for
decades and because Turkey, however genocidal its past, is now too important to
U.S. foreign policy to risk offending through contract-based litigation. See supra
Part II.E (describing defenses to banking and insurance litigation). Munich Re's
decision to stand on principle, so to speak, in Movsesian, is particularly odd in light
of the financial risk to the company. Movsesian counsel Brian Kabatek suggested at
oral argument in Movsesian I that the cumulative face value of the policies at issue
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violence against Bosnians was halted; troops and paramilitary gangs with-
drew or were disbanded. War criminals were tried.3 48 Confessions were
made and apologies given.149
in the case was less than $1 million in 1915 dollars, perhaps as much as $21 million
in 2010 dollars. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Movsesian v. Victoria Ver-
sicherlung, No. 07-56722, Dec. 8. 2008 at p. 12, available at 2008 WL 6059176.
Although $21 million is of course a considerable sum, one that would be increased
by prejudgment interest, costs, and perhaps counsel fees if plaintiffs were to be
totally victorious, plaintiffs undoubtedly reali/c that settlement for substantially
less would be attractive. But Munich Re, which surely expended much in defense
of the claims, appears not to have made a settlement offer in the case but has
instead publically sided with forces unwilling to admit wrongdoing in the
Genocide.
By way of full disclosure and personal observation, Stempel notes that he
has been an expert witness for Munich Re in a major insurance coverage matter
(where the insurer successfully disclaimed coverage for a loss in a case where the
policyholder had failed to report problems with a venture, as required by the pol-
icy) and followed Munich Re's general activity in the risk management sphere,
where it has been a progressive voice in the insurance community counseling
greater concern about the collateral impact of climate change. This Munich Re
bears little resemblance to the insurer in Movsesian, essentially hiding behind the
happenstance of the U.S. need to placate Turkey in foreign affairs as an excuse for
refusing to pay life insurance benefits for which premiums were collected and in-
vested a century or more ago.
348 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") pro-
vides status updates and case documents for current and previously completed trials
relating to war crimes in the Balkans. See The Cases, UNITED NATIONS INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR TlEi FORMIR YiGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/
action/cases/4 (last visited Dec. 23, 2010). See also WnI.IIAMS & SCHARF, supra
note 320, at 51-54 (providing review of several important indictments of the
ICTY).
349 See Tim Judah, Op-Ed., Serbia's Honest Apology. N.Y. TIMi s. Apr. 2, 2010, at
A3. Regrettably, however, sonc regimes engaging in wrongful or even criminal
behavior continue to both oppress and to deny. China remains an embarrassing
example in that its government murdered Tiananmen Square protestors and contin-
ues to oppress and brutalize dissidents with no seconing consequences. See COHEN,
supra note 326, at 263 ("Contrary to the expectations of many Western analysts.
China recovered rapidly from the sanctions imposed on it after the Tiananmen mas-
sacre and the brutal repression that followed. As a potential market and as a source
of cheap labor and inexpensive imports, China was very important to the interna-
tional business community, which did not fret long about the human rights abuses
of its government."). See also David M. Shribman, Editorial. A Nation Haunted bv
Its Past: Russians are Featfil as they Stand in History 's Shadow. PTSBLJRGH
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B. The Armenian Insurance Litigation as a Barometer of Law's
E/icac VftOr Corrective Justice
1. Jurispathos and Jurisprudence
The Armenian insurance litigation, like the Armenian Genocide itself, re-
flects contradictions in the law and the limits of law as a force for justice in
a sociopolitical world that frequently turns prejudiced, ethnocentric, relig-
iously intolerant, violent and cruel. Nearly a century after the Genocide, its
victims remain dramatically unremembered, underappreciated, and un-
dercompensated. For the most part, the descendants of the perpetrators con-
tinue to deny the scope and motivation for the deadly events of 1915-20,
often denying the existence of the events themselves. Similarly, insurers for
the most part have been able to retain funds without ever honoring the con-
tracts they issued in return for payment. But as the New York Life litigation
and settlement show, adjudicative law holds at least some potential for ob-
taining some recompense, however delayed and diminished. 50 Conversely,
the Movsesian Munich Re litigation reveals real limits in law's power to
adjudicate legal wrongs and to provide corrective justice.3-'
Perhaps most damningly, law may not only be an inadequate means
of enforcing its own principles, but may itself be part of the process of
injustice. The Armenian Genocide, like the genocide directed against Jews,
was a creature of official state policy. Ottoman Turkey, as part of its con-
trolling legal framework, subjugated its Armenian population, ensured its
vulnerability, and eventually used the coercive power of the state in a
largely successful attempt at extermination and dislocation . 5 2 A similar pat-
tern is found in Nazi Germany and other fascist 35 3 or totalitarian regimes. 354
Perpetrators of genocide and other crimes frequently use law as a
means of both asserting control and turning the general populace against the
targets of state-sponsored terror. 355 Although individual and mob acts of
POsT-GAZ/,17'I-, Apr. 4, 2010, at B3 (Russia "must come to grips with its history" of
oppression of ethnic and religious groups).
350 See supra Part Il.D (describing New York Life litigation and settlement).
351 See II.E (describing Movsesian litigation against Munich Re).
352 See AKCAM, supra note 4; BALAKIAN, supra note 5 I.H (describing the Arme-
nian Genocide).
153 See accompanying notes 303-306 (describing the parallels between the Nazi
Holocaust and the Armenian Genocide).
354 See ROSEFILLiDI. supra note 318, SOLZHENITSYN, supra note 318.
155 However, foreign policy pressures may, contra-Movsesian, push American law
in the direction of positive change. See, e.g., MARY L. DuDZIAK, COLD WAR Civil
RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000) (concern that
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violence are often precursors or accomplices, sustained and successful
genocidal efforts appear to nearly always require the approval of a govern-
ment, which in turn requires some semblance of legal authority for the ac-
tions against the disfavored group. 3 6 The transformative power of law can
thus be an instrument of oppression and atrocity as well as an instrument of
social progress.
Professor Robert Cover made this point well in Justice Accused,
noting instances in which the coercive force of American positive law was
enlisted not to protect civil rights but to cnforce the property rights of slave
owners. 7 More recently and informally, Judge Guido Calabria made a sim-
ilar point when addressing the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools.35 The theme of the Annual Meeting was "The
Transformative Power of Law," which to most attendees probably conjured
visions of law as a progressive social force such as the familiar American
examples of civil rights and employment legislation, constitutional rights of
equal protection and due process, and guarantees of procedural fairness.
Calabresi, whose family came to the U.S. to escape Mussolini's fascism, 35 9
noted that the transformative power of law is a double-edged sword. As an
example, he described how within a decade after the passage of laws di-
rected at Jews, his former country, community, and neighbors were engag-
ing in discriminatory (and worse) conduct that could not have been
Soviets were making political headway by pointing to segregation in America fu-
eled part of U.S. efforts to desegregate and end social and economic discrimination
against blacks): Ibrahim J. Gassama, Reaffirming Faith in the Dignity of Each
Human Being: The United Nations, NGOs, and Apartheid, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1464, 1470 (1996) (describing pressure by the United Nations. non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs"), and individual nations as part of a "fifty-year global cam-
paign" that resulted in the end of apartheid).
356 See MARK J. OSIEL, MAKING SENSE OF MAss ATROCITY chs. 2-6 (2009): supra
text accompanying note 337-39 (describing several instances of atrocity activelN
encouraged and implemented or at least aided and abetted by governments).
317 See generallv RoiiFRT M. CoVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED (1975) (noting. among
other things, judicial enthusiasm for enforcing Fugitive Slave Act, that required that
captured runaway slaves be returned to their owners).
351 Calabresi, a former Yale Law Dean and long-time professor and important legal
scholar prior to becoming a Second CiIcuit Judge, was receiving a lifetime recogni-
tion award from the AALS. See Philip Bobbitt, Guido Calabresi, in TIlE YAL[
BIOGRAPIICAL DICTIONARY Oi AMERICAN LAW' 92-93 (Roger K. Newman, ed..
2009).
319 See id.
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envisioned prior to the time that law gave "pernission" to abuse and op-
press or perhaps even required it of the citizenry. 360
To a degree, of course, this is nothing new, although it is oft forgot-
ten or overlooked. There have always been bad governments and good gov-
ernments with bad or good positive law, just as there have always been
more humane and less humane societies. But the United States maintains it
is one of the good governments that on a public level supports a humane
society in which its legal system vindicates justice rather than acts as in
instrument for injustice. On a private law level, the U.S. prides itself on
having a dependable, consistent, predictable, uncorrupted judicial system
that can adjudicate private disputes fairly, even if not perfectly in all cases.
In particular, America views itself as having a legal system that adequately
enforces contracts.
Regarding the Armenian Genocide, however, both the U.S. govern-
ment and its legal system have consistently come up short when measured
by any reasonable yardstick of justice and objectively defensible legal prin-
ciples. To be sure, the U.S. legal system deserves shining reviews and
praise when compared to that of Turkey or other countries that would not
permit either the limited relief accorded as yet to Armenian Genocide vic-
tims or even frank discussion of the matter. But as the legal saga of the
Genocide unfolds, U.S. courts often fall short.
2. Error Within the Confines of Doctrine and Errors of Doctrine
The failure of American law to date occurs on two dimensions. First and
perhaps most clearly, the U.S. judicial system-at least in the Movsesian I
panel decision and the Movsesian III en banc ruling-failed according to its
own declared norm of enforcing contracts and providing a legal infrastruc-
ture in which contracting parties and participants in the greater economy
and risk management system can have confidence that the arrangements
they make in furtherance of economic security and gain will be respected
and protected in the courts. This failing is particularly baleful when insur-
ance is involved.
Insurance is an arrangement for managing risk and protecting
against unpredictable future events through risk shifting and risk distribu-
tion. 3'1 Although perhaps corny, the adage that a policyholder who
360 Guido Calabresi, Keynote Address and Remarks Accepting Triennial 2010
AALS Award for Lifetime Service to Legal Education and to the Law at the 2010
Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting (January 8, 2010). http://
www.aalsweb.org/20 1 Opodcasts/friday/AALSluncheon.mp3.
361 See TOM BAKER, INSURAN('E LAW AND Poi.icy 2-22 (2d ed. 2008); ROBERT H.
JiRRY, I1 & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCI LAW 7-9 (4th
2012
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purchases insurance buys "peace of mind" has considerable truth and de-
scriptive power. In buying insurance, a policyholder incurs a comparatively
small but certain loss (the premium payment) in return for a contractual
promise of protection from a comparatively much larger but contingent loss
(e.g., an auto accident or house fire). Life insurance shares this characteris-
tic in that while death is certain eventually, the time and circumstances of
death are not.?62 Most obviously, younger and middle-aged policyholders
buy insurance even though they expect to live for decades in order to pro-
tect their estates and families from the financial consequences of unforeseen
early death.
To a degree, all contracts shift risk. More than average contracts,
however, and more than even most hedging contracts or stock shorts, insur-
ance shifts risk in a big way-something that is accomplished because the
risk is pooled among a group of policyholders (with risks that are not corre-
lated with one another). 363 But the insurance policy is an aleatory contract.
The exchange between policyholder and insurer is not equal. The policy-
holder could die shortly after the policy takes effect, resulting in a large
insurance death benefit in return for very little premium. Conversely, the
policyholder could live for decades, continuing to pay premiums that, if
successfully invested, result in revenues for the insurer surpassing any death
benefit that is actually paid.3(A
ed. 2007): ST ElMPFL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 195, at 1-5: KENNETH
S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 3-4 (4th ed. 2005); EMERC
FISCHER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW 14 (3d ed. 2004). Accord JAY M.
FE INMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INStJRAN(TI COMPANIEs DoN'T PAY
CLAIMS AND WHAT You CAN DO ABOUT IT 13 (2010) ("The purpose of insurance
is to ameliorate the financial consequences of risk by transferring the risk from an
individual to a group and sharing the cost of the risks that come to pass among the
members of the group.").
162 See FISCHER I T AL., supra note 346, at 341-43, 364-75, 801: STI-NMPEL ON IN-
SURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 195, at 16-3.
'" See FISCHIR ET AL., supra note 346, at 15: JERRY, supra note 346, at 14: STEM-
PEI ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 195, at 195.
364 Insurers typically profit primarily because of the investment opportunity they
have while holding premium dollars long before being called upon to pay claims.
Insurers enjoy the time value of money and can "play the float" while awaiting
claims that may or may not come. Where the insurer has underwritten the risk well,
this should produce not only investment income but also underwriting profit in
which premiums collected (without counting investment income) exceed claims
paid. See FEINMAN, supra note 346, at 18.
The time lag between taking in premiums and paying out claims
(the "float") and the income eamed in that time is a major source
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Relatedly, insurance "is also different from most ordinary contracts
because it requircs sequential performance" in which the policyholder (and
persons injured by the policyholder or dependent on compensation or re-
building after losses) depends on the insurer to perform in the future if there
is a trigging event. ,5 The policyholder cannot insist on immediate perform-
of profit in 2007, industry investment profits totaled $58 billion.
As Wairen Buffett, whose Berkshire Hathaway owns GEIC() and
other insurance companies, has said, float is the grcat thing about
the insurance business, because it is 'money we hold that is not
ours but which we get to invest.
In this way an insurance company is like a bank, which takes in
customers' money as deposits and lends that money out at a
higher interest rate than it pays on depositors' accounts
Insurance companies have an advantage over banks, though, be-
cause their loss ratio can be less than 100 [or 1:11. The bank
depositor always gets back 100 percent of the amount deposited,
plus interest. [But thel insurance company with [a lower loss ra-
tio] is only paying its customers [penniesI on the dollar [and this]
insurance company is ahead of the game even before its invest-
ment earnings.
Id. (citing Warren Buffett, 2006 Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Shareholder Letter,
2006, available at www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/20061tr.pd) (Buffett fre-
quently makes this point in his annual letters to shareholders).
Regarding the extra-contractual, socially important function of insurance,
see Jeffrey W. Stempel, The hisurance Policy as Statute, 41 McGF ORGE L. REV.
203, 205 (2010): Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insuratnce Cortract as Social Instrument
and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1489, 1489 (2010); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. L.J. 813, 815
(2009).
365 See FEINMAN, supra note 346, at 20. Elaborating, Professor Feinman notes that:
[iun a typical contract, if one party doesn't perform, the other
party can procure a substitute performance and sue for any added
cost. If a homeowner hires a contractor to renovate his house and
the contractor fails to show, the homeowner can refuse to pay,
hire another contractor, and , if he pays the second a higher price,
sue the first contractor for the extra. But if the homeowner has a
fire and his insurance company fails to pay the claim, it's too late
for the homeowner to buy alternate insurance. The best the home-
owner can hope for is to sue the [insuranceI company for the
coverage that should have been paid. But even that is not an ef-
fective remedy: the lawsuit does not give the homeowner the
money needed to rebuild until the litigation is concluded, perhaps
years later, during which time the homeowner has lost the secur-
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ance or performance simultaneous with the policyholder's performance be-
cause there must first be a trigging event-which may or may not take
place. Further, the policyholder has already parted with premium dollars
and is then highly dependent on whether the insurer honors the contract.
The insurer has ample opportunity for opportunistic behavior that can deny
the policyholder the benefit of the bargain in ways often more devastating
than opportunistic behavior in other contracting contexts.
Although all contracts contain an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, the covenant has real meaning in the insurance context. As
a result, insurance may be viewed as fiduciary in nature and insurers are
required to give at least equal attention to the rights of policyholders. 66 If
an insurer intentionally takes an unreasonable position regarding the pol-
icy's coverage, it commits bad faith. If the insurer engages in self-dealing
rather than looking out for the policyholder, it commits bad faith. Further,
in many states, an insurer's bad faith conduct or breach gives rise to a tort
action that may be pursued by the policyholder and punitive damages may
be awarded if the insurer acted with willful indifference to the
policyholder.367
In short, American law has long and consistently treated insurance
policies as a special form of contract where heightened duties apply to the
insurer.368 For these insurance purchases in particular, one would expect
courts to demand enforcement of the contracts because of both the policy-
ity and peace of mind for which he contracted. Accordingly.
courts hold insurance companies to a higher standard and subject
them to special remedies if they fail to honor their promises.
Id. at 20-21. See also infra, note 352 (regarding the possibility of bad faith claims
against insurers).
366 See SI Pl IN A IsEY, BAD FAI TH AcIONS LIABILITY & D, \M ,,XGES § 1.01 (2d
ed. 1997): FIscHFR ET Al., supra note 346, at 1041: JiERRY & RICHMOND. supra
note 346, at 176; STEMPFLL ON INSURANCI CONTRACTS, supra note 195. at 10-4.2.
Accord FlINMAN, supra note 346, at 18 ("[tlhe most basic rule is that in ad'usting a
clam, the linsurerl must not put its own interests above the interest of its policy-
holder. IT]he company will not try to increase its own profit at the expense of
the policyholder or take advantage of the insured precisely at the moment when she
is most vulnerable.").
367 Regarding the doctrine of bad faith and the bad faith cause of action regarding
insurance, see Asi i'.Y, ,supra note 351, at § 1.03: Fisc'iliR ET AL., supra note 346:
.iRRY & RICHMOND, SUlpra note 346, at 176: STIMPEL ON INStTRANCI. CON[RACTS,
supra note 195, at 10-57.
'" See Insmua nce Contract as Social Instrument, supra note 349. at 1489: Insur-
ance Policy as Statute. sut)ra note 349, at 206: Insurance Policy as Thing, supra
note 349, at 816.
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holder's dependency and the social importance of the insurance product as
part of the commercial infrastructure. In addition, where the insurance prod-
uct is a life insurance policy issued nearly a century ago, there is no serious
question that the triggering contingent event has occurred. Even those who
purchased insurance just prior to the Genocide would need to be older than
95 today to relieve insurers of their responsibility to pay-an unlikely re-
suit, since infants do not purchase insurance and parents of the era seldom
purchased life insurance for their children. More realistically, adults
purchase life insurance, which would require that any purchaser now be
older than 115 to avoid the triggering event of death. The policyholder's
beneficiaries or assignees are entitled to payment in accordance with the
terms of the policy. In circumstances of this type, one would expect the
legal system to require that the contracting party who took the premium to
make good on its payment in the event of death absent an applicable
exclusion.
3. The Movsesian Decisions: Confusion and Cowardice
Viewed against this backdrop, the first Morsesian panel decision and the
Ninth Circuit's Movsesian III en banc ruling 69 look increasingly erroneous
and problematic, both on their own terms and as an indication of insuffi-
cient judicial independence from the more overtly political branches.
Without doubt, Movsesian I and Movsesian III are inconsistent with
prevailing insurance law and contract norms that mandate honoring con-
tracts. These decisions invalidated a procedural statute that merely permit-
ted plaintiffs to pursue contract remedies.370 Although plaintiffs could
conceivably still overcome a statute of limitations defense on grounds of
equitable tolling or estoppel, this appears precluded by the en banc decision
remanding the case to the trial court "with instructions to dismiss all claims
revived" by California's Code of Civil Procedure § 354.4371 as well as the
length of time since the Genocide and the severe spoliation of evidence
incurred (in large part due to intentional destruction). In effect, Movsesian I
369 Movsesian 1, 578 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2009); Movsesian II1, 670 F.3d 1067 (9th
Cir. 2012) (en banc). See also supra text accompanying notes 234, 238-44, 246-59,
263 (discussing the Movsesian I) and notes 294-96 (discussing Movsesian III).
370 See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODF § 354.4 (West 2011) (the California legislature did
not attempt to impose any liability upon Munich Re that it had not already assumed
when its predecessor companies sold life insurance to Armenians for forty years.
Only further adjudication would determine whether plaintiffs would succeed on the
merits of the contract claims).
371 See Movsesian III, at 1077.
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and Movsesian III represent judicial immunization of breaching parties de-
spite state legislative support for the victims of the breach.
Where the contracts are not merely bilateral promises 372 but are part
of an extensive web of social ordering and risk management as well as
financial and personal planning, a decision inhibiting a contract party's abil-
ity to enforce the policy's promises runs strongly counter to the legal norms
of insurance and contract law.1 73 Predictability, dependability, efficiency,
reliance interests, and, of course, simple corrective justice are sacrificed
when insurance coverage is not provided as promised. Movsesian I and
Movsesion III are particularly bad decisions in that (absent the perhaps
long-shot plaintiff victory with tolling or estoppel arguments) it not only
denies some modest recompense to those displaced by the Genocide, but
also protects the breaching party and prevents the substantive contract claim
from even receiving consideration in the courts.
As a matter of private law jurisprudence and its internal norms,
Movsesian I and Movsesain III are disasters. They stand for the "principle"
that contracts will not be enforced, even under the most sympathetic of
circumstances, if the breaching party has the good fortune of failing to
honor contracts sufficiently connected to a politically sensitive topic or geo-
graphic region. In its finer moments, contract law has been relatively im-
mune to such considerations, such as when courts refused to let sellers
172 The prevailing traditional view is that insurance policies are unilateral or "re-
verse-unilateral" contracts on the theory that the policyholder "performs" at the
outset through paying the premium in return for the insurer s promise of future
coverage. See JosEPH M. PFRII-I o. CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRA( 'IS. § 2.
10(a) (6th ed. 2009). However, others view insurance policies as bilateral contracts
in which both sides exchange promises. particularly given the usual practice of
automatic renewal of policies and periodic payment of premiums throughout the
policy period. See JERRY & RwINisl)ND. supra note 346: Hazel G. Beh & Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Misclassi/tving the Insurance Policy. The Untfrced Errors ot Unilateral
Cotntract Characterization, 32 CARDO/o L. Riv. 85, 110-34 (1(010) (extensive dis-
cussion concluding bilateral classification more apt). Under any of these views, the
insurer unquestionably makes a promise to pay benefits upon the happening of
certain specified events, such as the death of the person whose life is insured under
a lile insurance policy.
371 See BAKI;R. supra note 346, at ch. 1 JiiRR'), & RIcHMtND. supra note 346. at
§§], 10: Si'iMI'Ii (ON INSURANUI. CONTRACTS, supra note 195, at ch. I- FISCHER ET
AL ., supra note 346, at ch. 1: The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument, supra note
349; The Insurance Policy as Statute, supra note 349: The Insurance Policy as
Thing, supra note 349.
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avoid their obligations due to the 1957 Suez Canal crisis. 374 Insurance law
has been particularly strong in this regard, usually taking a narrow view of
the war risk exclusion typically found in insurance policies in order to vin-
dicate the contract rights and reliance interests of policyholders, benefi-
ciaries, and society.3 75 In addition, it appears that the life insurance policies
sold to Armenian residents of the Ottoman Empire for the most part con-
tained no exclusions for war-related deaths.17 ,
In addition to failing as a matter of insurance and private commer-
cial law, Movsesian I and Movsesian III also represent a dismal failure of
the American court system to permit litigants to pursue some small crumb
of justice in the face of political power and expediency. On this dimension,
these decisions are a violation of the system's own professed credos that
justice is blind, no person is above the law, or that those who violate the law
are ultimately to be held accountable. As discussed below, the American
judiciary has become too deferential to the executive in matters even tan-
gentially connected to war, terrorism, and public policy. 377 In this sense,
374 See, e.g., Am. Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l Marine, 453 F.2d 939 (2d
Cir. 1972): Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines, 275 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1960): Transatlan-
tic Fin. Corp. v. U.S., 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also FARNSWORI TI, supra
note 195, at § 9.6 (describing the cases and force majeure doctrine generally).
375 See, e.g., Queen Ins. Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co.. 263 U.S. 487 (1924)
(collision of two commercial ships in separate convoys carrying supplies as part of
war effort not excluded loss under war risk exclusion): Pan Am. World Airways v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974) (applying New York law and
finding that the destruction of a commercial plane hijacked by Palestinian political
activists was covered despite insurer invocation of war risk exclusion: a specific
terrorism exclusion was required to avoid coverage); Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sunny
S. Aircraft Serv., Inc., 151 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1973) (hijacking of airplane is theft
rather than war-related loss, even though plane was attacked by Cuban military
when pilot attempted to return to United States). See also Jeffrey W. Stempel, The
Insurance Aftermath of September 11: Myriad Claims, Multiple Lines, Arguments
Over Occurrence Counting, War Risk Ex'lusions, the Future of Terrorism Cover-
age, and New Issues of Government Role, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 817, 843-57 (2002).
376 See, e.g., HUDNUT, supra note 79, at 36-38 (New York Life policies sold in the
late 1800s and early 1900s generally covered war-related deaths but U.S. policy-
holders in military service were assessed an additional premium). See also Plain-
tiffs' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Marootian v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., Case No.
CV-99-12073 CAS (MCx) at 41-44 (reproducing New York Life policy issued to
Armenian resident of Ottoman Empire: the policy, which was drafted in French,
appears to have no war exclusion on coverage).
177 See infra text accompanying notes 389-94.
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perhaps Movsesian I and Movsesian III are guilty only of continuing a dis-
turbing trend.
But the failings of Movsesian I and Movsesian III go beyond the
questionable foreign affairs doctrine on which the decisions are based. Al-
though there is ample precedent for deference to the Executive in matters of
foreign policy, the Armenian insurance litigation is readily distinguishable
from these precedents. For example, Movsesian I, tracking closely Munich
Re's brief in the case, notes that the extension of the statute of limitations
for Armenian Genocide insurance claims was modeled after other Califor-
nia laws "which extended the statute of limitations until 2010 for Holo-
caust-era insurance claims and World War II slave labor claims" and that
"[b]oth of these sister statutes have been found unconstitutional, because
they interfered with the national government's foreign affairs power."3 78
However, the underlying facts of these other situations leading to
adverse judicial decisions for claimants were far different than those of the
Armenian insurance claims. Concededly, Deutsch v. Turner struck down
the statute extending time for filing slave labor claims.3 79 But these claims
arguably were resolved by negotiations ending World War II in which the
U.S. was the major participant. 380 Munich Re had raised a similar claim in
its Movsesian I and Movsesian III appeals, but the Ninth Circuit, quick to
conclude that California law was swept away by general U.S. foreign policy
designed not to offend Turkey, declined to decide the narrower question of
whether treaties ending World War I had effectively precluded the Movse-
sian claims. 81
378 See Movsesia 1, 578 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir. 2009).
379 324 F.3d 692, 716 (9th Cir. 2003).
380 See id. at 712-14.
381 See 578 F.3d at 1055. We disagree with the argument that treaties ending World
War I effectively extinguished private citizen claims against private insurance com-
panies or other contracting parties. The treaties and related agreements may go erm
relations between the victorious and vanquished governments, but absent express
agreement, treaties governing nations do not address or eliminate private contract
or tort claims a person may have against another private actor. Even if such docu-
ments did expressly purport to eliminate such claims, there would of course be
serious questions regarding whether such agreements exceed the U.S. government's
treaty power or violate other constitutional provisions. At a minimum, a person
deprived of a property right (and contract rights are property rights) by the govern-
ment would appear to be entitled to fair compensation pursuant to the Takings
Clause and Due Process Clause.
But whatever the deficiencies of the treaty argument, it has the virtue (ab-
sent in the more sweeping foreign affairs power argument) not only of being a
narrower, less constitutionally disruptive option but also being based on official
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Similarly, Steinberg v. lIt'l Comm. on Holocaust Era Ins. ('lainis 3 2
struck down the extended statute of limitations for filing claims for cover-
age under life insurance policies sold to Jews in Europe killed or displaced
by the Holocaust.3s And in American hIs. Ass'li v. Garmendi, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that the California Holocaust Victim Insurance
Relief Act of 1999 [-HVIRA"], which required insurers to disclose infor-
mation about policies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945, was an un-
constitutional interference with "the National Government's conduct of
foreign relations."
But the cases striking down legislation related to the Holocaust are
quite distinct from the Armenian Genocide because of the federal govern-
ment's affirmative role in brokering a settlement of Holocaust-related
claims concerning insurance policies and bank accounts. As the Garamendi
Court noted, in response to suits and complaints from "defendant compa-
nies and their governments," the "Government of the United States took
action." Under Secretary of State and later Deputy Treasury Secretary Stu-
art Eizenstat acted as mediator in negotiations resulting in the
German Foundation Agreement, signed by President Clin-
ton and German Chancellor Schroder in July 2000, in
which Germany agreed to enact legislation establishing a
foundation funded with 10 billion deutsche marks contrib-
uted equally by the German Government and German com-
panies, to be used to compensate all those "who suffered at
the hands of German companies during the National Social-
ist era."
Further, '[t]he willingness of the Germans to create a vol-
untary compensation fund was conditioned on some expec-
tation of security from lawsuits in United States courts, and
after extended dickering President Clinton put his weight
behind two specific measures toward that end." . First,
acts of the government. By contrast, the California statute at issue in Movsesiai
was obliterated based on mere Executive Branch expressions of opinion rather than
any real positive law in the form of an Executive Order, a treaty, an executive-led
resolution of the dispute, or other more tangible expression of the President's for-
eign policy.
;92
13 Steinberg v. Int'l Comm. on Holocaust Era Ins. Claims, 133 Cal. App. 4th 689,
34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 944, 953 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
3s4 Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2002). See also Ramsey,
supra note 266, at 33-36 (distinguishing Garamendi from Movsesian on both facts,
magnitude of federal interest, and purported interference of state law).
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the Government agreed that whenever a German company
was sued on a Holocaust-era claim in an American Court,
the Government of the United States would submit a state-
ment that -it would be in the foreign policy interests of the
United States for the Foundation to be the exclusive forum
and remedy for the resolution of all asserted claims against
German companies arising from their involvement in the
National Socialist era and World War I1 ... Though unwill-
ing to guarantee that its foreign policy interests would "in
themselves provide an independent legal basis for dismis-
sal," that being an issue for the courts, the Government
agreed to tell courts "that U.S. policy interests favor dis-
missal on any valid legal ground... " On top of that under-
taking, the Government promised to use its "best efforts, in
a manner it considers appropriate," to get state and local
governments to respect the foundation as the exclusive
mechanism 385
California's HVIRA thus faced a situation in which the federal gov-
ernment had brokered a deal with European governments and insurers re-
sulting in substantial payments to policyholders. By contrast, no such
arrangement or alternative form of reparations or compensation exists re-
garding the Armenian Genocide. Although, as stated in Moysesian, it is
clear that Turkey wishes to keep the words "'Armenian Genocide" out of the
American and world vocabulary, the most the Executive has done to date is
to lobby Congress not to use the term and not to pass any resolution high-
lighting the atrocity or blaming Turkey) 8 6 Although this is not insignificant,
it hardly constitutes much of an exercise of the foreign affairs "power" of
the United States and falls far short of the active dispute resolution efforts
in which the Executive engaged in connection with Holocaust-related
coverage.
385 539 U.S. at 405-406. See also EiZ-NSIAT, IuIratl note 275.
386 See Movsesian L 578 F.3d at 1057-60 (describing indicia of national govern-
ment foreign policy discouraging use of term "Armenian Genocide" but noting no
instances of affirmative national goveminent efforts to mediate, prosecute. or re-
solve insurance claims related to the historical episode and noting not concrete
government action or policy forbidding civil litigation over insurance claims of
Genocide victim descendants or assignees). See also id. at 1063 (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting) ("Nowhere, however, does the majority point to any evidence of an
express federal policy barring states I from extending statute of limitations to facili-
late prosecution of Armenian insurance claims].").
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To be sure, we disagree with the Garamendi decision, as did four
members of the Supreme Court. Justice Ginsburg's eloquent Garamendi
dissent, which exposes the weakness of the majority analysis well, notes,
"no [federal] executive agreement or other formal expression of foreign pol-
icy disapproves state disclosure laws like the HVIRA. Absent a clear state-
ment aimed at the disclosure requirements [of the HVIRA] by the 'one
voice' to which courts properly defer in matters of foreign affairs" the dis-
senters found no reason to disturb the California law. 387 But agree or disa-
gree with Garmendi, it involves U.S. government involvement in
Holocaust-related insurance claims that far exceeds any tangible govern-
ment policy regarding the Armenian Genocide, although concededly the
U.S. Executive seeks to humor Turkey in discouraging the use of the term.
Similarly, while there is ample case law in which American courts
have blocked domestic litigation thought to be adverse to the Executive's
foreign affairs power, these cases tend to involve more obvious interference
with presidential prerogatives. In Dames & Moore v. Regan,388 the Supreme
Court upheld restrictions on U.S. business claims against the Islamic Re-
public of Iran related to Iran's seizure of their assets.8 9 In United States v.
Pink,3 90 a national executive compact with the Soviet Union was held valid
in the face of state objections prompted because the compact extinguished
those claim."'" In United States v. Behnont,392 the Court upheld the same
compact.3 93 All of these cases involved clear U.S. policy expressed by the
Executive Branch in something more than mere admonitions not to offend
foreign governments by using words they disliked. The cases all stemmed
from fairly tangible positive law such as a statute or treaty.
As the Movsesian I Court noted, it was not until Garamendi that the
Supreme Court for the first time ruled that something more amorphous like
-presidential foreign policy" could itself "carry the same preemptive force
as a federal statute or treaty."'9 4 But presidential foreign policy nonetheless
normally involves something more tangible than simply urging Congress to
avoid saying anything that might offend the sensitivities of ally. Although
national government efforts to resolve Holocaust-related insurance and
387 See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 430.
388 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
389 See id. at 674-75, 686-88.
390 315 U.S. 203 (1941).
' 1 See id. at 234.
39 1 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
391 See id. at 330-32.
394 Movsesian 1. 578 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Garamendi, 539 U.S.
at 421-23).
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bank disputes were not accompanied by formal treaties or executive orders,
there was without doubt substantial federal government involvement in the
shaping of the resolution. In effect, the federal government inserted itself
into the Holocaust litigation to bring about the resolution it preferred and
then sought to protect its achievement by doing what it could to provide the
settling defendants with "global peace" and the assurance that there would
not be straggling, recurrent claims of a similar nature in the future.
By contrast, the federal government has done nothing of similar
magnitude regarding claims related to the Armenian Genocide. '91 The Ex-
ecutive's supposedly vigorous opposition to upsetting Turkey has yet to
take the form of Executive Order, veto, or even mention in the State of the
Union Address where a President's complicity toward Turkish denial could
face even modest public scrutiny. Although the national government pur-
ports to have been steadily working toward improvement in Turkish-Arme-
nian relations, this appears to have focused on formal diplomatic
arrangements between the governments of Turkey and that of Armenia, a
former Soviet Socialist Republic that gained independence after the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union. Although a thaw in Turkish-Armenian relations
may perhaps someday include recognition, reconciliation, or reparations, to
date there has been no breakthrough or brokering of a deal in a manner
similar to Secretary Eizenstat's work related to the Holocaust. 96
395 In that sense. Professor Ramsey's excellent critique of Movsesian I, that it
would permit the Executive Branch to legislate by presidential decree, is a bit un-
derstated in that the Executive Branch brought the Judicial Branch to heel with far
less than a formal decree. Sec Ramsey, supra note 266, at 39. The Clinton, George
W. Bush, and Obama Administrations all made clear that they did not want Con-
gress or others to disturb Turkish sensibilities with the use of the words "'Armenian
Genocide." But, as reflected in the descriptions of the Executive's conduct in the
Movsesian decisions themselves, the U.S. Executive has been averse to asking Tur-
key to accept responsibility for the Genocide. Further, it remains difficult to see
why Turkey has any legitimate interest in thwarting efforts of U.S. citizens to col-
lect life insurance benefits from German insurers. Although Turkey is of course
upset about having its role in past atrocities highlighted by the language of a Cali
fornia law, the functional effect of Movsesian III is to permit foreign insurers and a
foreign government to negate a state law because of its rhetoric. In effect, the fed-
eral courts assist foreign entities in suppressing the speech of the largest U.S. state.
See supra text accompanying note 281 (discussing "'informal presidential
communications.").
3('11 A recent effort in normalizing relations was comprised of Turkey-Armenia Pro-
tocols, (officially known as the "Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Rela-
tions Between Republic of Armenia and Republic of Turkey") that were signed by
the Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers in Octoher 2009. Although the lan-
2012 STONEY ROAD OUT OF EDEN 105
Reduced to its essence, U.S. foreign policy on the matter is one of
"see no evil," 'speak no evil," "hear no evil" in that it seeks to avoid use of
the term "Armenian Genocide" by American lawmakers. In effect, the Ex-
ecutive Branch's policy on Armenian Genocide-related private law claims
is a non-policy that has essentially ignored the situation (relative to its ex-
tensive efforts regarding Holocaust-related claims) and focused primarily
on the inflammatory nature of the term rather than analyzing the insurance,
contract, banking, and fiduciary issues presented by litigation claims. De-
spite the national government's clear preference that the loaded word "ge-
nocide" not be used, the Executive Branch appears never to actually have
contended that there should be civil immunity for insurance companies and
banks that breached their obligations to policyholders and depositors.
Further, in Garamendi, the statute under attack was one of signifi-
cantly greater regulatory scope and state involvement than that at issue in
Movsesian. In Garamendi, California, as a state government acting in its
sovereign capacity, insisted that insurers provide information. In Movse-
sian, California merely provided a longer statute of limitations to a group of
litigants that it felt legitimately deserved more time to file claims due to the
extenuating circumstances of historical displacement. It was as if the state
had legislatively overruled a judicial decision with which it disagreed be-
cause it took an unduly strict approach to applying a limitations period.
Although the extended statute of limitations of course had potential for sig-
nificant impact (but only potential; it was not an imposition of liability), it
did not significantly involve the state as a state in the dispute. By contrast,
in Garamendi, the state was actively interacting directly with insurers in
imposing and enforcing regulatory obligations.
guage of the document would seem fairly innocuous to an uninformed reader, the
subtext ol the guidelines for normalization indicate a set of preconditions to further
dialogue. Among these preconditions was the establishment ol a commission to
examine "historical records and archives to define existing problems," and repeated
affirmations of recognizing territorial integrity. These preconditions are veiled ef-
forts to call into question and deny that the Armenian Genocide took place, and
further foreclose the possibility of territorial claims arising out of the Genocide.
Although the Turkey-Armenia Protocols were signed and have not been repudiated,
the document was not ratified by the either country's parliament due, in part, to
concerns about these preconditions. Nevertheless, it seems apparent that the Tur-
key-Armenia Protocols are not the equivalent of any formal understanding or reso-
lution between the descendants of the perpetrators and victims of the Genocide. See
Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between Republic of Arme-
nia and Republic of Turkey, Oct. 10, 2009. See also Armenia Suspends Ratification
of Turkey Deal, RFE-RL, Apr. 22, 2010, available at http://rferl.org.
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In addition, there was a non-trivial risk that disclosure by insurers
could spur further investigation and litigation, which would have under-
mined the U.S. government's quest for final resolution of the Holocaust
cases and global peace for the European insurers and governments that had
paid 10 billion deutsche marks to settle the claims. The defendants paid
these substantial sums and the U.S. became so involved in negotiations be-
cause they wanted the certainty and presumed political benefits of a suffi-
ciently fair resolution that was final. Although one may question whether
Secretary Eizenstat achieved a good deal, it was nonetheless the U.S. na-
tional government's official, approved resolution of the matter.
Supporters of the Garamendi holding could argue that permitting
the reporting requirements of HVIRA to stand, if it led to further claims,
would be the equivalent of state prosecution of former president Richard
Nixon in the aftermath of the pardon issued by his successor Gerald Ford.
That analogy may be a stretch, but no comparable assertions can be made
about allowing the Movsesian plaintiffs to sue because they caught a break
from the California legislature. Continuation of the Movsesian litigation
does not risk undermining any federally sponsored mass resolution of Ar-
menian insurance claims and does not subject Munich Re to repetitive
litigation.
To be clear: we agree with Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Garamendi
and believe that the HVIRA regulatory scheme requiring reporting by insur-
ers was not a sufficient conflict with the Eizenstat-brokered resolution of
claims. But it presented dramatically more federal-state tension than the
extended statute of limitations in Movsesian. Even if one finds Justice Sou-
ters majority opinion in Garamendi persuasive, there appears to us consid-
erable distance between the direct state regulation and extensive federal
settlement efforts in that case as opposed to the relatively nonintrusive ex-
tension of a limitations period regarding contract law claims on which the
national government has never taken a position.
In short, Garamendi, like the Holocaust statute of limitations cases
and the slave labor cases, seems clearly distinguishable from Movsesialn.
Although in our view all these cases are wrongly decided, Movsesian stands
out as the worst of the lot. One would hope that it represents the apogee (or
nadir) of judicial suppression of state law that displeases the U.S. Executive
Branch. The zeal of the Movscsiai I and Movsesian III courts for extending
Garamendi, a 5-4 decision, is particularly disheartening. While 5-4 deci-
sions are of course still binding law, the closeness of the Garainendi out-
come and the strength of the Ginsburg dissent (joined by the unusual
ideological coalition of Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas) bespeaks cau-
tion in the application of Garamendi, and logically suggests that it not be
aggressively extended to situations of less extensive federal and state in-
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volvernent and conflict. Molsesian I's expansion of the foreign affairs
power doctrine to strike down a standard fare state procedural law is the
equivalent of trumpeting BushI v. Gore 19 7 as the leading and controlling
equal protection precedent. -"I"
Under Movsesian I and Movsesian III, the test for applying the for-
eign affairs doctrine becomes one of whether the Executive Branch is upset
with the nomenclature used by state legislatures or is otherwise displeased
with state law. The fact that Turkey abhors the term "Armenian Genocide"
and that the President does not want to upset Turkey was enough to over-
turn an official act of a sovereign state legislature. Although tensions in the
Middle East and Turkey's strategic location require some concern over the
397 Bush \. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
318 Bush v. Gore is consistently criticized by commentators for adopting a novel
theory of equal protection (i.e., that continuing a recount of disputed ballots in
Florida would improperly discriminate against voters whose ballots were not sub-
ject to recount) and then stating that this novel (arguably strange and wrongheaded)
perspective could not be used as future precedent. Bush v. Gore is also routinely
criticized as both a poorly reasoned case and one that is result-driven and built on
political expediency and favoritism. See, e.g., ALAN DFRSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJLJS-
TICE: How Till SUPREME CouRT HIJACKED EI ('TION 2000 (2001); SAMUEL IS-
SA(IIAROFF IT A,\L. WHEN EIE rciIONS Go BAD: Tiii LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE
PRESIDENTIAL EiECTION OF 2000 (rev. ed. 2001); Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v.
Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOrRE DAME L. REV. 1093 (2001); Christopher Bry-
ant, Haste Makes Waste, 9 NEV. LAW. 18, 18-20 (May 2001); David A. David A.
Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, in Tii VOTE: BusFt. GORE, AND
THE SUPREME COURT 184-204 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001);
Peter M. Shane, Disappearing I)emocracv: How Bush v. Gore Undermined the
Federal Right to Vote or Presidential Electors, 29 FLA. STi. U. L. REV. 535 (2001);
Robert G. Kaiser, Slim Majority Raises Fear of Court Partisanship, WASH. POST,
Dec. 10, 2000, at A32 (quoting University of Texas Law School Professor Sanford
Levinson: "This looks like a group of five, hard-line, right-wing Republicans who
are willing to do anything to put their guy in office."). But see John E. Nowak &
Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law §14.31 and id. at 1096 (8th ed. 2010)
("While reasonable (or unreasonable, for that matter) persons may debate the wis-
dom and, indeed, legitimacy of the Court's ruling in Bush v. Gore, the legal issues
addressed by the Court in that case were fairly straightforward ones.") (footnote
omitted): RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADIOCK (2001) (taking fairly
charitable view of decision). See also ERWIN CHFMiRINSKY, CONSTIUTIONAL
LAW: PRINCIPLIES AND POLICIES § 10.8.4 at 897 (3d ed. 2006) (listing -'issues to
consider concerning" case that suggest error in decision); JEFFREY TOOBIN, Too
CLOSE TO CALL: THE THIRTY-Six DAY BATTLE TO DECIDE THE 2000 ELn("nON
(2002) (presenting an evenhanded account that nonetheless leaves the reader with
the impression that the Court erred and rushed to judgment).
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sensibilities of the Turks, giving this sensitivity and commitment to denial
of history an effective veto power over the actions of American states is a
frightening precedent that almost begs for Saturday Night Live parody.
"What's next?" one might reasonably ask. A state law providing
relocation assistance to Afghan refugees is struck down because the pream-
ble criticizes President Hamid Karzai? Funding for a Russian-American
museum is invalidated because it will include an exhibit on the arguably
totalitarian and allegedly criminal activities of former Prime Minister and
enduring power broker Vladimir Putin? Or because it contains an exhibit on
the Russia-Chechnya conflict? Perhaps state funded gifts or exchanges with
the Republic of Georgia would be in peril if the current federal government
policy toward Georgia were critical.
What about tort action arising out of alleged food poisoning at an
Afghan restaurant in the U.S. owned by a relative of Hamid Karzhai? 9 9 If a
Turkish national sued an American for defamation related to the Ameri-
can's suggestion that the Turk's ancestors were involved in the Genocide,
would the American defendant be precluded from raising a defense of truth
because to do so would offend the Turkish government's denial that any
such atrocity occurred? Surely, the sensitivity of U.S. -Turkey relations
would not support this sort of interference with the American legal system.
But the Movsesian I and Movsesian III decisions are essentially indistin-
guishable from these seemingly ridiculous hypotheticals.
Viewed only through the lens of private law and the American
commitment to enforcing contract rights, the rationale of Movisesian III is
dangerous because it arguably establishes a regime in which one's contract
rights-and perhaps other legal rights as well-vary according to the enti-
ties with which one has contracted or by which one has been victimized.
Seen in this light, Movsesian I and Movsesian III create something of an
'9" Not so far-fetched a hypothetical: one of President Karzhai's brothers reputedly
owns a popular restaurant in the Baltimore-D.C. area serving Afghan-style food.
Although the restaurant is reportedly excellent, it of course could become the sub-
ject of tort liability due to food problems, slip-and-fall lawsuits. wage-and-hour
disputes, discrimination or the like. The ability to sue this type of entity should not
hinge on whether the owner's brother or brother's government objects to the litiga-
tion. But decisions like Movsesian I and Movsesian III support such absurd results
by interfering with traditional state legal prerogatives because they pose the risk of
offending an ally and hampering U.S. foreign policy. See, e.g., Movsesian 1, 578
F.3d at 1052. 1060 (9th Cir. 2009) ("by using the phrase 'Armenian Genocide,'
California has defied the President's foreign policy preferences.") This quotation
from Movsesian I might be expected in a totalitarian society where Kangaroo
courts are controlled by dictators but seems oddly Orwellian coming from a U.S.
court.
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equal protection or due process problem. If your ancestors bought insurance
from a British insurer and died from a mugging in France, you have rights
under the policy. If they instead purchased insurance in Turkey from Ger-
man insurers, the beneficiaries are out of luck when the deaths as part of a
mass murder merely because of the historical accident of Turkey's pur-
ported importance to U.S. foreign policy. 4°10
C. Improving American Law by Giving Breathing Space to Private Law
Litigation Reslpoises to Human Rights Violations
1. The Increasing Problem of Excessive Judicial Deference to the
National Executive
Although Movsesian I and Movsesian III are great jurisprudential disap-
pointments, there is substantial case law taking a broad view of the foreign
affairs power that has resulted in the disapproval of several state laws that
simply touch upon matters of sensitivity to the U.S. Executive Branch and
the foreign nations with which it deals. Movsesian might therefore serve as
not only an example of problematic reasoning and application of precedent
but also as an example of larger doctrinal problems in the constitutional law
of federalism and separation of powers. Movsesian, like the Armenian Ge-
nocide insurance litigation overall, also illustrates the limitations of law
when component parts of the system are in tension.
In discussing a legal system, most focus is on courts. But whether a
legal system works well or poorly, all branches of government are usually
implicated. In the saga of the attempts to enforce the insurance policies
impacted by the Armenian Genocide, only the legislative branch appears to
have acquitted itself very well (although federalism has done better than
separation of powers in this doctrinal struggle in that the states have per-
formed better than the national government on this issue). The U.S. Con-
gress, although deferring to presidential requests to refrain from annoying
Turkey, has at least been willing to bring out into the open issues that have
400 One can, of course, argue thai the Armenian insurance plaintiffs had themselves
enjoyed special advantage because of the California legislation extending the stat-
ute of limitations. But this was thought necessary by the legislators only because
the defendant insurers and others had created a situation hindering and arguably
preventing the plaintiffs from making a timely exercise of their contract rights.
From this perspective, the California legislation is better seen not as a special favor
for Armenians but rather as a state's efforts to level the playing field so that a
gravely disadvantaged group of litigants is provided the opportunity to enforce in-
surance policy rights typically enjoyed by policyholders and their beneficiaries and
estates.
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long been swept under the rug by Turkey and its enablers. 401 State legisla-
tures have been willing to enact corrective or remedial legislation to assist
in allowing private law claims related to atrocities to have an airing in the
courts. Although California has been the clear leader, it is not alone. 4112
By contrast, the Executive Branch has to a degree been the anti-
justice arm of the government in that it has rather consistently lined up on
the side of foreign governments that have violated international human
rights and foreign banks and insurers that appear to have breached their
fiduciary and contractual duties to depositors. Ironically, the U.S. govern-
ment has done much to help these foreign commercial entities but compara-
tively little on behalf of domestic insurers such as New York Life, almost as
if the national government is discriminating in favor of aliens relative to its
own commercial citizens. To be fair, where the Executive Branch has got-
ten heavily involved, as in the Holocaust negotiations, it has sought and
achieved at least some recompense, justice, and sense of closure, albeit ar-
guably at the cost of preventing the American judicial system from running
its course, perhaps resulting in greater compensation to policyholders and
depositors. By contrast to the Holocaust litigation, the U.S. government's
involvement regarding Armenian insurance has been almost exclusively
negative-opposing even acknowledgment of the Genocide while offering
no affirmative efforts to achieve corrective justice for policyholders and
depositors.
The judiciary has a mixed record in this drama. Although cases like
Movsesian and Garamendi are troubling, neither decision was unanimous
and trial courts have divided on the issues. The decisions taking an exces-
sively broad view of the foreign affairs doctrine could be overturned wvith
the shift of even a few votes. For example, Judge Nelson's switch replaced
Movsesian I with Movsesian II (only to have this undone by the Court en
banc in Movsesian III). Justice David Souter, the author of Garamendi, has
been replaced by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
and Chief Justice Rehnquist, members of the Garamendi majority, have
been replaced by Justice Samuel Alito and Chief Justice John Roberts, re-
spectively. Justice Stevens, a member of the Garamendi majority, has been
replaced by Justice Elena Kagan, who may or may not share the views of
.to See Movscsian 1. 578 F.3d 1052, 1057-60 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing congres-
sional consideration of resolution recognizing and condemning Armenian
Genocide).
402 See Assicura/ioni Generali S. P A. Holocaust Ins. Litilo., 340 F. Supp. 2d 494,
501-508 (S.D.N.Y 2004) (striking down on pre-emption grounds Florida. New
York, Wisconsin, and California statues permitting Holocaust-related insurance
claims).
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the White House. 41 Notwithstanding stare decisis, there is some ground for
optimism that the Supreme Court of 2012 could take a less expansive view
of the Executive Branch's power to thwart state law than did the 2003
Garanenti Court. Further, the Court's 2008 Medellin decision appears to
have adopted a restrained reading of Garamendi. "'1
But whatever the ideological or political composition of the High
Court, serious consideration should be given to whether constitutional law
doctrine-like American politics generally-has excessively empowered
the Executive. Observers have noted a steady increase in executive power
during the past fifty years, one that appears to have gained significant mo-
mentum during the George W. Bush Administration, both because of Ad-
ministration efforts and the receptive social, political, and legal climate
created by the September 1 I terror attacks.40 1 Constitutional doctrine ceding
substantial authority to the President of course predates this era in that legal
constructs such as the act of state doctrine, the foreign affairs power, and
various abstention doctrines reflect self-imposed judicial limits on adjudica-
tive power. 40 6 But in recent decades, world events and greater executive
103 See Paul Kane & Robert Barnes, Senate Confirms Kagan as Justice; 4th Wo-
man Joins Court in 63-67 Vote; She is Unlikely to Shift the Ideology of the Bench,
WASH. POST., Aug. 6, 2010, at Al; Robert Barnes, Senators Working to Piece To-
gether Portrait of Kagan: No Long 'Paper Trail' Supreme Court Pick's Old Writ-
ings Dissected, WASH. POST., May 26, 2010, at A3; Peter Baker & Jeff Zeleny,
Obama Said to Pick Solicitor General for Court, N.Y. TiMiLs, May 10, 2010, at Al;
Sheryl Gay Stolbert & Charlie Savage, Justice Stevens Retiring, Giving Obama a
2nd Pick, N.Y. TIMI s. Apr. 10, 2010, at Al.
404 See Ramsey, supra note 266, at 33-37 (discussing Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S.
491 (2008) in comparison to Garamendi).
405 See CHARIiE SAVAGE., TAKEOVER: THn. RrURN 0; TIlE IMPERIAl PRESIDENCY
AND TilE SUBVERSION oti AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007) (describing aggressive
Bush administration efforts spearheaded by Vice-President Dick Cheney to expand
federal executive power in controversial and arguably inappropriate, excessive
ways).
406 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 383, at ch. 6: SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCI-
PLES OF INTRNATIONAL LAW 199-235 (2006): CHFMEPINSKY, supra note 383, at
§§ 2.8, 4.6. : JANIS. supra note 305. at 109-12: CHESTER J. ANTEAU & WILLIAM J.
RicH, MODIRN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 47.33-47. 56 (2d ed. 1997): Louis HEN-
KIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED S[ATI5; CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996):
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987): JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A NuISHkIEI 181-95 (7th ed. 2009) (describing the Su-
preme Court as more deferential in "the foreign arena" and stating that "While the
Court generally has reacted negatively to assertion of inherent domestic govern-
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exercise of power appear to have pushed the boundaries of these doctrines,
with courts tending to yield substantial ground.
For example, as previously noted, in Garamendi, the Supreme
Court for the first time granted deference to the executive and invalidated a
state law merely because the Executive was involved in the subject matter
area rather than because of treaties, compacts, executive orders, or docu-
mented international agreements. 407 With Movsesiaul, it is possible that
these doctrines have reached the point where any state or congressional
action that upsets the Executive regarding foreign policy matters is vulnera-
ble to invalidation by the courts. And, as the Armenian Genocide debates
demonstrate, the U.S. Executive could be seen by some courts as adopting a
"foreign policy position" merely by stating that it opposes certain legisla-
tive action and merely because another nation or entity 408 of sufficient stra-
tegic import finds particular words offensive.
mental powers, the claim of extra-constitutional national powers in external rela-
tions has received a far more sympathetic judicial response."). See, e.g., New York
v. United States., 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (refusing to decide if a representative of
foreign nation was proper party with whom President could negotiate treaty):
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (upholding validity of executive
orders nullifying contract judgments against Islamic Republic of Iran that were part
of negotiated agreement for release of hostages seized during 1979 takeover of U.S.
Embassy in Teheran); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1965)
(leading "'act of state" doctrine case in which Court supports Cuba in litigation
challenging Castro government's expropriation of property and recognizing federal
common law of foreign relations binding on states); United States v. Pink. 315 U.S.
203, 229 (1942) (finding a national executive compact with Soviet Union valid and
that conflicting state claims were extinguished by the compact): United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937) (upholding the same compact as in United
States v. Pink): United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.. 299 U.S. 304, 319
(1936) (upholding a congressional delegation of power to the President to ban arms
sales to foreign governments). See also ANTEAU & RICH, supra 392, at 653
("[clontroversies involving presidential and congressional handling of foreign af-
lairs have repeated been deemed 'political questions' not proper for judicial
review.").
407 See supra text accompanying notes 370-72. 381-82 (describing and criticizing
the Garatnendi decision).
408 The reach of decisions like Movsesia~t III and Garamendi seem to admit of no
reasonable stopping point. At least as we read the majority opinions in those cases.
the basis for Executive Branch opposition to legislation need not be concerned with
its impact on another nation but need only involve a person, group, or entity that
the Executive wishes to placate. For example, if a particular political party or im-
portant corporation or individual (e.g., arms makers, energy producers) disliked
state lcgislation, for any reason, the Lxecutive could conclude that national foreign
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Relatedly, the nation's courts have faced cases presenting the issue
of the degree to which the Executive Branch can seize and hold terrorism
suspects and establish separate incarceration and legal systems for them
outside the mainstream. Although courts have to a degree resisted broad
assertions of executive power, they have nonetheless provided substantial
deference? °9 One particularly egregious example is Arar v. Ashcrt-?ft.'
Plaintiff, a Canadian citizen, was on a vacation in Tunisia when called back
to work by his employer in Canada. Flying home, he sought to change
planes at Kennedy Airport in New York, only to be seized for questioning
because of alleged ties to terrorist organizations, a charge he denied.4 ' He
was questioned for two days by representatives of the FBI and the INS
without an attorney present before finally being given a cold McDonald's
meal to eat. He was told he could voluntarily go to Syria, his country of
policy militated against the legislation. And, under Movsesian III, the Executive
need not formally seek invalidation of the law. The mere Executive dislike for the
law or its terminology would be enough to invalidate the act of the states as sover-
eigns. In the Armenian Genocide litigation itself, it appears that Movsesian III
would have been decided the same way even if the basis of Executive Branch
concern was not the Turkish government's views but the views of banks, insurers.
or political activists who were thought important to the stability of Turkey and its
continued alliance with the United States. This is a very slippery slope that seem-
ingly has no end, save perhaps for the exercise of common sense on a case-by-case
basis. But in our view this type of ad hoc 'jurisprudence should have upheld the
extended statute of limitations which in and of itself had only the most modest and
indirect impact on U.S. foreign policy and did nothing tangible against the Turkish
government.
409 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 383, at § 4.6 (reviewing the development of doc-
trine generally and examining in particular judicial treatment of "Ip]residential
power and the war on terrorism" (§ 4.6.4) with particular focus on Hamdi v. Rum-
sfeld. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (5-4 decision holding that national executive may hold
American citizen apprehended in foreign country as enemy combatant, with con-
gressional authorization a key factor in upholding such action: government must
accord due process to person so held with notice of charges, "meaningful factual
hearing," right to respond. and right to counsel), Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426
(2004) (5-4 decision holding that federal court in New York lacked jurisdiction to
hear habeas corpus challenge to detention of American citizen seized in Chicago on
suspicion of planning terrorist act after being transferred to military prison in South
Carolina by way of New York), and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (6-3
decision holding that federal court may hear habeas petition by persons held at
Guantanamo, and cases concerning authority of military tribunals).
10 Arar v. Ashcroft. 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
"I Id. at 565 (Arar did admit to knowing at least one individual with suspected
terrorist ties but "continued to deny terrorist affiliations.").
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birth (he had emigrated to Canada years before). He refused, citing fear of
torture, and asked to go home to Canada or to be sent to Switzerland if the
U.S. would not let him return home.
The INS initiated removal proceedings. Arar was finally permitted
a phone call and through his mother obtained a lawyer, who was given
limited access to Arar with the U.S. giving "false information about Arar's
whereabouts." '4 1 After a week of being held in this Kafkaesque 413 limbo,
Arar was
taken to New Jersey, whence he flew in a small jet to
Washington, D.C., and then to Amman, Jordan. When he
arrived in Amman on Oct. 9 [nearly two weeks after he was
first detained at Kennedy Airport] he was handed over to
Jordanian authorities who treated him roughly and then de-
livered him to the custody of Syrian officials, who detained
him at a Syrian Military Intelligence facility. Arar was in
Syria for a year, the first ten months in an underground cell
six feet by three, and seven feet high. He was interrogated
for twelve days on his arrival in Syria, and in that period
412 Id. at 565-66.
413 We realize the term Kafkaesque is used so frequently that it risks clich6 status.
As of January 24, 201 l,"Kafkaesque'" or "Kafka-esque" was found in 606 U.S. law
review and journal articles in the LexisNexis database while there wcre 1,350 arti-
cles with references to Kafka. The term and most of the references, at least in legal
literature, pay homage to FRANz KAFKA, THE TRIAL (1925). in which the protago-
nist is arrested and processed without ever being informed of the charges against
him, nor having a fair opportunity to air the issucs, defend himself, and resolve the
matter on the basis of evidence. As a result, a proceeding that mocks values of
truth, the rule of law, justice, and due process is often termed Kafkaesque.
The facts of Afar, as reflected in the Second Circuit opinion, clearly qual-
ify as Kafkaesque. And throughout all of his legal travails, Mr. Arar has largely
simply been trying to achieve a day in court on the substantive merits of his claim
that U.S. officials illegally sent him abroad to be tortured in violation of his rights.
All of this is complicated, of course, by recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence
over the sufficiency of pleading. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Court ga'.e judges signifi-
cantly more authority to dismiss claims pursuant to Li o. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) where
the court found allegations of conspiracy or other legality insufficiently -'plausible.-
The decisions have been widely criticized in the academic community and there
have been some congressional efforts to overturn them. See, Arthur R. Miller.
From Conlv to Twombhl to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 60 DJKI- L. J. (2010): A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausible Pleadings, 49
B.C.L. Riv. 431 (2008).
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was beaten on his palms, hips, and lower back with a two-
inch-thick electric cable and with bare hands. Arar alleges
that United States officials conspired to send him to Syria
for the purpose of interrogation under torture, and directed
the interrogations from abroad by providing Syria with
Arar's dossier, dictating questions for the Syrians to ask
him, and receiving intelligence learned from the
interviews. 4 '4
Eventually, Arar was released and returned to Canada, 415 and in
2004 filed suit seeking damages from U.S. officials for injuries suffered as
414 585 F.3d at 566. See id. at 582 (Sack, J., dissenting) (providing more extensive
recitation of facts illustrating considerable indignity and injury inflicted on Arar).
415 In another ugly aspect of American foreign policy in the wake of 9/11, the U.S.
appears to have routinely lied to, and refused to cooperate with, its ally, Canada,
regarding its treatment of a Canadian citizen:
On October 20, 2002 [24 days after Arar's initial detention], Ca-
nadian Embassy officials inquired of Syria as to Arar's wherea-
bouts. The next day, Syria confirmed to Canada that Arar was in
its custody; that same day, interrogation ceased. Arar remained in
Syria, however, receiving visits from Canadian consular officials.
On August 14, 2003, Arar defied his captors by telling the
Canadians that he had been tortured and was confined to a small
underground cell. Five days later, after signing a confession that
he had trained as a terrorist in Afghanistan, Arar was moved to
various locations. On October 5, 2003, Arar was released to the
custody of a Canadian embassy official in Damascus, and was
flown to Ottawa the next day.
Id. at 566-67.
Lest some readers conclude that Arar was a terrorist who got what he
deserved, we hasten to add that the "confession" signed by Arar was almost cer-
tainly false and executed only as an expedient means of obtaining release. In view
of Arar s regular contact with Canada as a citizen-resident with a responsible "day
job" as a computer software engineer in good standing and earning a good income,
it appears logistically impossible that he ever could have snuck off to Afghanistan
long enough to receive even minimal terrorist training. See 585 F.3d at 587 (Sack,
J., dissenting) ("To lessen his exposure to the torture, Arar falsely confessed.
among other things, to having trained with terrorists in Afghanistan, even though
he had never been to Afghanistan and had never been involved in terrorist activ-
ity."), COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELA-
TION TO MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR:
ANALYSIS AND RE('OMMENDATIONS 190 (2006) (concluding that Arar's confession
was the result of torture). See also DAVID COLE & JULES Low.1L, LESS SAFE, LESS
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a result of his detention and interrogation in the U.S. and Syria, invoking
the Torture Victim Protection Act ["TVPA"] 416 and the Fifth Amendment
(via a Bivens action), 4 17 as well as a declaratory judgment that this rights
were violated. The defendants sought dismissal on personal jurisdiction
grounds (an argument rejected by the court), and based on the argument that
Arar's allegations of conspiracy were insufficiently compelling to make out
a claim under TVPA or the Constitution.
FRI+: WHY AMERICA iS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR 23-25 (2007) (describing
Arars ordeal): David Cole, He Was Tortured, But He Can't Sue, NEW YORK RE-
VIEW ()i BooKs Bi o(;, June 15, 2010, http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/
2010/jun/15/he-was-tortured-but-cant-sue/ (discussing U.S. Supreme Court's deci-
sion not to hear Arar's appeal).
The situation is perhaps made more sympathetic to the U.S. defendants
because it can be argued that all of this was Canada's fault. At least that seems to
be part of the majority's reasoning. "'I]t was, after all, Canadian authorities who
identified Arar as a terrorist (or did something that led their government to apolo-
gize publicly to Arar and pay him $10 million)." 585 F.3d at 580. Perhaps. But this
hardly required the U.S. to treat Arar like a bag of potatoes, notwithstanding that
that Second Circuit majority. id. at 580-8 1, raises a number of supposedly intracta-
ble dilemmas faced by the U.S. government officials, suggesting that if Arar was
not renditioned to Jordan/Syria, the U.S. might be forced to put a potentialk dan-
gerous man on an airplane of innocents bound for Canada. We find the majority's
view a little preposterous. If there was good authority to arrest Arar, he should have
been arrested. If the situation was uncertain, its exigencies may have supported
holding Arar without charges longer than would ordinarily be permissible. But we
see no justification for holding Arar incommunicado, without counsel, without
communication, and without a chance to substantively address the issue of whether
he was or was not a terrorist.
More important, even if Arar was a terrorist, he was in our view entitled to
a basic quantum of due process and decency during the arrest and interrogation
process. He should have never been arrested absent probable cause, been gi en
notice of the basic nature of charges against him, had access to an attorney and the
outside world, an opportunity to defend himself in front of a neutral magistrate on
both procedural and substantive matters related to his case. And. to state what we
wish were an uncontroversial position, he should never have been tortured.
016 28 U.S. C. §1350 et seq. (creating cause of action for damages by torture xic-
tims against any "individual who, under actual or apparent authority. or color of
law, of any foreign nation subjects an individual to torture.").
411 Sec Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S.388 (1971) (permitting implied private right of action under Constitution
against federal officers alleged to have violated a citi/en's constitutional rights in
case involving unlawful warrantless search resulting in arrest: Fourth Amendment
provides basis for violation).
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Although the court never flormally invoked the foreign affairs doc-
trine in the manner of Movsesian or Garmendi, the same type of undue
deference to federal officials and executi\e-driven policy decisions (regard-
less of their correspondence with prevailing legal norms) animates the Arar
decision.
Cases in the context of extraordinary rendition are very
likely to present serious questions relating to private diplo-
matic assurances from foreign countries received by federal
officials, and this feature of such claims opens the door to
graymail.
Should we decide to extend Bivens into the extraordinary
rendition context, resolution of these actions will require us
to determine whether any such assurances were received
from the country of rendition and whether the relevant de-
fendants relied upon them in good faith in removing the
alien at issue.
Any analysis of these questions would necessarily involve
us in an inquiry into the work of foreign governments and
several federal agencies, the nature of certain classified in-
formation, and the extent of secret diplomatic relationships.
An investigation into the existence and content of such as-
surances would potentially embarrass our government
through inadvertent or deliberate disclosure of information
harmful to our own and other states.4 18
Bypassing completely the issue of whether it is permissible for the
U.S. to kidnap a foreign national passing through the U.S. and send him to
an unwanted destination, the majority worries that providing victims of
such conduct with a right to litigate a cause of action for damages will
unduly "embarrass" the U.S. and foreign governments. Our view is that
418 585 F.3d at 578 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). As noted above, Arar is
doctrinally different than Movsesian in that Arar did not address alleged state law
conflict with the federal executive's power over foreign affairs but instead focused
on the availability of a Bivens action "in the context of extraordinary rendition,"
finding that Mr. Arar had no standing and that there could be no such claim for
"detention and torture" in Syria in the absence of congressional authorization as
this would constitute too great a judicial impingement on federal executive author-
ity. See id. at 563-65. Notwithstanding these doctrinal distinctions, we find Arar of
a piece with the unfortunate Movsesian I and Movsesian III decisions in that both
exhibit undue deference to the federal executive merely because an otherwise
seemingly justiciable case involves matter arguably touching on foreign policy.
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simply reading about the Arar episode embarrasses the U.S. (and Jordan
and Syria) in profound ways unlikely to be expanded very much by litiga-
tion. On the contrary, providing a full airing of Arar's claim and damages if
violations are proven would do much to rehabilitate the U.S., notwithstand-
ing that the government continues to fight hard to prevent Arar and others
from having the full adjudication promised by the American judicial
construct.
Arar is marked not only by the undue deference of the majority
(Judge Denis Jacobs joined by Judges Joseph McLaughlin, Jose Cabranes,
Reena Raggi, Richard Wesley, Peter Hall and Debra Livingston) but also by
strong dissents by Judges Robert Sack, Rosemary Pooler, Barrington Parker
and Guido Calabresi. 41 9 The dissents are marked by being highly cognizant
of executive prerogatives and the realities of foreign policy and terrorism.
The dissenters are hardly seeking a radical change in doctrine respecting
executive authority and cannot credibly be viewed as undermining the na-
tional executive or the war on terror- 211 But neither are the dissenters willing
to abdicate or unduly constrict the judicial function in hearing civil claims
419 The en banc Arar decision was unusual in that it included the participation of
four judges on senior status even though senior judges normally do not participate
in en bane decisions. Judge McLaughlin. as a member of the three-judge panel that
first heard the case, was eligible to participate in the en bane hearing. Judges Cala-
bresi. Parker, and Sack all assumed senior status during the course of the en bane
proceedings and were therefore eligible. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 46(c)(2) & 46(c)(2).
Judge Sonia Sotomayor became Justice Sonia Sotomayor on August 8, 2009 and
therefore was no longer part of the Second Circuit at the time of the November 2,
2009 Arar opinion. Judge Robert Katzman did not participate. See 585 F.3d at 562.
The personnel aspects of assembling the Second Circuit en bane also sug-
gest that decisions like Arar are perhaps even more likely in the future. Of the non-
senior judges ordinarily available for en bane review, only Judge Pooler dissented,
with six non-senior judges in the majority and Judge Katzman's views unknown.
Although Arar may be an aberration, it holds the prospect that the demographic
trend of the federal bench is one with younger/newer judges showing more defer-
ence to the Executive Branch than did their predecessors. In any event, plaintiffs
similar to Mr. Arar are likely to get even less support from this court in future
cases.
420 See 585 F.3d at 582, 605-10 (Sack. J.. dissenting) (noting that national govern-
ment interest may be protected by state secrets privilege where government can
demonstrate applicability of privilege later in litigation): id. at 610, 612 (Parker, J.,
dissenting) ("active management of foreign policy and national security is entrusted
to the executive and legislative branches"); id. at 626-27 (Pooler, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging precedent granting more leeway to executive branch in matters of
war and foreign policy): id. at 630, 634-39 (Calabresi, J.. dissenting) (suggesting
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for wrongdoing and injury.4 2' Putting the larger issue well, Judge Calabresi
viewed the majority decision as a jurisprudential disaster.
[B]ecause I believe that when the history of this distin-
guished court is written, today's majority decision will be
viewed with dismay, I add a few words of my own
more in sorrow than in anger.' Hamlet, act 1, sc. 2.
[The other dissenters] have already provided ample reason
to regret the path the majority has chosen. In its utter sub-
servience to the executive branch, its distortion of Bivens
doctrine, its unrealistic pleading standards, its misunder-
standing of the TVPA and of § 1983, as well as in its per-
sistent choice of broad dicta where narrow analysis would
have sufficed, the majority opinion goes seriously astray. It
does so, moreover, with the result that a person - whom we
must assume (a) was to totally innocent and (b) was made
to suffer excruciatingly (c) through the misguided deeds of
individuals acting under color of federal law - is effec-
tively left without a U.S. remedy ...
All this, as the other dissenters have powerfully demon-
strated, is surely bad enough. I write to discuss one last
failing, an unsoundness that, although it may not be the
most significant to Maher Arar himself, is of signal impor-
that legitimate government concerns in case can be addressed by invocation of state
secrets privilege during course of further proceedings).
"I See id. at 582-83 (Sack, J., dissenting) (majority reaches conclusion that Arar
has no Bivens claim "by artificially dividing the complaint into a domestic claim
that does not involve torture and a foreign claim that does.") and id. at 591-92
(criticizing majority for requiring Arar to name individual perpetrators, pointing out
that in Bivens itself, the defendants were "Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics"): id. at 610, 612 (Parker, J.. dissenting) (enhanced presiden-
tial role in foreign affairs "does not mean that executive and legislative officials are
left to adhere to constitutional boundaries of their own accord, without external
restraint. That is the job of the courts.") and at 613 ("The Supreme Court has re-
peatedly made clear that the separation of powers does not prevent the judiciary
from ruling on matters affecting national security, and that the courts are competent
to undertake this task."): id. at 623, 625 (Pooler, J., dissenting) ("Were the major-
ity's dicta the rule, there would be no explanation for the Supreme Court's decision
in Bivens in the first place."): id. at 630, 633 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) ("The na-
tional security concerns that the majority relies upon in its special factors analysis
are precisely those that the Supreme Court said must be avoided [in Christopher v.
Harbury, 536 U.S. 402 (2002)].").
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tance to us as federal judges: the majority's unwavering
willfulness. It has engaged in what properly can be de-
scribed as extraordinary judicial activism. It has violated
long-standing canons of restraint that properly must guide
courts when they face complex and searing questions that
involve potentially fundamental constitutional rights. It has
reached out to decide an issue that should not have been
resolved at this stage of Arar's case. Moreover, in doing
this, the court has -justified its holding with side comments
(as to other fields of law such as torts) that are both sweep-
ing and wrong. That the majority- made up of colleagues
I greatly respect-has done all this with the best of inten-
tions, and in the belief that its holding is necessary in a time
of crisis, I do not doubt. But this does not alter my convic-
tion that in calmer times, wise people will ask themselves:
how could such able and worthy judges have done that? 422
2. The Essential Role of Courts in Adjudicating Without Regard to
Political Pressure
Cases like Movsesian and Garamendi lack the immediate emotional punch
of Arar. The atrocities of the Holocaust, and particularly the Armenian Ge-
nocide, have faded considerably from historical remedy. 423 The cruelty in-
flicted upon Mr. Arar is closer in time, raw, and has been largely
memorialized, albeit with fictional license, in cinema.424 But these decisions
and others of their type are united by a disturbing judicial tendency to be so
422 585 F.3d at 630 (footnote omitted). Judge Calabresi defined "'judicial activism"
in "its literal sense, to mean the unnecessary reaching out to decide issues that need
not be resolved, the violation of what Chief Justice Roberts called 'the cardinal
principle of judicial restraint - if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary
not to decide more' PDK Labs., Inc. v. U.S. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (Roberts, J., concurring)." See id. at 630, n. 1. Whether Chief Justice Roberts
continues to practice what he preached as Judge Roberts remains subject to reason-
able debate. See Peter Baker, Obama v. Roberts, N.Y. TiSii s, Apr. 18, 2010, Week
in Review p. 1 (discussing view that as Chief Justice Roberts has spearheaded judi-
cial activism in favor of politically conservative policy preferences).
12.' In addition, Garamendi is sanitized to a degree by its focus on regulation and
disclosure, while Movsesian is about contract rights rather than a direct attack on
the perpetrators of the Armenian Genocide. See supra text accompanying notes
209, 256 (describing case).
424 The filn RINDITION (New Line Cinema 2007) largely presents the Arar situa-
tion but makes the victim an American citizen aided by his wife fruitlessly seeking
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skittish of interfering with the executive or doing anything that might em-
barrass the national government or its allies (no matter how stained their
human rights records) that it will not perform the core function of courts-
the adjudication of tort, contract, and statutory claims.1
To be sure, trials may have a political component and the evidence
adduced at a trial may lead to judgments with significant social impact or
may spur changes in the larger body politic. But this is not a reason to avoid
trials. Rather, it is a compelling brief for having judges do their duty and
adjudicate even uncomfortable and difficult cases. To cite an obvious exan-
ple, cases involving slaves hastened the abolition of the practice in both
England 4'' and America .' 7 This was not because of a judicial activism of
help f'rorn elected officials and introduces a fictitious (so far as we know) govern-
ment official who out of pangs of conscience assists the victim in escaping.
425 See 585 F.3d at 638 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (if extraordinary renditions per-
missible, it must be acknowledged that mistakes will be made in application. -[A]
civilized polity, when it errs, admits it and seeks to give redress. In some countries,
this occurs through a royal commission. In the United States, for better or worse,
courts are, almost universally, involved.").
[Arar's] complaint offers an exceptionally compelling basis for
relief, one that the majority repeatedly sidesteps: The charge that
government officials actively obstructed Arar's access to the
courts, violating core procedural due process rights. Any
court should be deeply disturbed by such allegations, especially
those backed by the factual detail presented here.
Id. at 622 (Parker, J.. dissenting).
421, See ADAM HocHSCInLD, BURY TIHE CHAINS: PROPHETS AND REBELS IN TIlE
FIGiIT TO FREE AN EMPIRE'S SILAVES 79-82 (2005) (describing the Zong case that
led to public furor over harshness of slavery and provided major support to aboli-
tionist movement in England). Like Arar, the situation in the Zong case made it to
the cinema. The film AMAZING GRACE (Bristol Bay Productions 2006) about Brit-
ish MP William Wilberforce, touches on the case as part of the mix of factors
leading to Wilberforce's successful political crusade against slavery. For a detailed
examination of the Zong case, see James Walvin, THE ZONG: A MASSACRE, THE
LAW & Tin. END OF SLAVERY (2011); Geoffrey Clark, The Slave's Appeal: Insur-
alfe and the Rise of Commercial Property in THE APPEAL OF INSURANCI; 52 (2010)
(Geoffrey Clark, Gregory Anderson, Christian Thomann & J. Matthias Graf von
der Schulenburg, eds.); IAN BAIUCOM, SPECTERS OF TIHE ATLANTIC: FINANCE CAPI-
TAL, SLAVERY, AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (2005).
427 See United States v. The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841) (providing that
escaped slaves arriving in U.S. need not be repatriated to slave masters or prospec-
tive owners), celebrated in the Steven Spielberg film AMISTAD (DreamWorks SKG
1997). provided substantial ammunition for American abolitionists.
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expanding the law or deciding more than necessary to resolve a dispute.
Courts in these cases were instead addressing the disputes before them on
the merits without undue regard for the consequences that might ensure.
This approach fits admirably within the legal profession's classic view of its
role. 428
When courts are too skittish about addressing such matters, the ju-
dicial function itself is seriously undermined and society itself is injured, to
say nothing of the individual litigants. Although judges have more obvious
responsibilities to the system than do advocates in an adversarial model of
litigation, the systemic premise in both instances is that members of the
legal profession will perform their tasks without the paralysis of undue sec-
ond-guessing as to the consequences, 429 particularly whether actions will be
unpopular or might impede career advancement4 311
Faced with this evolving expansion of executive power and con-
striction of adjudicatory power, courts (either alone or in collaboration with
12' For example, an oft-cited example of lawyer courage is Lord Henry
Brougham's statement, while defending Queen Caroline on charges of adultery,
that "an advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. [In serving the client, the lawyer] must not
regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others
[H]e must go on reckless of the consequences. though it should be his unhappy fate
to involve his country in confusion." See TRIAL OF QUiEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightin-
gale ed. 1821); S'rEPHI.N Gi.IRS, RIr(;ILATION OF LAWAYERS 23-24 (8th ed. 2009)
(reproducing quote). The express suggestion is that lawyers (and by implication.
judges) should not pull punches in the discharge of their duties out of personal or
political concerns. Implicitly, the Brougham dictum is a little tarnished in that it is
now widely viewed as "graymail'" of a sort designed to back the Crown off the
prosecution for fear that somc unflattering information about the King's personal
habits might surface. See GILLERS, supra, at 24 (suggesting strategy worked). See
al1So JANi RoBBINs, THE TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE (2006).
429 To be sure, courts deciding cases must give some consideration to the likely
operation of their precedents in practice. A court should legitimately consider
whether a doctrine is confusing, leads to excessive caution or recklessness, is costly
to apply, over-deters, and the like. But this consideration is quite different from
worrying about whether another branch of government will like the decision.
430 At the risk of being unduly cynical, the proposition cannot be discounted. Many
federal trial judges aspire to become appellate judges and many appellate judges
aspire (however unrealistically) to the Supreme Court. Any such promotions re-
quire the support of the Executive Branch. What begins as concern over unduly
intruding on the function of another branch can become a self-serving desire to
inake friends or avoid making enemies in that branch in order to increase the odds
of promotion.
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the other federal branches and the states) may need to rethink this entire
area of constitutional law. Two key concerns arise: federalism and separa-
tion of powers. Federalism is the shorthand term for the traditional Ameri-
can view that power is largely reserved to the states for governing most of
society's affairs absent specific constitutional authorization for national
government activity. Separation of powers refers to the concept that none of
the three branches of the national government (executive, legislative, and
judicial) may usurp power outside its sphere and that there are imbedded in
the Constitution checks and balances that impede the ability of any one
branch to gain undue dominance. 3 If judge-made doctrines of deference to
the executive in foreign affairs, war, terrorism, or other matters become too
broadly and aggressively applied, both federalism and separation of powers
(and perhaps other constitutional provisions)4 ' - are violated.
Movsesian I and Movsesian III, like Gararnendi, were setbacks for
the states in the ongoing federalism jousting that pervades much constitu-
tional law. And to an extent, it is surprising in that to a large degree, state
autonomy has enjoyed relatively wide support in the U.S. Supreme Court
during the past half-century -.4 3 But so, too, has executive power, in the con-
431 See NOWAK & ROIINDA, supra note 381, chs. 3-5, 8-9 (overview of federal
power in relation to states), ch, 7 (overview of separation of powers concept and
presidential and congressional relations): BARRON & DIFNES, supra note 390, ch. 3
(discussing federalism); ch. 4 (discussing separation of powers); CHuMERSINSKY,
supra note 381. 233-39, 312-26 (outlining federalism and separation of powers
concepts). As a practical matter, of course, the national government has great
power, particularly since the post-New Deal expansion of the scope of the Com-
merce, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses (which increased the ability of
courts to curtail state action violative of those provisions). The national govern-
ment's greater revenue raising abilities also enable it to achieve state cooperation
with economic incentives even where it may not directly regulate.
43_ For example, the Executive Branch policy of treating the words "Armenian
Genocide" as if it were a timid Harry Potter character mentioning "Voldemort" (see
J. K. RowiINC, supra note 293) could violate the First Amendment if it rose to the
level of a prohibition. For example, if the President issued an executive order bar-
ring use of the term, this would almost certainly violate the First Amendment's
guarantee of free expression. But in Movsesian I, the California legislature's ac-
tions extending the statute of limitations was invalidated because it contained the
term. See Movsesian 1, 578 F.3d 1052, 1057-59 (9th Cir. 2009). In effect, the Cali-
fornia legislature, the Governor (who signed the legislation), and the state itself
were punished for exercising their presumed rights to describe matters as they saw
them.
433 See NOWAK &, ROTUNDA, supra note 418, § 2.11 (Supreme Court decisions
invoking Eleventh Amendment provide significant immunity from suit in federal
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texts of both federalism and separation of powers.4 14 One explanation of
Garmendi is that in a heavyweight battle between states rights and execu-
tive power, the executive prevailed. Of course, defenders of Garamendi,
Movsesian I, Movsesiaii III, and like cases argue that they represent not
broad deference to the executive in all matters but only regarding issues
affecting foreign policy. But under Garamendi, Movsesian, and their prece-
dential allies, the concept of foreign policy has greatly expanded to include
traditional core state matters such as regulating insurance, 41 5 private con-
tracts, litigation, and dispute resolution.
court: § 2.14 (abstention doctrines used to avoid federal court adjudication of state
law or interference with state proceedings. See, e.g.. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Flor-
ida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Congress may not employ Commerce Clause to create
private rights of action and abroguate state immunity conferred by Eleventh Amend-
ment, regardless of whether relief is monetary or injunctive); Fla. Prepaid Post-
secondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (striking
down congressional Patent Remedy Act that would permit infringement suit against
states as violative of Eleventh Amendment immunity): Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman. 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment bars enforcement
of federal disability rights statutes against state agency in federal court)).
131 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 383, ch. 7 (discussing broad power gener-
ally enjoyed by President): CIIEMERINSKY, supra note 383, ch. 4 (same). See, e.g..
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 391-92 (2004)
(taking a broad, sympathetic view of executive privilege and overturning and re-
manding decision that would have required Vice-President to disclose interaction
with energy industry in policymaking); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749
(1982) (finding the President's "unique position in the constitutional scheme" and
separation of powers doctrine create substantial immunity protections for Presi-
dent): Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974) (broadly construing presidential pardon
power). But see Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (finding the President sub-
ject to deposition requirement in pending civil damages litigation): United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (recognizing the existence of executive privilege for
the President but requiring that it yield to demonstrated needs of valid adjudication
by the judicial branch).
135 The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011, provides that "the continued
regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the
public interest and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to
impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several
states." The Act was passed in response to United States v. South-Eastern Under-
writers Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), which overturned well -established precedent
removing insurance from the reach of federal commerce power. By enacting Mc-
Carran-Ferguson, Congress restored this status quo in which insurance was to be
primarily state regulated, including a general exemption from federal antitrust law
absent boycott, coercion or intimidation by insurers acting jointly in restraint of
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These cases also arguably run afoul of separation of powers con-
cepts in that they ecessively privilege the executive over the legislature in
matters that go beyond the common understanding of foreign policy and
certainly are far afield from the war power and protective mandate of the
executive that spurred creation of doctrines deferring to the President in
matters of this type. Again, Garanendi is problematic while Movsesian I
and Movsesian iI1 are appalling. Recall that in Movsesian I, a large part of
the 'evidence" of the national government position opposing any legislation
recognizing the Armenian Genocide was based on presidential opposition to
proposed congressional resolutions that would use the term and criticize
Turkey. 4- 6 Congress was never considering imposing any concrete or tangi-
ble action against Turkey.
In the face of presidential concern over formal recognition of the
Armenian Genocide, Congress backed down. But it remains clear that there
was (and presumably still is) substantial support in Congress for addressing
the Genocide and seeking recognition and rectification to the extent possi-
ble. Although these congressional sentiments never became positive law,
neither did the executive's misgivings. Under these circumstances, a rea-
sonable observer employing a sports metaphor might deem this a "no harm;
no foul" situation in which no blood was drawn. Unless the matter at issue
is one clearly sounding in direct diplomacy, war making, or protection of
the national population, the wiser judicial course would appear to be one
that gave little weight to the executive's opinions-or at least no more than
those of Congress, particularly where the opinions were "informal," such as
expressed in letters rather than executive orders or agreements with foreign
entities. By treating presidential and cabinet officer correspondence as the
equivalent of national "law" regarding the Armenian Genocide and related
matters, Movsesian I, Movsesian III, and the Judicial Branch too greatly
elevates the Executive Branch over the Legislative Branch.437
trade. See United States Dept. of Treas. v. Fabe, 598 U.S. 491 (1993); JERRY &
RICHMOND, supra note 346, at § 21; STEMP-I ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra
note 195, § 2.03[b].
436 See Movsesian 1, 578 F.3d 1052, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 2009). See also supra text
accompanying notes 234, 238-44, 246-59 (discussing Movsesian I).
117 Even if the President had issued a formal executive order or proclamation at-
tempting to bar a congressional resolution on the Armenian Genocide, it should not
have the force of law. See Ramsey, supra note 266, at 39 (noting that even Alexan-
der Hamilton, the founding father most supportive of a strong presidency, "did not
propose . giving the executive the power to change law by decree.").
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3. Determining the Degree of Deference Due
Despite its age, Justice Robert Jackson's famous concurrence in Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube '. Sawver,4 " remains instructive in this area. The Court
in Youngstown invalidated President Harry Truman's takeover of steel mills
during the Korean War, ruling that despite the exigencies of war, that this
affirmative action (taken by formal executive order, not cajoling or disap-
proving correspondence), exceeded the President's power.43 9 Attempting to
establish a matrix for assessing the dispute and others like it, Justice Jack-
son wrote
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum,
for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all
that Congress can delegate 440
When the President acts in absence of either a congres-
sional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or
in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congres-
sional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at
least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on
independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any ac-
tual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of
events and contemporary imponderables rather than on ab-
stract theories of law.44 1
When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its
lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitu-
tional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress
over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential
control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from
41 Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579, 634-60 (1952).
439 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, su/ra note 383, at § 6. 11 (b)-(c) (describing Youngs-
townv decision and opinions in the casc): CIiIIRINSKY. supra note 383, at 38-
42(dcscribing Youngstowt).
440 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634. 635-36 (Jackson, J. concurring) ("In these cir-
cumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to person-
ify the federal sovereignty. If this act is held unconstitutional under these
circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government as an undivided
whole lacks power.").
441 Id. at 635, 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at
once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinicd with
caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established
by our constitutional systen.442
Applying a similar approach to the application of the foreign affairs
doctrine to state laws alleged to run afoul of national foreign policy inter-
ests, courts should consider the degree of legislative-executive harmony as
well as the clarity, formalism, and tangibility of legislative and executive
conduct when assessing what constitutes the "national" position on an issue.
For example, regarding the Armenian Genocide, the Executive clearly
would prefer to accommodate the sensitivities of the Turkish government-
but Congress apparently would prefer to call out Turkey for its role in the
atrocity, but cannot summon the will to openly battle the President on this
issue. But neither is the President taking a strong or high profile position
adverse to Congress.
At the very least, the Executive acts without congressional support,
albeit with some arguable acquiescence, when it attempts to undermine
state law merely because it uses words disliked by a purported national ally.
But in view of continued congressional consideration of Armenian Geno-
cide resolutions and continued criticism of the White House position of
acknowledging no evil on the issue, one could argue that the Executive is
acting against the implied will of Congress and that its power should be
limited to the constitutional minimum even where foreign affairs issues are
concerned. Applying Justice Jackson's template, the most likely classifica-
tion is that on the issue of litigation related to the Armenian Genocide, the
Executive at best acts in the "twilight" area where the "imperatives of
events" and the practical problems of U.S. foreign policy must be weighed
in relation to traditional state prerogatives regarding civil litigation, contract
rights, and the like.
Beyond pandering to Turkish aversion to the word genocide, it is
not completely clear what the U.S. position is on the issue, and there exists
little in the way of formal or tangible declarations about the Genocide or
related issues. Certainly, neither the President nor Congress has stated it is
opposed to honoring insurance policies, bank accounts, or other financial
instruments under which the Genocide victims or their heirs and assigns
may hold rights. Neither has Congress or the President ever approved the
Genocide or suggested that merely letting bygones be bygones is a fair res-
olution of an episode that continues to torment victims and oppressors alike.
Against this backdrop, the errors of Movsesian I and Movsesian III are
442 Id. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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clear, while Garamendi is defensible, at least in terms of the degree of con-
crete involvement by the national executive.
Weighed against these factors of clarity, tangibility, unity, and firm-
ness of national position should be the rights of the states and the degree of
conflict actually presented by the state law or action in question. The Jack-
son concurrence in Youngstown dealt with separation of powers. Califor-
nia's extension of the statute of limitations for Armenian insurance claims
adds federalism to the mix-and in doing so weakens the case for deference
to the federal executive when the national executive opposes a duly enacted
law of the nation's largest state. Further, as discussed above, in Movsesian
the actual federal-state conflict was minimal and largely based simply on
the notion of Turkish offense should an American state use the dreaded G-
word when referring to Turkey's past actions against Armenians. Although
the state regulation struck down in Garamendi was more intrusive and more
in tension with national actions, it still was not much of a conflict, a factor
vindicating the Ginsburg dissent.
Further, in both cases, the state action in question was not some
frolic or detour into the diplomatic arena but instead was simple regulation
of private law litigation (Movsesian) and management of the historically
state-based regulation of a highly regulated industry (Garamendi). If Cali-
fornia had refused to respect diplomatic immunity for the Turkish ambassa-
dor or consulate or had levied a genocide tax on Turkish visitors to the
state, the situation would of course be different. But in both Garanendi and
even more so in Movsesian, California chose a path that attempted to, and
in our view did, honor the reasonable parameters of the foreign affairs doc-
trine. To the extent that the foreign affairs doctrine and other judicially cre-
ated attempts to accommodate the national executive prohibit such actions,
they raise severe federalism concerns.
4. Questioning the Need for Judicial Deference to the National
Executive
Although it is well beyond the scope of this article, the courts may also
wish to rethink entirely the conceptual underpinnings of the doctrines of
deference to the executive. One underpinning is the view that the nation
must speak with one voice. Gararnendi and Movsesian arguably achieve
this-but at the high cost of giving insufficient attention to separation of
powers, federalism, contract rights, fiduciary duty, and citizen access to the
courts. A second underpinning is the view that in matters of foreign policy
the executive is best positioned to consistently make better decisions (at
least better than Congress or the states) regarding national welfare in the
world arena. But the evidence of the past forty years provides little empiri-
cal support for this proposition.
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The Vietnam War was largely unsuccessful, consuming tens of
thousands of lives, billions of dollars, and ultimately failing to prevent
South Vietnam from being absorbed into a communist North Vietnam
-4 4 3
The Afghanistan invasion Succeed in rooting out al Qaida elements using
that country as a base, but the subsequent decade of occupation has been
costly in dollars and lives and appears primarily to have succeeded in prop-
ping up a corrupt government widely viewed as an ineffectual U.S. pup-
pet.444 The Iraq invasion of 2003 proved totally erroneous and unnecessary
according to the rationale advanced by its proponents 4-5 as well as raising
443 See GIOR;- C. HERRING, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: THE UNITtI STAFS AND
VIETNAMI. 1950-1975 346-48 (4th ed. 2002) (1979): RoiwRI S. M'NAMARA ET AL.,
ARGUMENT WiTlOUTr END: IN SEARCH OF ANSWIRS Y( THE VIETNAM TRAGEDY 1
(1999): STANE,,v KARNOV'. VIETNAM: A HIsroRY 9-11 (2d ed. 1997) (1984). The
Vietnam War was a sufficiently scarring experience for America that it continues to
be a substantial source of literature, almost all of it unflattering in the manner of
portrayal of U.S. involvement the experience of soldiers and society generally. See,
e.g., Sebastian Junger & Danielle Trussoni, The Vietnam Wars, N.Y. TIMEs BOOK
REVIEW (Apr. 4. 2010) (reviewing, respectively, KARL MARLANTES, MATIFERHORN:
A NOVEL 01 THE VIETNAM WAR (2010) and TAJANA SOLI, THEI LOTUS EATERS
(2010)).
444 See AIIMED RASHID, DESCENT INTO CHAOS: THE UNITED STATl S AND TIll
FAIl.URt 01 NATION BUILDING IN PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND ClNTRAL ASIA
xxxviI, 156 (2008); Laura King, Crucial Year Beginning fbr Ajghanistan, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2011, at AI (describing continuing difficulties in the Afghanistan
war): Robert D. Blackwill, Plan B in Afghanistan, 90 FOREIGN Arl AIRS 42 (2011)
("Current U.S. policy toward Afghanistan involves spending scores of billions of
dollars and suffering several hundred allied deaths annually to prevent the Afghan
Taliban from controlling the Afghan Pashtun homeland - with little end in
sight."); U.S. Department of Defense, Casualty Status. www.defense.gov/news/
casualty.pdf (1,445 casualties in and around Afghanistan as of Jan. 10, 2011, 10 a.
m. EST).
445 See, e.g., Russ HoYiF-, GOING 10 WAR: How MISINFORMATION, DISINFORMA-
TION, ANt) ARROGANCI; LI-I) AMRICA INTO IRAQ (2008): FRANK RIwH. THE GREAT-
EST STORY EVER SOLD (2005); James P. Pfiffner, Did President Bush Mislead the
Country in His Arguments for War with Iraq?, in INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAl
SI ,(URITY POLICYMAKING IN IRAQ: BRITISH AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 59-84
(James P Pfiffner & Mark Phythian eds., 2008) (assessing misleading and exagger-
ated claims of the Bush Administration regarding weapons of mass destruction and
links between Saddam Hussein, al Qaeda. and the September I I attacks): Mark
Phythian, Locating Failure: U.S. Pre-War Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass
Destruction, in AMERICA'S "WAR ON TERRORISM:- NEW DIMENSIONS IN U.S. Gov-
ERNMINT AND NATIONAL SECURITY (John E. Owens & John W. Dumbrell eds.,
2008) (stating "no WMD were found in Iraq, the threat was illusory rather than
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severe questions as to whether the United States was behaving properly as
matter of national morality. 446 With this track record, it is hard to imagine
imminent, and the United States has continued to pay a heavy price in blood, trea-
sure, and diplomatic stature for a course of action now widely regarded as unneces-
sary and counter-productive."); Dana Priest & Walter Pincus, U.S. 'Almost All
Wrong' on Weapons: Report on Iraq Contradicts Bush Administration Claims,
WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2004, at Al (describing chief U.S. weapons inspector's report
"that contradicts nearly every prewar assertion made by top administration officials
about Iraq"); S. Rtp. No. 108-301 (2004) ("Most of the major key judgments in the
Intelligence Community's October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE),
Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either overstated,
or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting. A series of failures,
particularly in analytic trade craft, led to the mischaracterization of the
intelligence.").
446 The prevailing norm in the U.S. is one eschewing attacks on others but rallying
strongly in the event of an attack. The U.S. response to the Dec. 7. 1941 Pearl
Harbor attack being perhaps the classic example. One of us is old enough to have
been fortunate to have taken classes from noted political science scholar Hal Chase,
a long-time member of the Princeton and University of Minnesota faculties. See,
e.g., Harold W. Chase, Federal Judges: The Appointing Process (1972). Professor
Chase, a former Marine (holding the rank of Brigadier General in the Reserve at the
time of his death in 1982), could never credibly be accused of advocating a "wob-
bly" foreign policy insufficiently realistic about the world or determined to protect
American interests. But he emphasized the practical limits on military and execu-
tive authority imposed by forms of government and drew confidence that the
American system would prevent undue aggression or adventurism in foreign policy
or military operations. "Democracies don't start wars," he frequently intoned with
approval, although he supported democracies ending wars (by vanquishing aggres-
sors) as necessary to support their national interests. As far as we have been able to
determine, Professor Chase's aphorism was, although of course subject to debate,
substantially correct until 2003 when the U.S. invaded Iraq, a country with which it
was not currently at war and which did not by any objective standard provoke the
invasion and occupation.
To be sure, Saddam Hussein behaved badly in his conduct toward U.N.
weapons inspectors-but most observers have concluded this was a ruse to create
concern over his possible nuclear capability in order to discourage Iran from adven-
turism in Iraq. With the great deference shown to President George W. Bush in the
wake of the September I I attacks (for which it is clear that Saddam and Iraq were
in no way responsible), America appears to have finally and conclusively falsified
Professor Chase's axiom. See generally Glenn Kessler, Hussein Pointed to Iranian
Threat, WASH. POST, JULY 2, 2009, at A I (describing Saddam Hussein's concerns
about Iran and denials of dealings with al-Qaeda): Pfiffner, supra note 430, at 59-
62 (describing lack of evidence linking Saddam Hussein, al Qaeda, and the Sep-
tember 11 attacks); S. Ri p. No. 109-33 1, at 110, 126 (2006) (finding lack of evi-
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that Congress or the states could do much worse if they were permitted to
conduct parallel foreign policy at odds with the preferences of the Execu-
tive Branch.
The Mov s.sia,, I panel majority was so focused on a formalistic but
broad application of the foreign affairs doctrine that it seemed not to appre-
ciate the almost comical irony of its data points used to demonstrate na-
tional policy forbidding states from even uttering the words "Armenian
Genocide." In opposing a proposed congressional resolution on the issLcs,
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and former Secretary of State Con-
doleeza Rice warned that if Congress passed the resolution, Turkey could
become so upset that it would refuse cooperation in the war effort in Iraq
that "could harm American troops in the field [and] constrain [ ] our ability
to supply our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan .... 4 7 In 2003, less overt but
apparent arguments were made to the effect that angering Turkey could
impede American effectiveness in Iraq, the Middle East, and Asia.4 8
After a decade of two costly military ventures that many regard as
ineffective and unnecessary (particularly the unprovoked Iraq invasion of
2003), cynics might be forgiven for wishing Congress had called Turkey's
bluff and that the Turkish response would have prevented the Iraq invasion
or forced withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. While no one in the Amer-
ican legal mainstream wants courts second-guessing the policy decisions of
the President (and no American anywhere wants to endanger U.S. troops),
neither does it seem wise for courts to expand judicial deference to the often
erroneous, incompetent, and perhaps deceptive conduct of the Executive
Branch so far above that accorded to Congress and the states. Hindsight is,
of course, usually 20-20 (except for blind ideologues)449 but the miscues of
dence that Iraq was involved in the September I1 attacks and noting Saddam
Hussein's primary goal to "bluff Iran about Iraq's WMD capabilities.").
447 See Movsesian 1, 578 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2009).
448 See id.
449 Of which there appears to be no shortage. In spite of the clear lunacy of
America's military adventure in Iraq, architects and proponents of the 2003 inva-
sion and war continue to be largely unapologetic about their role in the deaths of
both Americans and Iraqis. the destruction of much of Iraq, and the empowerment
of Iran, an avowed enemy of most or these supporters of the Iraq War. See, e.g.,
GEORGE W. Busmi, DECISION POINTS 267-70 (2010) ("As I record these thoughts
more than seven years after American troops liberated Iraq. I strongly believe that
removing Saddam from power was the right decision."); KARl ROVE, COURAGE
AND CONSEQUI NCE: My LIFE AS A CONSERVATIVE IN THE FIGttT 332-43 (2010)
(refuting claims that the war in Iraq was unjustified in chapter entitled "Bush Was
Right on Iraq"): BoB WOODWARm. STATE O[ DENIAL 488-90 (2006) (describing an
interview with President Bush reflecting his "habit of denial," particularly when
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the U.S. executive in the region in which Turkey is purportedly such an
important ally should give courts greater caution in giving the executive
carte blanche not only to make such military and diplomatic blunders, but
also to invalidate state law. In a nation that prides itself on federalism, de-
mocracy, and separation of powers, the strong form of the foreign affairs
doctrine advanced in cases like Movsesian I and Movsesian III is suffi-
ciently discomforting to merit retirement.
CONCLUSION
Despite the disappointments of Movsesian I and Movsesian III, the path of
the New York Life and Munich Re claims reveal both accomplishment and
frustration due to the practical and political limits of both litigation and
legislation for vindicating the rights of policyholders and beneficiaries.
More broadly, of course, the insurance litigation reflects both the potential
of the law for corrective justice and law's ability to fall short of that poten-
tial. Just as the insurance litigation had only limited success in accomplish-
ing its objectives, law has had only limited success in vindicating human
rights in the face of sufficiently ruthless regimes and the strictures of
Realpolitik.
It would be comforting to believe that an enlightened Turkey will
someday acknowledge both the Genocide's occurrence and confess error,
perhaps even providing reparations. Similarly, one hopes that either because
of a change in Turkey's position or a retooled U.S. foreign policy less
driven by oil, terrorism, and geopolitical concerns enhancing Turkey's
power vis-i-vis America that the Executive Branch would cease pandering
to Turkey's worst human rights impulses regarding its "shameful act.'-45°
Although the modern trend has generally supported human rights and
greater frankness in national assessments of past problematic behavior, pro-
gress is hardly a given. For some regimes and societies, national conscious-
ness appears to mean never admitting, never apologizing, and never
rectifying. If perpetrators of human rights crimes are sufficiently ruthless
questioned about Iraq and weapons of mass destruction): BOB WOODW\ARD, PiLAN
OF ATTACK 419-43 (2004) (reporting con\ersations with President Bush and mem-
bers of his administration concerning the failure to find \keapons of mass destruc-
lion and their continuing support for the decision to invade Iraq): John F. Burns &
Alan Cowell, At Iraq Inquirx, Blair QOers Regrets fr Loss (f Life. N.Y. TIMIs.,
Jan. 22, 2011, at A6 (describing former Prime Minister Tony Blair's expressions of
regret for lives lost in Iraq while remaining steadfast in his support for decision to
go to war).
450 See AKCAM, supra note 4.
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and unyielding, they may ultimately triumph over a body politic unwilling
to make hard decisions in the face of political and economic expediency.
American law, of course, has always aspired to something better.
American courts cannot right all wrongs of the world. They can, however,
use their greater isolation from the instant pressures of expediency to faith-
fully apply the U.S. legal system's own internal rules and norms to matters
clearly within their jurisdiction, such as breach of contract claims involving
contracts made by American companies (and foreign companies doing busi-
ness and earning money in the U.S.). When U.S. courts shirk this part of
their job description, they begin uncomfortably to resemble the puppet-like
judiciaries of totalitarian regimes. Deference to the U.S. Executive Branch
so great that courts refuse to apply state law because it contains terminology
disliked by the Executive may not descend to the depths displayed by Nazi
judges, 45' Soviet tribunals, or the kangaroo courts of Third World dictator-
ships-but it clearly slouches in that direction. And what begins with a
slouch can become eventual prostration.
451 See INGO MOLLER, HIrLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF TIlE THIRD Ricii
(Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1991) (noting the degree to which the German
bench was complicit in the rise of Nazism and suppression of political enemies).
See also Richard A. Posner, Courting Evil, NEw REPUBLIC, June 17, 1991, at 36
(reviewing IN(;O M(iLLER, HITI iR'S JUSTI'Ic: THE COURTS OF TIlIRD REI IC
(Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1991)).
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